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Abstract 
 
An insurance contract is a contract of utmost good faith. The nature of the 
insurance bargain makes the duty a commercial necessity. Duties of disclosure 
and representation, which were two fundamental components of the principle of 
utmost good faith, operate in different ways in England and China. The insured 
and insurer in these two countries bears distinctive good faith related 
obligations pre- and post-contractually.  
English insurance law exercise considerable influence in most common law 
countries and some civil law jurisdictions. The separation between utmost good 
faith and the duty of fair presentation, with the abolition of the avoidance 
remedy, under the Insurance Act 2015 could influence other jurisdictions to alter 
their remedies.  
This thesis examines the application of the civil law notion of good faith and the 
common law duty of utmost good faith. It covers the operation of insured’s pre-
contractual duties of disclosure and representation in both countries. The thesis 
considers the insurer’s duties as well as the continuing duties and the effect of 
utmost good faith taking in account the recent legislative changes on fraudulent 
claims and late payment. The thesis further examines the legal status of brokers 
and their disclosure duty in China and England. Finally, it also provides special 
considerations on consumers and micro-businesses.  
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Introduction 
 
I. Background 
Modern insurance in China has experienced transformation from an industry 
that was fully controlled by foreign enterprises, to a sophisticated and 
developed system that plays a significant role in international market. Insurance 
was introduced to China at the beginning of the 19th century as a by-product of 
the vicious invasion of foreign trade after the weak and corrupted the Qing 
government was defeated in the Opium War, and developed in that chaotic 
period. Thus, the Chinese insurance market was born with congenital 
malformations. Moreover, insurance legislation and monitoring and inspection 
measures were not brought in along with the import of insurance products. 
Consequently, foreign insurance entities gained exorbitant profits from China 
until the Country closed its door in 1949 – the year in which the new China 
announced its establishment. Since then, the Chinese government, for a long 
period of time, pursued a centrally-planned policy on economy, whereby all 
companies were owned by the state. In 1979, the central government made 
some significant changes on public policy which rocked the orientation of 
national economic development strategy. In conjunction with the Four 
Modernizations and the ‘Open Door’ Policy, China resumed its foreign trade and 
investment activities as of 1978. In recent years, China has achieved a 
spectacular success in its economic development and has come to play an 
increasingly important role in the world economy.  
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In 1995, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) introduced its first piece of 
comprehensive insurance legislation. Good faith was put on a statutory footing 
in the Insurance Act of PRC 1995 (known as “1995 Act” or “IAC 1995”) as a 
general principle. China is a civil law (also known as “continental legal system”) 
country. The principle of “good faith” under the 1995 Act is inherited from the 
civil law notion of good faith prescribed in the Contract Law of PRC and The 
General Principles of the Civil Law of PRC (now the General Provisions of the 
Civil Law,1 known as the first step towards adoption of a new Civil Code2). None 
of these pieces of legislation provides a definition of good faith. The principle of 
Good faith is a “pervasive” doctrine of contract law in civil law jurisdiction3 
infiltrating into all civil activities including all contractual relationships, whereas 
in common law, the duty works in its utmost form. However, English courts do 
not impose an overriding obligation of good faith to every type of contract. The 
duty of utmost good faith only applies in certain categories of contract, in 
particular insurance contracts. An insurance contract is a contract of utmost 
good faith, in which it requires a higher standard of good faith from both parties 
to avoid non-disclosure and misrepresentation by the additional obligation to 
disclose all material facts that would induce the insurers to underwrite the risk. 
                                                            
1 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China, No.66. The “General Provisions of the Civil 
2 Weihan YANG & Sha LUO, ‘Zhongguo Minfa Zongze Dansheng – Kaiqi “Minfadian Shidai”’ [General 
Provisions of the Civil Law of China Enacted, Start of the “Civil Code Era”] Xinhuashe (Beijing, 15 Mar 
2017), republished in the official website of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of 
China <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/rlyw/2017-03/16/content_2019204.htm> accessed 1 Dec 2017; also 
see Laney ZHANG, ‘China: First Step Towards Adoption of a New Civil Code’ The Library of Congress 
(Washington DC, 30 Mar 2017) <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-first-step-towards-
adoption-of-a-new-civil-code/> accessed 1 Dec 2017 
3 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good 
Faith (Law Com IP No 6, 2010) para 7.7 
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By contrast, the civil law notion is intangible.  
 
Due to historical reasons, Chinese insurance law reflects a blend of legal 
cultures, with Japanese and Western – in particular English insurance law, and 
more recently the United States – influence. Thus, the duty of utmost good faith, 
being a common law principle, is acknowledged and discussed by Chinese 
scholars in the insurance field, ensuring its’ status as the most important 
principle for insurance law. However, it is not enacted in insurance legislation. 
Further, recognition in China is made in the duties of disclosure and 
representation, which are two fundamental components of the principle of 
utmost good faith. Chinese academics hold the view that the doctrines of 
warranty, waiver, and estoppel are also parts of this principle. A question arose 
to the necessity of providing legal ground to the duty of utmost good faith in the 
Chinese legal system. In China, marine insurance is governed by Chapter 12 of 
Maritime Code of the PRC 1993 (the “MC 1993”), where the duty to disclose 
and the duty not to misrepresent, imposed upon the insurer and insured, are 
somewhat different, with duties set out by the IAC 1995 and three of its 
Amendments. Moreover, significant distinctions are found between tests in 
accessing materiality for marine and non-marine insurance contracts. The 
inconformity of laws causes serious problems in legal practice. Apart from that, 
to the best of my knowledge, to no extent that rules are distinguished between 
consumer insurance and commercial insurance. 
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II. Aims and Objectives 
This research focuses mainly on development of the insurance law in China in 
respect of the principle of good faith and the duty not to misrepresent, 
prescribed under the Insurance Act of P.R.China 2015 (the “IAC 2015”).4 The 
duty of disclosure under the MC 1993 will also considered as a comparison to 
the obligation upon non-marine insureds. The purpose of this research is to take 
the English and Australian approaches as references to analyse Chinese 
insurance law, marine or non-marine, in respect of the duty of [utmost] good 
faith and its legal operation. Thus, the Law Commission process is of significant 
importance due to its identification of the defects and its’ transformation of them. 
The Law Commission has aided in the introduction of the Consumer Insurance 
(Disclosure and Representation) Act 2012. In Australia, the law reform body has 
recently amended their Insurance Contract Act 1984, but with regards to 
consumers. Consequently, this thesis will examine whether Chinese law should 
be distinguishing between consumer and commercial insurance contracts. The 
new business regime of Insurance Act 2015 (the “IA 2015”) is discussed in 
detail. A minute analysis on broker disclosure is considered in a separate 
chapter, given that brokers place risks in the London marine market.  
 
The object of this thesis is to identify the weaknesses and defects in Chinese 
law, so as to develop a commercial presence akin to that of London, and to 
make it suitable for modern insurance market conditions. This thesis also aids in 
                                                            
4 Insurance Act of People’s Republic of China has been amended three times since it first enactment in 
1995, the latest amendment is  
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mutual understanding and the dispelling of prejudice and misinterpretation 
between Chinese and English law pertaining to the principle of [utmost] good 
faith. It is noted that the thesis mainly focuses on the application of the doctrine 
of [utmost] good faith, specifically in contract law. Therefore, the use of good 
faith in public sector of law will not be discussed in this thesis. 
 
III. Methodology 
This thesis is a comparative doctrinal legal research as a whole. Methodologies 
used in this research are law reform study, case study, and more importantly 
comparative study. Comparative study is widely used in various research areas 
and is a very important discipline in communication between legal systems, 
particularly in present culture due to the rise of internationalism, economic 
globalisation, and democratisation. Comparative law study is an academic study 
of separate legal systems, each one analysed in its constitutive elements. It 
appears today the principal purposes of comparative law are: to obtain a better 
understanding of the legal systems in effect; to perfect the legal systems in 
effect; possibly, to contribute to a unification of legal systems, of a smaller or 
larger scale. In relation to this particular thesis a comparison between the  
 
IV. Outcomes 
The nature of the insurance bargain makes utmost good faith a commercial 
necessity. However, this fails to provide significant basis for confidence that the 
common law principle would fully take root in China, although as mentioned 
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earlier the principle of utmost good faith is widely accepted by Chinese 
scholars. Now, utmost good faith and the evolutionary new duty of fair 
presentation are now “entirely independent and unrelated” principles under 
English law.5 The duty of fair presentation, building on case law approaches and 
the statutory duty set out by Marine Insurance Act 1906 (the “MIA 1906” or 
“1906 Act”),6 is clearly confined to pre-contractual stage. The format of the 
disclosure must be appropriate and “in a manner which would be reasonably 
clear and accessible to a prudent underwriter”.7  The nature of duty of full 
disclosure retained from MIA 1906 s.18, with an importance modification as to 
the remedy, re-enacted in s. 3(4)(a) of the IA 2015. In addition, the Law 
Commission provides to the insured a cushioning device – the s. 3(4)(b). 
Accordingly, the insured, who has failed to satisfy the strict duty set out in s. 
3(4)(a) but has nevertheless disclosed just enough information which would 
lead a prudent insurer to make further enquiries, which when answered, would 
reveal the material circumstances, might still comply with its duty of disclosure. 
It places an onerous duty on the insurers to ask follow up questions. 
Misrepresentation set out in s. 3(3)(c) of IA 2015 is a restatement of s. 20 of 
MIA 1906. There is a fair presentation of the risk where “every material 
representation as to a matter of fact is substantially correct, and every material 
representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is made in good faith.” 
Under the Insurance Act 2015, the objective test of materiality is  “…defined by 
                                                            
5 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-006 
6 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 6.5 
7 Insurance Act 2015, s. 3(3)(b) 
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reference to circumstance which would influence the judgement of a prudent 
insurer”.8 The IA 2015 has, for the first time, provided limited statutory guidance 
on materiality. The subjective inducement requirement was introduced on a 
statutory footing, as a separate concept, by the Insurance Act 2015, s. 8(1). The 
notion of requiring proof of inducement operates as a prerequisite to a remedy 
of avoidance rather than as the second limb of the test of materiality. Thus, 
there is no remedy until the insurer can prove that something different would 
actually have happened in underwriting terms had the duty of fair presentation 
not been broken. The remedy will be based upon that assumed outcome, albeit 
there is an automatic right of avoidance in cases of fraud or recklessness on the 
part of the assured.9 
 
None of these requirements appear in Chinese insurance law. In fact, there is 
no disclosure obligation resting upon a non-marine assured under Chinese 
insurance law. The insured’s duty to disclose and the duty not to misrepresent 
material information to the insurer in relation to marine insurance is governed by 
art. 222 of MC 1993. This Section is, to a large extent, a copy of s. 18 of MIA 
1906, although without remedy. The Supreme People’s Court of China (the 
“SPC”) clarified that the insurer refers to a prudent insurer in Art. 9 of the 
‘Answers to Practical Issues of Maritime and Admiralty Trials concerning 
Foreign Affairs’. By contrast, there is no clear indication made for general 
                                                            
8 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 6.5 
9 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-087 
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insurance contracts as to the identity of the insurer. Under IAC 2015, the pre-
contractual duty imposed upon non-marine insured is to provide honest 
statements in responding to specific enquiries made by the insurer. Failure to 
do so grants the insurer a right to rescind the contract. Information is material if 
it sufficiently influences the insurer’s decision on whether or not to take the risk 
or charge for a higher premium. That test is vague and equivocal. In 
comparison to the common law approaches, evidently that the phrase 
“sufficiently influence the insurer’s decision”, in its ordinary meaning, literally 
leads to the “decisive influence” conclusion, which has further been confirmed 
by regional courts – the degree of influence remain unclear outside these 
regions.  In the marine sector, many Chinese scholars are in favour of the 
“decisive influence” test10 due to its’ consistent with the general contract law 
principle that contracts can only be rescinded in cases of radical breach. 
Proofing of materiality does not entitle the insurer to a remedy. The breach has 
to be made intentionally or through gross negligence. In England, the insurer’s 
state of mind is also taken into account by IA 2015. The proportionate remedy is 
based on degrees of culpability of the insured. IA 2015 confines the automatic 
right of avoidance to deliberate or reckless breaches of duty. There has not 
been a sign of inducement under Chinese law. Considering the importance of 
that test, it might be the time for legislatures to think a step further from 
materiality 
 
                                                            
10 Tingzhong FU, ‘Re-study on assured’s duty of disclosure’ (2012) 1 Chinese Journal of Maritime Law 32  
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The IAC 2015 art. 16 is silent on whether the duty continues post-contractually, 
although art. 52 imposes a post-contractual duty on the assured to inform the 
insurer any significant change of risk. Differences between Chinese and English 
law in the context of increase of risk are considered in Chapter 7. Insofar as the 
civil law notion of good faith is penetrable, it might be able to determine that 
good faith continues after the contract is concluded. In England, The removal of 
the avoidance remedy from s. 17 of the MIA 1906 by IA 2015 s. 14 gives life to 
post-contractual duties. Utmost good faith has now been re-designated as a 
general “interpretative principle”.11 However the further operation of utmost good 
faith remains uncertain and will likely need to be tested in court proceedings to 
better understand how it will be interpreted and applied to different scenarios. 
The historic tangled ties between fraudulent claim rule and the duty of utmost 
good faith are now clear and coherent. The issue of fraudulent claims is dealt 
with in ss. 12-13 of the IA 2015. Therefore, the continuing duty of utmost good 
faith has no part to play in determining the remedies for the making of a 
fraudulent claim. Further, the matter as to late payment is now incorporated by 
implied term under s. 13A of the Insurance Act 2015, which was added 
subsequently to the Act by the Enterprise Act 2016, although the Law 
Commission had suggested that 13A liability should rest upon good faith and is 
intended to award a remedy of damages for a breach. This provision will 
importantly for the first time allow policyholders to pursue damages against 
underwriters for late payment. By contrast, In China, in performing of the 
                                                            
11 Insurance Act 2015, s. 14 
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principle of honesty and good faith, paying valid claims timeously is a primary 
obligation to the insurer. An insurer who fails to fulfill the obligation shall 
compensate the policyholder or beneficiary for losses incurred therefrom, in 
addition to paying the insurance amount or claim.  
 
The original formulation of the duty of utmost good faith in Carter v Boehm12 
indicated that the principle is bilateral. However, the MIA 1906 failed to expand 
the duty mutually, and was silent about the operation of insurer’s pre-
contractual duty of utmost good faith. China is in the same boat. The traditional 
view as to the origin of insurer’s pre-contractual duty rests upon the proposition 
that this duty is a demonstration of the mutuality of utmost good faith. Thus, in 
theory, the insurer owes a corresponding duty to represent material information 
to the insured. However, the obligation actually imposed by IAC 2015 art. 17 is 
for the insurer to explain to the insured the contents of an insurance policy, 
particularly clauses exempting insurer’s liabilities and obligations. Its legal 
objective and operational measure is highly consistent with the duty of 
explanation owed by the contract drafter under the Contract Act of PRC. Failure 
to perform the duties of prompt and clear explanation will lead to the exclusion 
clauses in question to be of no effect. The biggest problem about art. 17 is that 
it is lack of implementing rule. Hence, it becomes one of the most commonly 
disputed matters amongst all kinds of insurance disputes.13 In England, the 
                                                            
12 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 
13 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, 102. 
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corresponding duty of disclosure falling upon the insurer was affirmed by the 
case law, notwithstanding the remedy of avoidance nevertheless renders the 
finding of the insurer’s breach “worse than useless”.14 The ambit of the insurer’s 
duty of disclosure is confined to insured perils, and it does not extend to the 
legal meaning of contract terms.15 Again, the removal of the sole remedy of 
avoidance by IA 2015 s. 14 might be seen as a turning point. It is interesting to 
watch how English courts will react in the near future to this change on this 
point. 
 
The law on brokers in China is undeveloped, because, for a long time, brokers 
were technically unnecessary where the Chinese insurance market had been 
monopolised by the one and only insurance company, namely, the People’s 
Insurance Company of China (the “PICC”). The first generation of insurance 
brokers did not receive their approval from the CIRC until 1999.16 Before the 
role of brokers was introduced, in China, insurers used commission agents to 
solicit insurance agreements. The problem caused by the usual practice of 
commission agents has not been dealt with in Chinese law. English law used to 
permit insurers to avoid the policy for non-disclosure or misrepresentation in this 
circumstance on the ground that the insurer’s appointee may become the 
assured’s agent simply by taking the administrative role in filling in the proposal 
form, unless agents have actual or ostensible authorised to receive the relevant 
                                                            
14 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-040. 
15 ibid at 6-038. 
16 Hui LIN (ed), Bao Xian Zhongjie Lilun yu Shiwu [Insurance Intermediaries: concepts and practice] 
(Tsinghua University Press 2006) 85 
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information on behalf of insurers.17 That problem has been resolved by the 
adoption of CI(DR)A 2012 and IA 2015. Under the CI(DR)A 2012, insurers’ 
agents are treated as representatives of the insurers so that information 
received by them are deemed to be communicated to the underwriting 
department directly. Meanwhile consumers are no longer requested to volunteer 
material facts to the insurer, the problem will arise only where the broker 
receives a material fact but misstate it.18 In commercial cases, the issue is 
unlikely to arise concerning the custom of the market. Even if it, by any chance, 
dose arise, it should still resolve the problem “by treating knowledge of an agent 
as the knowledge of the insurer itself and thus not required to be disclosed” 
under Insurance Act 2015. More importantly, it is worth noting a significant 
change made on the duty of disclosure owed by brokers. The separate duty of 
disclosure set up in s. 19(a) of MIA 1906 was substantially abolished. S. 19(b) is 
now replaced with a duty of disclosure imposed upon the assured by IA 2015 s. 
3. The ordinary principle of agency applies. The insured is now deemed to have 
the same knowledge as the broker. 
 
In England, matters as to consumer insurance are dealt with separately in 
CI(DR)A 2012. The consumer can no longer be required to volunteer 
information but only to take reasonable care in answering questions posted by 
the insurer fully and accurately and ensure that the information is not 
                                                            
17 Biggar v Rock Life Assurance Co [1902] 1 KB 516; Newsholme Brother v Road Transport and General 
Insurance Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 356 
18 R. Merkin, ‘Consumers and Agency’ (2009) 21 ILM 4, 4 
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misleading.19 To preserve “a wide and flexible approach to the issue of what 
amounts to a misrepresentation” in line with the common law concept of a 
misrepresentation interpreted by the English courts, 20  the term 
“misrepresentation” is deliberately not defined by CI(DR)A 2012.21 The duty 
imposed by s.17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 is confined to the pre-contractual 
statement for consumer insurance contract. Whether or not a consumer has 
taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation will depend on all the 
relevant circumstances.22  Further, CI(DR)A 2012 s. 3(2) lists “examples of 
things which may need to be taken into account in making a determination”. 
However, this list is not exhaustive. The requirement of materiality set out in s. 
20 of the MIA 1906, was not preserved by 2012 Act.23 Instead, the specific 
underwriter must show that it relied on the misrepresentation and would have 
acted differently had they been in possession of all necessary facts. There is a 
three-part classification: reasonableness; deliberate or reckless breach of duty 
and careless breach of duty. CI(DR)A 2012 introduced the proportionate 
approach into insurance law: if the misrepresentation was “deliberate or 
reckless”, the underwriter may be entitled to avoid the contract and refuse all 
claims and retain premiums in most of cases “except to the extent (if any) that it 
would be unfair to the consumer to retain them”;24 if a misrepresentation is 
                                                            
19 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law Com 
No 319, 2009) para 4.7. 
20 ibid paras 5.50 & 5.52. 
21 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-31. 
22 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 3(1). 
23 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law Com 
No 319, 2009) para. 6.10. 
24 CI(DR)A 2012, sched 1, para 2. 
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found to be “careless” the remedy will depend on an assessment of the effect of 
the misrepresentation in compliance with the loss to the insurer; if the 
underwriter would have simply charged a higher premium had there been no 
misrepresentation, the underwriter will be entitled to “reduce proportionately the 
amount to be paid on a claim.”25 Unlike the current English position, in China 
consumer insurance is not separated as a distinctive issue from commercial 
insurance matters under IAC 2015. It might the time for Chinese legislature to 
start thinking the difference between these two types of insurance contract and 
the necessity to treat consumer insurance independently.  
 
V. Structure  
This thesis is made up of eight substantive chapters:  
 
Considering the abnormal start of modern insurance, it is necessary to 
introduce the development and structures of China’s insurance industry and 
legislative history of insurance law as well as legislative and judiciary system in 
insurance litigation in China. The matter is dealt with in the First chapter. The 
aim of that chapter is to delineate a full picture of Chinese insurance industry 
and a framework of courts and judiciary system so as to attain a deeper 
knowledge of the duty of good faith as a general principle under Chinese law 
from perspective of legal and cultural background.  
 
                                                            
25 CI(DR)A 2012, sched 1, para 5-8 
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Chapter Two makes comparison between the civil law notion of good faith and 
the common law duty of utmost good faith exploring substantial differences 
between these two norms. The remainder is composed of six chapters 
expounding hot discussion topics on controversial issues of utmost good faith. 
Comparisons made between Chinese and English law run through each part of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter Three concerns operation of the duty of fair presentation enacted in IA 
2015 – fruit of the English insurance law reform, including changed and 
unaltered elements of insureds’ duty to disclose and the duty not to 
misrepresent. It is interesting to compare and contrast the new duty with the old 
forms stated under the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  
 
Chapter Four covers both materiality and inducement. They are now separate 
concepts under English law. The duty of utmost good faith required reciprocity. 
Thus, insurer’s pre-contractual duties are given a particular consideration in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Brokers play a significant role in insurance industry. London is a “broker 
market”.26  In China, the absolute importance of brokers is beginning to be 
understood. Chapter Six deals with broker disclosure. Additionally, the legal 
status of brokers in China is examined in comparison with law reforms on 
                                                            
26 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018) 
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commission agents. 
 
Post-contractual duties, i.e. fraudulent claims and late payment, and the effects 
of utmost good faith are examined in Chapter Seven. In addition, this Chapter 
nevertheless includes the insured’s duty to notify the increase of risk to the 
insurer, being identified by Chinese scholars as a post-contractual duty of good 
faith, although English law does not treat these issues as of good faith and 
deals with them on the basis of contract.  
 
The Chapter Eight considers insurance law reform in the consumer context in 
England, including definition of “consumer insurance contract”, duty of 
consumer assureds, qualifying misrepresentation and the insurer’s remedies for 
breach under CI(DR)A 2012. 
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Chapter 1 Pursuing the Origin of Chinese Insurance Legislation 
 
1.1 Historical antecedent of insurance legislation in China (Pre-1911) 
The modern insurance legislation system in China reflects a blend of legal 
cultures, with Japanese and Western – in particular English insurance law and 
more recently United States (US) - influence. A commonly accepted view is that 
insurance was introduced to China in 19th century with the economic expansion 
of western capitalist countries. Considering insurance as a form of risk 
management, however, the origin of insurance can be traced back to ancient 
China. Early methods of transferring or distributing risk were practiced by 
Chinese traders as early as the 3rd millennia BC. These merchants travelling 
treacherous river rapids would cleverly distribute their wares across many 
vessels to spread the loss due to any single vessel’s capsizing. To prevent the 
total loss of any one shipment, the businessmen established “collective 
agreements” to share the economic losses of any vessel incurred from sinking, 
rapids, bandits, and pilferage.27  
 
Up until modern insurance was established in the late 17th century, different 
forms of insurance had been used substantively in various industries and 
societies worldwide. Insurance soon became far more sophisticated and a well-
developed industry in England. Meanwhile, insurance legislation was built up 
gradually. Before 19th century, the social, economic and cultural environment for 
                                                            
27 Jennifer A. Meyer, ‘Let the Buyer Beware: Economic Modernization, Insurance Reform, and Consumer 
Protection in China’ (1994) 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2125, 2136. 
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insurance was not so established in China for a long period of time owing to an 
under-developed economy; development of China’s modern insurance industry 
thereby became a course of learning and following the suit of western insurance 
system. After Qing government was forced to open its door to the outside world, 
China’s market including insurance market was dominated by foreign 
enterprises. During the later years of the Qing Dynasty, the government 
attempted a range of legal reforms, including establishment in 1904 of the 
Imperial Law Commission. The Commission was tasked with compiling 
information on legal models in other countries, particularly Japan and Germany, 
and drafting legislation for application in China. This process was one of several 
initiatives taken by the declining Qing government to utilise foreign knowledge 
and technology while preserving the essence of Chinese values and identity.  
China then started the overall transplantation of western laws including 
insurance law. Beginning with the traditions of the Qing imperial periods, legal 
initiatives of insurance under the Republic of China (est. 1911), during the 
revolutionary period, and after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
(the “PRC”), reflected tensions between domestic concerns with increased 
international influence. Chinese legal system was and still is affected deeply by 
moral principles of Confucian propriety. While much of the law code of Qing 
Dynasty focused on criminal punishments for anti-social behaviour, many kinds 
of ordinary social and economic activities were also addressed, including 
commercial law, contracts and property. Understanding Chinese insurance 
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legislation today requires an appreciation for its historical antecedents and 
contemporary contexts. 
1.1.1 Establishment of Modern Insurance Industry 
The origins of insurance can be traced back to the time of the Pre-Qin period.28 
Going back to the time of the Warring States, the so-called relief material 
reserve system was highly regarded by the slave owners as the result of low 
level of productivity and ability to resist natural disasters. The modem insurance 
industry, however, was not established until the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911), 29  China's last feudal dynasty. Initially, the Qing Dynasty pursued a 
‘closed door’ policy resulting in serious trouble both at home and abroad. The 
western powers, which had already completed the industrial revolution, later 
compelled the weak and corrupted Qing government to accept trade, thus 
introduce modem insurance to China in conjunction with Western 
commodities.30 
Guangzhou was previously the only trade port in China before the Opium War 
(1839-1842) between China and England. In 1805, the Canton Insurance 
Society was established by a British businessman in Guangzhou City. 31 
Insurance businesses, however, did not gain any popularity until the Qing 
government was defeated in the Opium War and was forced to open more trade 
ports. Consequently, a sharp increase of foreign trade resulted in a tremendous 
                                                            
28 Dongzhou (700 to 256 B.C.) had the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period. The 
Spring and Autumn period represents an early formation of the state of China.  
29 Fang SU & Jinliang XU, Bao Xian Xue [The Insurance] (Tsinghua University Press 2003-2004) 32. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ibid. 
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demand for insurance. Many foreign firms divested their insurance business 
and established separate insurance companies in China, which monopolized 
China's insurance market profitably for a long period of time.  
In May 1865, the Shanghai Yihe Insurance Society, a freight insurer, was 
established. Yihe Insurance Society, as the first domestic insurer in China, 
introduced insurance policies written in both English and Chinese for the first 
time. Policies were written only in English prior to that, even in China.32 In 
December 1875, the Insurance Promotion Bureau was founded, which ended 
the monopoly of foreign insurers for hull insurance. The emergence of domestic 
insurance society was supported by the Chinese/local business community. 
Subsequently, the Renhe Marine Insurance Company which known as China’s 
first marine insurance company, and Jihe Fire and Marine Insurance Company 
as well as other domestic insurance companies were set up by China 
Merchants. A year later, the first Chinese businessman's insurance company 
was founded in 1876, which marked – what accepted by most historians – the 
beginning of Chinese modern insurance industry 33  after the prolonged 
domination by foreign companies from the end of the Opium War in 1842 until 
the beginning of the 20th century. Chinese insurance industry retained this 
structure through World War II and the Civil War until the victory of the 
Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China 
(hereinafter the PRC). 
                                                            
32 Yide YE, Yue WU & Yuanren ZHU (eds), Zhong Guo Bao Xian Shi [Chinese Insurance History] (China 
Financial Publishing House 1998) 44. 
33 Ibid. 
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1.1.2 History of Insurance Legislation 
The history of insurance legislation in China is relatively short. Compared to the 
development of criminal law, Chinese insurance legislation, as mentioned 
previously, can only be dated back to the end of the Qing dynasty. In 1902, with 
the development of domestic insurance industry and the initiative of law reform, 
the Qing government drafted the “Qing Commercial Code” consisting of the 
Company Code and Business Code, which has been considered to be the first 
piece of legislation expressly stating general rules as to the insurance industry 
and insurance entities. After a further five years, Mr Rui XU drafted the first 
insurance bill, namely, the Insurance Code Draft Bill. Although the Bill was sent 
to the Qing Imperial government by the Minister of Transportation of the Qing 
Empire34 for approval, it failed to attract the Emperor’s attention and became ill-
fated eventually. 35  In May 1908, the Qing government invited a Japanese 
insurance expert to draft the Qing Commercial Bill including two insurance 
chapters: life insurance and loss.36 The Bill inevitably followed the Japanese 
legislation. The Qing Dynasty, however, collapsed before implementation of this 
law.37 Most of these acts and regulations focused on compulsory insurance, 
especially for the property of state institutions and for the property of ship, train, 
and airplane passengers.38  
                                                            
34 Mr Xuanhuai SHENG, a founder and the first president of the Red Cross Society of China, was 
appointed head of the Board of Posts and Communications until the dynasty fell in 1911. 
35 ibid 
36 Dongxia YANG, Zhongguo Jindai Baoxian Lifa Yizhi Yangjiu [The Transplant of Modern Insurance Law 
in China] (Law Press 2009) 57 
37 Yide YE, Yue WU & Yuanren ZHU (eds), Zhong Guo Bao Xian Shi [Chinese Insurance History] (China 
Financial Publishing House 1998) 46. 
38 Linbo Fan, ‘The Insurance Market System’ in J. Norton, C.J. LI and Yangxin HUANG (eds), Financial 
Regulation in the Great China Area: Mainland China, Taiwan and Hongkong SAR (Kluwer Law 
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1.2 Republican Period (1912-1949) 
After the downfall of Qing dynasty with the rise of Nationalists in 1911, the 
Chinese conducted their insurance business primarily to support foreign trade.39 
Until then, there were approximately 45 domestic insurers operating in China, 
where the majority were highly concentrated in trade ports in Shanghai. During 
the Republican era, the Chinese insurance industry was a thriving and growing. 
One of the most prominent foreign-invested insurance companies operating in 
China from 1912 to 1949 was the American International Assurance Company 
(Know as “AIA”), founded in Shanghai in 1919. The headquarters of AIA was 
moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 1949. 
As being the major watershed in transition from a monarchy to a republic, the 
establishment of the central government of the Republic of China in 1911 
marked the end of feudal dynastic regime. Later in 1929 and 1936, two 
subsequent attempts on insurance legislation were made by the central 
government of the Republic of China. The 1929 legislation was drafted by a 
French insurance lawyer appointed by the central government. That piece of 
legislation was not well received in the insurance industry and was ill fated 
because the civil war (1927-1937) broke out in China. The 1936 legislation that 
was in need of the industry to absorb principles and doctrines from the English 
insurance law was also aborted due to the Japanese war (1937-1945) and the 
civil war (1945-1949) after its enactment. 
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1.3 Development of Insurance Industry of the PRC (1949-Present) 
After the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China followed the steps of the 
previous Soviet Union and pursued a close door policy. Most large foreign 
insurance companies left China entirely after 1949, though some retreated to 
Hong Kong.40 Since then, insurance business in China was almost closed. 
There was no legislation on insurance law or other commercial law until 
economic reform in the late 1970s. The modern law and practice of insurance in 
the PRC only started to develop over the last 20 years. 
1.3.1 Prior to Economic Reform of the PRC (1949 – 1978) 
On 20th October 1949, the Financial Committee of the State Council formed a 
state-owned enterprise – People’s Insurance Company of China (the “PICC”) in 
Beijing,41 which was a leap for the insurance industry in China. PICC developed 
a mission to “protect state assets, ensure industry safety, promote materials 
flow, provide stability,” and, more importantly, to “collect surplus funds and 
enriching state assets”.42 In its first decade of operation, the PICC made a rapid 
and steady progress by setting up regional branches and offices in each 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. 43  Meanwhile, the 
government interfered in the operation of private insurance companies, and 
incorporated them one by one into the PICC, thereby private insurance 
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companies disappeared gradually from the market.44 Pursuant to the decision of 
the State Council, the PICC was designated in 1951 as the only institution to 
engage in mandatory insurance, i.e. mandatory insurance of state-owned 
enterprise.45 In addition, the PRC government started imposing restrictions on 
foreign insurance institutions that had a presence in China. These restrictions 
included prohibitions on remitting foreign currency and severely penalised 
companies that violated laws and regulations. As a result, all foreign-invested 
insurance companies withdrew their business from China in early 1952.46 
On September 15 1954, the first plenum of the first National People’s Congress 
(the NPC) – this year is the 19th NPC - was successfully held in Beijing, which 
marked the foundation of system of people’s congress. The First Constitution of 
the P.R.China (the Constitution 1954) was promulgated in this meeting 
empowering the NPC and the People’s Congresses at all levels that are elected 
to be the legislative bodies exercising “the legislative power of the state”47. After 
25 years of development, the NPC is deemed to be the “highest organ of state 
power”,48 which has the authority to enacts – or formally approves - legislation, 
and in addition has the power to elect, appoint or remove members from central 
state organs, for example, the President and Vice President, the Premier (the 
head of the State Council), the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court and 
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the procuracy, and a number of other organisations.49 The NPC is composed of 
a permanent body – the Standing Committee of the NPC50, the Chairmen’s 
Council, and nine different Special Committees51. The Standing Committee is 
empowered “to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement” and to 
enact and amend all laws except for those of which are enacted and amended 
by the NPC itself.52 The Standing Committee enacts amendments and provides 
interpretations for laws adopted by the NPC, with reference to the basic 
principles of these statutes.53 It is to be noted here that the NPC, and the NPC 
only, has the power to amend the Constitution.54  
 
Before entering the market-directed economy epoch, the economy in China was 
centrally planned by the government resulting all companies were owned by the 
state. The Chinese government, by virtue of communist doctrine,55 protected its 
entities and citizens through the People’s Communes System; thereupon other 
means of social security such as insurance was rendered meaningless.56 Thus, 
in the period of Great Leap Forward Revolution (1958-1962), the central 
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government applied the same policy to insurance industry.57 The suspension of 
domestic insurance businesses lasted for the following two decades. Since 
then, the PICC was incorporated into the People’s Bank of China (the “PBOC”), 
and became a department of the central bank.58 Although the PICC maintained 
operations in the cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou, its businesses were limited 
to foreign trade activities, primarily insurance cargo and hull risks.59  
1.3.2 From the “Open Door” policy to WTO (1979-2001) 
It was not until 1978 and the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party 
China Central Committee led by Xiaoping DENG that economic system reform 
and market-directed economic construction became the main theme of China’s 
development. Given that Chinese government could not entirely uphold its 
responsibility to assume insurance-type claims, it re-authorised the industry in 
1979. Subsequently, the State Council made its landmark decision on resuming 
insurance businesses by setting up insurance operational pilot zones in different 
areas throughout China, by which it changed the future of the industry. In 1980, 
the Chinese insurance industry was revived after twenty years of stagnation. 
After a further two years, the PBOC obtained the approval of the State Council 
to set up the Board for PICC, which was a milestone in corporate reconstitution 
in PICC’s history. On January 1 1984, the State Council separated the 
insurance function from the PBOC and officialy established, again, the People’s 
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Insurance Company of China. 
In 1980, when the insurance market was first reopened as part of the financial 
reforms, the total insurance premium was only CNY 640 million. In conjunction 
with the Four Modernizations and the ‘Open Door’ Policy, China resumed its 
foreign trade and investment activities. On one hand, the economic system 
reform vitalised Chinese insurance market and thus laid the foundation for the 
direction of future development of the industry; on the other hand, the ‘Open 
Door’ Policy exposed the infant industry to a fierce international competition, 
which brought great opportunities along with sharp challenges to Chinese 
insurers. In order to promote new public policies and facilitate foreign 
investment, the National People’s Congress passed “The Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Chinese Foreign Equity Joint Ventures” (the CFEJV).60 
Insofar as the PICC was the only authorised insurer in those days the CFEJVA 
1979 was passed, it guaranteed domestic market dominance. Along with good 
growth momentum of economic reform and further market developing, the 
monopoly was eventually ended in 1985 with the promulgation of the 
Provisional Regulations Regarding the administration of Insurance Enterprises 
(The Regulations). The Regulations, opening the gate to other domestic 
insurers intending to operate in China, nevertheless reserved certain lines of 
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insurance, such as foreign business projects, for the PICC. 61  Xinjiang 
Agricultural Insurance Company was subsequently set up in 1986.62 After two 
years, the China Merchant Steam Navigation formed Ping An Insurance 
Company, and then followed by the establishment of China Pacific insurance 
Company in 1991.63 Rapid growth in foreign-related insurance business and 
foreign-owned insurance companies could also be observed in this period.64 By 
1995, the PICC was in possession of nine foreign-related and overseas 
insurance institutions, some of which were holding companies or group 
companies. In 1996, the PICC was restructured as PICC Group, as a holding 
company for its life, property and reinsurance operation, named People’s 
Insurance Company of China Holding Limited.65 In October 1998, the State 
Council restructured PICC group, and three subsidiaries were renamed:66 
• PICC (Life) Insurance Company Limited 
• PICC Property Insurance Company Limited 
• PICC Reinsurance Company Limited  
 
China opened its door to foreign-owned insurance enterprises from 1992. In 
September 1992, the PBOC first granted the American International Group 
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(AIG) a permit to sell personal life and property insurance in China’s largest city, 
Shanghai.67 In 1994, Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance Company, the biggest 
property and casualty insurance company in Japan, initiated its business in 
Shanghai. 68  Thereafter, foreign insurance business started returning to the 
Chinese insurance market in the form of foreign-owed companies, 
representative offices or joint ventured with local companies. By the end of 
1996, five foreign owned insurance companies and some 126 representatives 
and liaison offices from 77 foreign insurance companies were in operation in 
China.69  From 1992 to 2000, China gradually approved the re-entry of 16 
additional leading foreign insurers.70 Economic reforms in china have increased 
the foreign participation in Insurance industry in China. The government 
however was and still is heavily involved in the industry, although its role is now 
changed from an administrator to a regulator. 
1.3.3 In-depth economic reform (2002-Present) 
In recent years, China has achieved a spectacular success in its economic 
development and has come to play an increasingly important role in the world 
economy. China’s insurance industry has being one of the fastest developing 
industries in national economy. Since 2002, the average annual growth rate of 
China premium revenues was 17.3 per cent.71 By 2005, insurance institutions 
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had reached 100 and initially formed fair competition and common development 
market situation in which many kinds of organization forms and ownership 
elements coexisted such as state-owned holding (Group) company, joint-stock 
company, policy-oriented company, professional company, foreign insurance 
company, etc. From 2002 to 2005, China’s premium revenues rose by 8 
percentage points annually, higher than world average level, and in 2005 China 
premium revenues ranked the 11th of the world and occupied 1.8 per cent of 
global total premium revenues, increased by 0.4 percentage point than that in 
2002.72 By 2007, there were 110 insurance companies including 43 foreign 
companies which increased by 21 than 22 at the end of 2002. By December 31, 
2007, there were 2331 professional insurance intermediaries and 7 foreign 
ones. In 2007, total profits of national professional intermediaries were CNY 
194.962 million, increased year-on-year 96.22 per cent. Especially for insurance 
broker institutions, total profits in the whole year 2007 were CNY 220.53 million, 
increased year-on-year 104.74 per cent, to be the best level in history.73  
As a great potential and opening up market, China attracts international 
insurance capital extraordinarily, and many famous international insurance 
companies have arranged the businesses developed in China as an important 
strategy. For domestic insurance enterprises, it means keener competition. 
China insurance industry has entered into a rapid developing period, and the 
operation model of insurance industry is developing toward diversification. As a 
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result of WTO negotiations, China has agreed to completely open its financial 
services market, including insurance. The WTO accession has stimulated much 
additional reform activity to prepare domestic insurance market in China for 
vastly increased foreign participation and competition. In 2014, the State 
Council released a new set of guidelines on strengthening coverage, innovation, 
functionality, fundamental protection and competitiveness for the insurance 
industry. The Directive is viewed as a key factor towards regulating the 
Mainland insurance landscape. An improved regulatory regime coupled with 
increasing domestic wealth, has substantially booted the scalability of the 
market. In 2016, the growth of business scale hit a new high since 2008. Data 
shows that in 2016 the whole industry realised the original insurance premium 
income of CNY 3.1 trillion, a year-on-year increase of 27.5 per cent.74 This was 
the first time the China insurance market surpassed Japan ranked second in the 
world, driven by five years of growth accompanying with transformation going 
on in the environment and regulation mechanisms of the insurance industry.75 
This accelerated market growth has prompted more companies to enter the 
market. A BMI Research report states that the Chinese insurance market will 
remain one of the strongest in the region in the years ahead, in line with the 
rising disposable income levels of Chinese households. The report anticipated 
total life premiums to grow from CNY 1.5 trillion in 2017 to CNY 1.86 trillion in 
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2020.76 Most recently, as One Belt, One Road Initiative unfolds – China’s USD 4 
trillion strategy to boost economic cooperation and investment among 65 
countries across 3 continents – it has been hailed as one of the most ambitious 
infrastructure projects in the world, 77  China is seeking to provide a huge 
stimulus to economic growth and international trade, and also to insurance. 
Provided that more than 60 countries are to be connected by land and sea, the 
One Belt, One Road project could throw a new focus on both Chinese and other 
insurance market concerned – particularly in the area of marine insurance. 
Chinese insurers are being mobilised to pour the world’s biggest pool of 
premium income to help close a potential funding gap in the government’s 
multibillion yuan infrastructure build up along the old Silk Road.78 Meanwhile, 
many global insurance giants have already seen opportunities brought by 
diverse levels of political, credit and security risks along the 10,000 kilometre 
route and are ready to join the battles. 
1.4 Chinese insurance legislation framework and sources of law  
The legal system in People’s Republic of China does not trace its roots to the 
private-law system of Rome or to any religious basis. Unlike England, the 
Chinese legal system is based on the civil law system which is structurally 
similar to Germany and France. The legal history of the PRC begins with the 
                                                            
76 Ching-hoo HUI, ‘China’s Insurance Sector Growing at A Rapid Rate’ Journal of Investments & Pensions 
(Hong Kong, 8 Mar 2017). <http://www.asiaasset.com/news/ChinaInsurance_CH_DM_0706.aspx> 
accessed 29 Nov 2017  
77 Joe Blenkinsopp, ‘Sponsored: One Belt, One Road: Linking China to Europe’ Global Trade Review 
(London, 10 Aug 2017) <https://www.gtreview.com/supplements/gtr-insurance-2017/sponsored-one-belt-
one-road-linking-china-europe/> accessed 29 Nov 2017.  
78 Maggie ZHANG, ‘China to Use Insurers to Close the Funding Gap in Silk Road Project’ South China 
Morning Post  (Hong Kong, 22 May 2017) <http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-
finance/article/2095233/china-use-insurers-close-funding-gap-silk-road-projects> accessed 29 Nov 2017.  
57 
 
abolition in 1949 of all the laws of the predecessor state – the Republic of 
China. Since then, there was for many years little need for a formal legal system 
in many areas of national life, as the economy was largely subject to state 
planning. It was not until the economic reforms of 1978 that a true institutional 
legal system was introduced, mostly to deal with the demands of the growing 
economy. Over a decade ago, since China joined the World Trade Organisation 
(the “WTO”), in complying with a number of WTO obligations, more than 3000 
pieces of legislation79 have been enacted and amended at the national level 
alone including laws, administrative regulations, implementing rules and 
measures, and regional rules on different aspects, not to mention the multitude 
of administrative regulations and provincial and municipal enactments. As 
Western business moved into China, laws governing foreign-invested 
enterprises and joint-ventures were to be enacted as well as its implementing 
rule and measures to fulfil WTO requirements. 
1.4.1 A hierarchical structure of Chinese legal system 
The “Reform and Open Door” policy initiated the on-going transition to a market 
economy, thus had enormous implications for China’s legal development. The 
Chinese legislation can be broken down into several parts in terms the level of 
enforcement empowered to it. The hierarchic rank is as follow: 
• the constitution;  
• basic laws (statutes) are enacted by NPC and SCNPC;  
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• administrative regulations are promulgated by the State Council;  
• local People’s Congress regulations are enacted by different levels of 
local People’s Congress and their standing committees at the provincial 
level; 
• regional ordinance including Government Rules and Ministry Rules are 
made by local governments of provinces, central-level ministries, 
commissions, and agencies directly under the State Council.  
In addition, judicial interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court is not 
recognised as a source of law, although judicial interpretation carries substantial 
weight in legal practice. Judicial interpretation stands independently without 
subjecting the courts to any other legislation, and may to some extent alter the 
laws by wielding its discretion in interpreting the law made by NPC and 
SCNPC.80 International treaties ratified by China are directly applicable and 
prevail if they conflict with domestic law.  
Rules laid down in Constitution rank highest, which are followed in descending 
order by the rules of basic laws, government decrees and, lastly, ministerial 
orders and regulations issued by lower authorities. Lower-ranking rules must be 
in harmony with higher-ranking ones. Judges and public servants, in performing 
their functions, may not apply a rule given in a government decree or lower-
ranking enactment if it is contrary to basic law or the Constitution. In addition, 
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the conflict of rules is also solved by the concept of meta-rules,81 namely, a law 
governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a law governing 
only general matters (lex generalis);82 and the doctrine of “lex posterior derogat 
legi priori” – the younger law takes precedence of the older law. 
1.4.2 The new Constitution of the PRC 
Constitution, as the “mother-law”,83 is the “fundamental law of the state” and has 
supreme legal authority.84 The current Constitution of the PRC, adopted by the 
5th NPC in 1982, has been revised four times in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004 
respectively. Three prior constitutions from 1954, 1975, and 1978 have partially 
contributed to composition of the current Constitution. Under the Constitution, 
every citizen must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the 
laws such as power of the state lies with the people, equality of all ethnic 
groups, equality of citizens, rights to elect and be elected etc., while they enjoys 
the rights85. In addition to general principles of government and state affairs and 
the fundamental rights and duties of the people in China, the 1982 Constitution 
also delineates the national frame of government. Meanwhile, it furnishes an 
extensive legal framework for liberalising economic policies of the 1980s, which 
allows the collective economic sector not owned by the State to play a broader 
role and provides incentives for individuals to participate in economic activities. 
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All of that set up a firm foundation for further economy reforms in China. More 
importantly, the new Constitution bestows the constitutional basis for the 
considerable body of laws passed by the NPC in subsequent years permitting 
and encouraging extensive foreign participation in all aspects of the economy.  
1.4.3 NPC statutes and other enactments 
The first Insurance Act of the PRC was promulgated by the NPC in 1995 – the 
Insurance Act 1995 (known as ‘the Act’ or the ‘IAC 1995’) – in which it provided 
guiding principles and rules for the insurers and the insureds in the insurance 
contracts. The 1995 Act also codified the regulatory rules for insurance 
companies and insurance intermediaries in the PRC. After China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) in 2001, the Act was amended in 
2002. The amendments were limited to the regulation of insurance business. In 
February 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of 
the PRC promulgated a further amendment to the Act. Compared to the 
previous change to the Act, which focused on regulations pertaining to China’s 
WTO commitments, this amendment placed more emphasis on settling 
insurance contract issues arising prior to the amendment and on the prudential 
regulation of insurance companies.  
Insurance and reinsurance activities are mainly governed by the Insurance act. 
The legislation treats insurance and reinsurance activities as being largely 
synonymous. Although the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) 
has in recent years promulgated a few guidelines and measures solely 
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regulating the reinsurance business, there is no comprehensive statutory 
framework for the regulation of reinsurance activities in the PRC. However, it 
does not appear that the provisions in the insurance act regarding the rights and 
obligations between the insured and insurer under an insurance contract should 
be automatically applied to the reinsured and reinsurer under a reinsurance 
contract. Other than the mandatory provisions of the Insurance Act, it is subject 
to the General Provisions of Civil Law of the PRC and the Contract Law of PRC. 
In addition to the Insurance Act, specific contract principles and rules for marine 
insurance are codified in Chapter 12 of the PRC Maritime Code which came 
into effect as of July 1, 1993. 
Legislation is also created at local levels by local people’s congress of 
provinces, municipalities, autonomous areas and cities. The Constitution 
provides the structure, authority and duties of the local people’s congress in 
articles 95-111. All of the local regulations that are passed by these lower 
people’s congress shall comply with the Constitution, statutes passed by the 
NPC, and the people’s congresses above each of the local congresses in the 
hierarchy. 
1.4.3.1 The Insurance Act 1995 
On October 1 1995, the Standing Committee of the NPC promulgated the first 
Insurance Act of the People’s Republic of China, which is the original and most 
significant law that governs the Chinese insurance industry. The Insurance Act 
1995 was the first national legislation, providing a framework for understanding 
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China’s insurance regulations.86 This legislation consisted of 152 articles in 
eight chapters. The first chapter covered the purpose of the law, the definition of 
insurance, the scope of the law, and principles of the insurance industry. 
Chapter Two, pertaining to insurance contracts, consisted of three sections: (1) 
the general rules of the formation, amendment, and performance of the 
insurance contract; (2) property insurance; and (3) life insurance contract. 
Chapters Three through Five set forth the rules and requirements of insurance 
company administration and supervision, including licensing, scope of business 
management of premiums, liquidation, and continuous supervision. Chapter Six 
offered rules for supervision of insurance and related industries such as 
insurance agents and brokers. Finally, Chapters Seven and Eight included 
provisions regarding legal liabilities and sanctions.87  
1.4.3.2 The 2002 Amendment to the Insurance Act 1995 
China’s insurance industry changed drastically between 1995 and 2002. The 
number of insurance companies reached 53 by the end the 2002, and total 
annual premium income had risen from CNY 226.30 billion through the first 
three quarters of 2002.88  This growth resulted in an increasing number of 
insurance consumers and products, also generating demand for higher quality 
service and upgraded regulatory systems. With these changed objectives, 
several parts of the Insurance Law 1995 ceased to be applicable to the market. 
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Some original provisions became obstacles to reasonable operation in the 
altered environment.89 Soon after its establishment, the CIRC placed amending 
the Insurance Law of 1995 at the top of its list of priorities. Eventually, the 
People’s National Congress granted legislative approval to this amendment on 
October 28th, 2002. This amendment was expected to accomplish four 
objectives:90  
i. to sustain the reform and development of China’s insurance industry; 
ii. to strengthen supervision and regulation of the industry;  
iii. to standardize the regulation of insurance enterprises and business 
operations; 
iv. to fulfil pledges to adopt international practices made during the WTO 
accession negotiations 
1.4.3.3 The 2009 Amendment to the Insurance Act 1995 
For the purpose of balancing the rights and interests between the insured and 
the insurer, and facilitating prudential supervisions on insurance companies, on 
28th February 2009, the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress 
adopted the long-awaited amendments to the Insurance Law, which came into 
effect on October 1st, 2009. 91  The primary source of reference for this 
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amendment was American and British law.92 A number of new provisions were 
included and extensive amendments to existing provisions made, resulting in 
major changes to both substantive insurance contract law and insurance 
company regulations. Although the 2009 Amendment retains the structure and 
organization of the old law in the Amendment 2002 and the Insurance Act 1995, 
at least 80 per cent of the original articles were amended and the total number 
of articles increased from 158 to 187. The Amendment 2009 attempts to 
maintain a balance between the right of the insureds to settle their claims fairly 
and promptly and that of the insurance companies to effectively use of their 
resources. Compared to the Insurance Law Amendment 2002, the amended 
version expands the rights of policyholders while imposing heavier duties on 
insurance companies.93 The Amendment 2009 has improved various aspects of 
the original Insurance Act by enhancing the protection for consumers under an 
adhesion contract, clarifying the insurer’s right to rescind the contract due to the 
insured’s misrepresentation, and the addition of a requirement specifying the 
insurer’s duty to explain the contract.94 
Significant changes made in the Amendment 2009 included issues related to 
the insurance contract, the regulation of insurance companies, and the conduct 
of business. In particular, the insurance contract category, of which is divided 
                                                            
92 Kuan-Chun CHANG, ‘Commentaries on the Recent Amendment of the Insurance Law of the People’s 
Republic of China Regarding Insurance Contracts from the Perspective of Comparative Law’ (2011) 10(4) 
Washington U. Global Studies L. Rev.749, 750. 
93 Chongmiao Xu & Li Li, Zui Xin Baoxian Fa: Shiyong Yu Anli Jingjie [Newly Amended Insurance law: 
Application & Cases] (China Law Press 2009) 24. 
94 Huabo Yang, Jie Du Xin Baoxian Fa [The interpretation of new Insurance Act] (2009) 2 Journal of 
Baoxian Shijian Yu Tansuo <http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab4052/info99344.htm>  accessed 29 Nov 
2017. 
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into three sections i.e. general rules, personal insurance contracts, and property 
insurance contracts, includes articles pertaining to the insurable interest, 
applicants’ duty not to misrepresent, interpretation of the policy, timely notice of 
increased risks, insurance fraud and double insurance.95  One of the most 
important reforms of the Amendment is in the clarification of the timeline within 
which an insurance claim should be settled by an insurance company. Under 
the 1995 Act, there was no clear and specific deadline within which an 
insurance company should settle the insured's claims. There have been many 
complaints from insureds for lack of mandatory time limits and resulting 
insurer’s abuse of rights. The Amendment provides that an insured's claim shall 
be settled within a reasonably limited period of time.96 Pursuant to Article 22(2), 
when the insured files his claim with supporting documents, the insurance 
company may request additional information only once, if it believes that the file 
is not complete. Previously, insurance companies could effectively delay the 
claim process by asking the insured to provide additional documents again and 
again. The insurance company must complete its verification process within 30 
days after receipt of the insured's claim and shall make payment in 10 days 
after the agreement with the insured, unless otherwise specified in the 
contract.97 If the insurance company decides to turn down the insured's claim, it 
shall inform the insured of the decision with reasons within three days after the 
                                                            
95 Amendment 2009, Chapter two: The Insurance Contract, arts. 10-66. 
96 Amendment 2009, art. 23. 
97 Ibid. 
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verification process.98 
The 2009 revision has for the first time introduced incontestability provision into 
the Insurance Act, clarifying the insurer’s right to rescind the contract for the 
insured’s misrepresentation.99 When the insurer knows about the facts that the 
insured fails to disclose intentionally or negligently after the conclusion of the 
policy, it has the right to terminate the insurance contract within 30 days after 
the insurer becomes aware of the misstatement. Insurers are entitled to 
exercise their right of termination within two years after conclusion of the 
contract. In addition, the 2009 Amendment in effect shortens the statutory 
limitation from four years to two years within which an insured must file his claim 
from the day that he knows or ought to know the occurrence of the insured 
incident.100 
In respect of the regulations to insurance companies, the 2009 Amendment 
established additional licensing criteria for the establishment of an insurance 
company, and a process for the approval, fit and requirements of directors. With 
respect to continuous supervision, although the list of permissible investment 
objects has been expanded, the CIRC has also been granted the authority to 
take prompt corrective action against insurance companies when necessary. 
Furthermore, provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies were 
deliberated and adopted at the chairman’s executive meeting of the CIRC on 
                                                            
98 Amendment 2009, art. 24. 
99 Amendment 2009, art. 16 par.3. 
100 Amendment 2009, art. 26 par.1. 
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September 18th 2009 to confirm with and implement the Insurance Law 
Amendments.101 It focuses in particular on the amendments relating to insurable 
interest, the insured’s duty of disclosure, the interpretation of contractual 
clauses, double insurance, and insurance fraud.  
1.4.3.4 2015 revision 
The Insurance Act has been lately amended at the 14th session of the Standing 
Committee of the 12th NPC on April 24, 2015. The Act’s Amendment mainly 
covers issues involving operating and funding rules, supervision and 
management, and legal responsibility. No changes are made to the part on 
insurance contract law in this latest round of revising the insurance law which 
was last overhauled in 2009.102 Notably, in relation to insurance/reinsurance 
intermediaries, the 2015 revision abolishes the procedures to examine the 
qualification certificate of insurance agents and brokers. Insurers and the 
intermediaries must scrutinise and train their practitioners to ensure that they 
have good integrity and ability.103 Practitioners of insurance brokers and agents 
is required to take pre-service training for at least 80 hours in total. In addition, 
each practitioner must receive post-training and education for at least 36 hours 
per year, including at least 12 hours of legal knowledge and professional 
ethics.104 
 
                                                            
101 The CIRC Amended and Promulgated Provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies, China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission <www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab456/i112034.htm> accessed 29 Nov 
2017.  
102 Zhen JING, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017) 37. 
103 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, arts. 111& 122. 
104 CIRC Ordinance on the Supervision of Insurance brokerage Institutions, art. 30; CIRC Ordinance on 
the Supervision and Administration of Specialised Insurance Agencies, art. 29. 
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1.4.4 Administrative regulations 
The State Council is formally responsible to the NPC and its Standing 
Committee in conducting a wide range of government functions both at the 
national and at the local levels. The State Council is recognised as the 
executive body of the highest organ of state power. It carries out the day-to-day 
work of central government including adoption of administrative regulations and 
issuing governmental decisions in compliance with the Constitution and 
statutory law. Administrative regulations must be formulated in accordance with 
the Constitution and statutes by the State Council and its ministries and 
commissions and local authorities. Comparing to acts, administrative 
regulations are operable measures or previsions providing detailed guidelines to 
individuals and/or entities for a better operational result of the existing statutory 
framework. For the purpose of standardisation of the procedures for formulating 
administrative regulations and to ensure the quality of such regulations, the 
State Council promulgated the Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation 
of Administrative Regulations in 2001, which came into force as of January 1, 
2002.105  
After the promulgation of the Insurance Act 1995 and two of its amendments, 
the State Council issued a series of insurance regulations consisting of rules, 
administrative decisions, ordinances, methods, and notices covering various 
areas of insurance and reinsurance activities as well as market entry 
requirements of insurance companies. With an increasing participation of 
                                                            
105 Promulgated by Decree No. 321 of the State Council on November 16, 2001. 
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foreign insurance enterprises, in 2001, the State Council adopted the 
Regulations of the PRC on Administration of Foreign-invested Insurance 
Companies,106 which provides general administrative and registration rules for 
setting up a foreign-invested insurance company in China. The Regulations 
have been revised in 2013 by the State Council in accordance with significant 
changes on registered capital in the Company Law of the PRC Amendment 
2013. 
1.4.5 Implementation rules and other administrative regulations of the 
CIRC 
In November 1998, because of the rapid growth in the insurance sector in China 
and the lack of sufficient industry oversight, the State Council devolved 
supervision functions from the People’s Bank of China to the newly established 
CIRC.107 The CIRC is the primary governmental agency regulating insurance 
and reinsurance activities in the PRC, which examines and approves the 
establishment of insurance companies, supervises insurance business 
operations, investigates irregularities, and imposes penalties in the event of 
illegal operations of insurance enterprises. The CIRC is not a legislator, but 
under delegated authority issues administrative regulations, rules and orders 
from time to time to ensure that the Chinese insurance market functions soundly 
and steadily.  
                                                            
106 Promulgated by Decree No. 336 of the State Council on December12, 2001, and effective as of 
February 1, 2002. 
107 The Notice of State Council on Establishment of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, Guofa 
[1998] No.37. 
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As articles pertaining to the supervision and administration of insurance 
companies were still in the early stages of development, the CIRC promulgated 
the Regulation Regarding the Administration of Insurance Companies in 2000 
and subsequently amended it in 2005.108 The Regulation currently has seven 
Chapters with 105 articles, providing more detailed rules for supervision and the 
administration of insurance companies.109 On March 2004, the CIRC issued the 
Detailed Implementing Rules for the Regulations of the PRC on the 
Administration of Foreign-invested Insurance Companies. The Rules, which 
entered into effect on June 15 2004, provide further guidelines on the 
establishment and operation of foreign-invested insurance companies, launched 
into an elaborate explanation on the rules set forth in the Regulations of the 
PRC on Administration of Foreign-invested Insurance Companies. The Rules 
comply with China’s commitments under its World Trade Organisation Protocol 
of Accession to the World Trade Organisation. 
1.4.6 Judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China 
Formal judicial interpretations are issued by the judicial authorities, especially 
the SPC, from time to time to address uncertain legal issues existing in judicial 
practice. Whether judicial interpretation can be regarded as a legal source is 
debatable academically, but this rarely becomes a real issue in judicial practice. 
The Chinese court system has a strict hierarchical structure and, in such a 
system, a lower court would be likely to follow legal opinions, orders or 
                                                            
108 Regulation Administration of Insurance Companies (CIRC Dec 22, 2005), 
<http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site45/tab2746/i21575.htm> accessed 29 Nov 2017.  
109 Ibid.  
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guidelines form the higher court; therefore, judicial interpretations are valued as 
an important as well as a practical legal source by the courts.  
The Supreme People’s Court has officially published three judicial 
interpretations on various issues of insurance activities. Interpretation I of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of the 
Insurance Law of the PRC (the “Interpretation I”) was published and taking 
effect not long after the Amendment 2009, which deals with insurance contracts 
made before the Amendment 2009 took effect but performed after that time. 
The Second Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues 
concerning the Application of the Insurance Law of the PRC (the “Interpretation 
II”) came into force on June 8, 2013. The Interpretation II clarifies a number of 
issues relating to insurable interest, duty of disclosure, and the insurer’s 
obligations to explain insurance clauses. In addition to these two judicial 
interpretations concerning the applications of general requirements and 
principles, the Supreme People’s Court also published judicial interpretations on 
marine insurance, namely, the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues about the Trial of Cases concerning Marine Insurance Disputes 
(the “Marine Insurance Provisions”), which addresses disputes arising out of 
marine insurance in particular. The Third Interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Certain Issues concerning the Application of the Insurance Law of the 
PRC (the “Interpretation III”) came into force on 1 December 2015, which 
focuses on issues as to insurable interest and beneficiaries. 
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1.4.7 International treaties and the case Law 
Unlike common law jurisdictions, there is no strict precedential concept for case 
law in China. In theory, each case stands as its own decision and will not bind 
another court. In practice, however, judges of lower people’s courts often 
attempt to follow the judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court. In 
the absence of national laws and regulations for a particular point, international 
customs and practice may be referred to. English insurance law as a source of 
international customs and practice may therefore be considered by the PRC 
courts for reference when it is necessary. 
1.5 Chinese courts and judicial system in insurance litigation 
The judicial system of the PRC is stipulated in Art. 123-125 of Constitution, 
consisting of the people’s courts, the Supreme People’s Court, the people’s 
procuratorates, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, military court, and other 
special people’s courts, i.e. Maritime Courts, Railway Transportation Courts and 
Forestry Courts. Art. 129 refers to the people’s procuratorates as “state organs 
for legal supervision.” In 1983 the NPC amended the Organic Law of the 
People’s Procuratorates, which included an enumeration of the powers and 
functions of the procuratorates. The functions seem to set up an organisation 
which initially performs similar to a prosecutor in the United States, in that it 
oversees investigations by the public security organs and decides which cases 
will be prosecuted. However, the oversight of the procuratorates extends 
beyond investigation and trial, into supervision of the legal activities of the 
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people’s courts, the execution of judgments, and the activities of prisons. 
There is a hierarchy within the court structure from the top down: the Supreme 
People’s Courts, the Higher People’s Court, the Intermediate People’s Courts 
and the Basic People’s Courts. The Basic People’s Courts are comprised of 
3117 courts at county level, which are further subdivided into about 20,000 
smaller units referred to as people’s tribunals located in towns and villages. 
There are 409 Intermediate People’s Courts and 32 Higher People’s Courts 
located in the provinces.110 Litigants are generally limited to one appeal. The 
appeal judgment is final. Cases of second instances are often reviewed de novo 
as to both law and facts. Protests are filed by the procuratorate in criminal 
cases when it is believed that an error has occurred in the law or facts as 
determined by the judgment or order of the court of first instance. In civil cases 
the procuratorate does not possess a right to file a direct protest, but it can 
initiate adjudication supervision via a protest. Adjudication supervision refers to 
a type of discretionary post-“final” decision review, which may occur in certain 
situations in criminal cases. 
1.6 Principles of Chinese insurance contract law 
1.6.1 Insurable Interest 
The principle of insurable interest was firstly adopted in the Insurance Act of the 
PRC in 1995.111 Art. 12 of the 1995 Act provided that the insurance applicant 
                                                            
110 The official website of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China,  
<www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj> accessed 29 Nov 2017.  
111 Article 12 of Insurance Act 1995 defined insurance interest as interest legally recognised in the subject 
matter insured. 
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shall have insurable interest in the subject matter insured. This indefinite and 
vague provision was revised substantially in 2009 in order to make the law 
clearer more sophisticated. The Amendment 2009 adopted two different rules 
on insurable interest for property and life insurance. The insured must have 
insurable interest at the time of loss under a property insurance contract; 
however, in a life insurance policy the insurance applicant shall have insurable 
interest on the insured at the time when the policy is made. Otherwise, the 
policy is void. Huge debate then rises on what could constitute insurable 
interest. The vast majority hold the view of that, in order to constitute an 
insurable interest, the interest i) has to be measurable in value; ii) must be 
legitimate; and iii) needs to be definite. Accordingly, it is believed that three 
types of interest in property and liability insurance are required, which are 
current interest, expected interest and liability interest. Current interest refers to 
interest arising out of existing property rights, charges, mortgages, liens, 
intellectual property rights, and shareholders’ rights. Expect interest refers to the 
rights or benefits expected to incur from contractual relationships. Finally, the 
liability interest refers to liabilities to be incurred in times of breach of contract or 
tort.  
 
With the Second Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court on Certain 
Issues Concerning the Application of the Insurance Law of the PRC (the 
“Judicial Interpretations II”) came into force on June 8, 2013, the legal status of 
insurable interest of leases and carriers was clarified. Previously, the people's 
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court generally did not recognise that leasees or carriers have insurable 
interests in property being used, leased, or transported by them. Article 1 of the 
Interpretation provides where different parties have taken out insurances for the 
same property, the people's court will uphold their claim on the insurance claim 
to the extent of their insurable interest. The Interpretation formally clarifies that 
different parties, including leasees and carriers, have insurable interests in 
property even though they are not the legal owner and can purchase insurance 
for property leased or carried by them. 
 
The requirement of insurable interest for life insurance is stricter. Article 31 of 
the Amendment 2009 provides that insurance applicant only has insurable 
interest in i) the insurance applicant self; ii) their spouse, children and parents; 
iii) other family members or relatives who have a supporting relationship with 
the insurance applicant apart from persons in the proceeding category; iv) with 
whom the applicant has a labour relation. In addition, where an insured has 
agreed to be insured by the insurance applicant on his/her behalf, the applicant 
is deemed to have an insurable interest in the insured. However, the Insurance 
Act made it clear that, unless the insurance applicants are parent of the insured, 
anyone who is under ten-years-old cannot be insured against death by the 
applicants. The law also requires that in life insurance where payment is made 
against death of the insured, the insured amount must be agreed by the 
insured. Otherwise, the policy is void. Such policy must not be assigned or 
mortgaged without the consent of the insured unless the insurance applicant is 
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the parent of the minor being insured.  
1.6.2 [Utmost] good faith 
The PRC insurance law acknowledges the principle of utmost good faith in 
theory. However, neither the Insurance Act nor Maritime Code provides any 
provision on the principle. The contents of the principle are far from clear in the 
legislation although academics and judiciary refer to the principle as a matter of 
fact frequently to assist them in adjudicating difficult situations where the law 
has no clear rules. It has been widely recognised that disclosure and 
representation are two fundamental components of the principle of utmost good 
faith. Chinese academics somehow hold the view that the doctrines of warranty, 
waiver and estoppel are also counted to be parts of this principle.  
Instead of using the actual wording of utmost good faith, the Insurance Act 1995 
adopted concepts of disclosure and misrepresentation. The duty is a pre-
contractual duty, which only arises during the negotiation period of the 
insurance contract. The law is silent on whether the duty continues after the 
contract is concluded. The provision on the duty of disclosure was entangled 
and twisted with the duty not to misrepresent. The Insurance Amendment 2009 
has adopted substantial changes to the provision on such duties, which will be 
analysed in detail in the next two chapters. Pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Amendment 2009, now the 2015 Revision, when concluding the insurance 
contract, the insured is required to make true representations in response to the 
insurer's inquiries relating to the subject matter of insurance. The Judicial 
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Interpretation II limits the insured's duty as follows: 
i. The insured only needs to provide information limited to the scope and 
content of the insurer's queries. In other words, the insured only needs to 
provide information specifically requested by the insurer. If the insured and 
the insurer have different understanding about the scope and content of the 
inquiry, the insurer bears the burden of proving the scope of the inquiry. 
ii. The insured only needs to provide information that it clearly knows. 
iii. The insurer may not terminate the insurance contract if it has received 
premiums when it knew or ought to have known that the insured failed to 
provide truthful disclosure. 
The Insurance Association of China (the “IAC”) issued new policy model 
clauses designed to comply with the Amendment 2009, which are effectively 
pre-approved by the CIRC. The IAC has included provisions in its model 
wording which, in summary, provide that in concluding the policy, the proposer 
must make truthful representations concerning the insurer's enquiries on the 
relevant circumstances of the subject matter of the insurance or the insured 
(proposer's duty of disclosure). The insurer has the right to terminate the policy 
if the proposer deliberately, or due to gross negligence, fails to perform their 
duty of disclosure and that failure is sufficient to significantly affect the insurer's 
decision on whether to accept the risk; or increase the level of premium. 
By contrast, in marine insurance which is governed by Maritime Code of the 
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PRC, the duty is imposed upon the insured and the insured is required to 
disclose all the material information to the insurer even if it has not been asked 
for. 112  The rationale for the difference between marine and non-marine 
insurance in the duty of disclosure is not clear. the drafting of the marine 
insurance provisions in the Maritime Code were influenced by the English 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, while the Insurance Act may have been influenced 
by other civil law jurisdictions in Europe due to the history of the Chinese 
general insurance legislation as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. The 
principle of utmost good faith will be discussed in much more detail in later 
chapters together with English law from the perspective of comparative law.  
1.6.3 Causation 
It is generally accepted that the principle of proximate cause is a fundamental 
principle of insurance law in the PRC. The Insurance Act, however, has no 
provision on this and there are no sophisticated rules on what would constitute 
a proximate cause in practice. In the absence of such, English case law is 
sometimes referred to for guidance by both the judiciary and the practitioners. 
However, it may be purely a matter of common sense rather than law for the 
judges in some cases. Nonetheless, the popular view is that the proximate 
cause is the effective or dominant cause which led to the occurrence of the 
insured accident. It does not necessarily have to be the cause proximate in 
time. Over the years, Chinese academic writers have summarized and 
discussed three situations where the courts will need to determine the causation 
                                                            
112 Maritime Code 1993, art. 222. 
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issues: (i) multiple consecutive causes; (ii) multiple concurrent causes; and (iii) 
multiple interrupted causes. The problem will only arise when one of the 
multiple causes is an insured risk and another is not. These will be considered 
below. 
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Chapter 2 “Good Faith” and “Utmost Good faith”: Two Doctrines, or One? 
 
2.1 Status of the principle of utmost good faith in Chinese legal system 
In China, the principle of utmost good faith is widely acknowledged by insurance 
scholars, although the principle itself does not appear in Insurance Act of 
People’s Republic of China 2015, nor does in the Maritime Code 1993. IAC 
2015 art.5 states as follow: 
“The parties to insurance activities shall follow the principle of good faith 
in exercising their rights and performing their obligations.”  
The principle of good faith, reserved from the General Provisions of Civil Law of 
People’s Republic of China,113 stands in the Chinese legal system as one of the 
four fundamental principles running through the whole civil law and governing 
all civil activities. Neither the definition of good faith nor its scope is provided by 
the Act. Moreover, the contents of the principle are far from clear in the 
legislation. In practice, judiciaries refer to the principle frequently, as a matter of 
fact, to assist them in adjudicating difficult issues where the law is unclear. At 
common law, it is commonly recognised that disclosure and representation are 
the two fundamental components of the principle of utmost good faith, although 
there is no long the case under the new English business insurance regime of 
Insurance Act 2015. Chinese scholars further accept that the principle of good 
faith also consists of doctrines of promissory warranties, waiver and estoppel, 
                                                            
113 Adopted at the 5th Session of the Twelfth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 
on March 15, 2017, are hereby issued, and shall come into force on October 1, 2017, Order No. 66 of the 
President. 
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while as the English law currently stands, the basic rule of warranty is that, with 
some exceptions, a warranty is independent of all questions of materiality. In 
implementing the general principle of good faith, the art.16 of the Insurance Act 
of PRC 2015 adopts a duty for insurance applicants to honestly provide related 
information upon insurers’ request. A similar duty also appears in English law, 
under which an insureds is required to respond honestly to questions asked by 
their insurers. 
 
The principle of utmost good faith, expressed by the Latin maxim ‘uberrimae 
fidei’, originated from English insurance contract law case, Carter v Boehm.114 
The initial elaboration of the duty was introduced into common law by Lord 
Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, who had great influence on 
English mercantile law reforms in the eighteen century. The duty of utmost good 
faith serves as a fundamental doctrine of insurance law in many jurisdictions 
around the world, either civil or common law. However, amongst those 
countries that recognise it, the doctrine does not hold the same meaning nor 
does it operate in the same way. Meanwhile, it is also appears that the principle 
of utmost good faith is not recognised in some jurisdiction. Therefore, questions 
arise here are whether the general principle of good faith under Chinese law 
and the duty of utmost good faith in English law pertaining duty of disclosure 
and representation, refer to the same obligation? If yes, is the notion of good 
faith the same with the principle of utmost good faith? The remainder of this 
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chapter will discuss in detail the definitions of the concept of good faith, 
historically and contemporarily, and its operations in different legal systems, as 
well as its application in both Chinese and English contract law.  
 
2.2 Meaning of good faith 
Though the doctrine of good faith is regarded as vitally important ingredient in 
different areas of the law in most legal systems around world or even 
international conventions (i.e. CISG115), there is no agreement, among those 
countries that recognise it, as to what exactly constitutes its core principle and 
boundaries.116 It appears difficult to give it a precise, positive and unequivocal 
meaning. Each country has developed its own theory about good faith with 
nuance of application.117 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that different connotations 
of the principle have been employed in different sectors of law. This is to say 
that, in private law sector for example, the effect of good faith is perhaps aptly 
conveyed as to be faithful to the parties, fair dealing, honesty with no deliberate 
intent to defraud the others and exchange of equivalent value;118 or “by such 
metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’, ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s 
cards face upwards on the table’”.119 In contract law, the constitution of good 
faith based on an objective test and will depend on the nature of the relationship 
                                                            
115 The CISG fails to adequately define requirements of good faith. 
116 R. Hooley, ‘Controlling contractual discretion’ (2013) 72 CLJ 65, 74. 
117 Livia Mocanu, ‘Roman Marks to European Law of the Contracts Good-Faith’ (2011) CKS 382, 386-388. 
118 see generally at Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd 
(Trading as Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200; Berkeley Community Villages Ltd & Another v Pullen & Ors. 
[2007] EWHC 1330 Ch; Black’s Law Dictionary (Online Legal Dictionary 2nd edn), 
<https://thelawdictionary.org> assessed 9 Dec 2017; Tong Rou, ‘The General Principle of Civil Law of the 
PRC: Its Birth, Characteristics, and Role’ (Jonathan K. Ocko tr, 1989) 52(2) Law and Contemporary, 161. 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3995&context=lcp> accessed 29 Nov 2019. 
119 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433, 439 (Lord Bingham). 
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between the parties.120 When considering whether a party is acting in good faith, 
it is necessary to consider whether the conduct would be regarded as 
commercially acceptable by reasonable and honest people.121 Reference to the 
application of good faith, of which employed in civil litigation, is used against 
frivolous or malicious lawsuits and the abuse of process by litigants, such as 
intentionally delaying proceedings, falsifying evidence and the like.122 Having 
reviewed different developments of the principle, it appears that good faith is a 
notion which attracts great interests in contemporary law not only because of 
the function it performs, but also as a result of the uncertainties that surrounds 
it. It is, therefore, necessary to retrace the origins of the concept in order better 
to comprehend the difficulties associated with it. 
 
2.2.1 Good faith: an historical perspective 
The concept of bona fides has existed long before the development of Roman 
law123, and has reached its milestone in the period of Roman law. The Romans 
converted a universal social norm/philosophical thought (similar to the notion of 
bona fides), governing the relationships of its citizens, recognised by the ancient 
Greeks, into a basis for legal action.124 Good faith rights of action were initially 
designed to solve legal relationships, such as those between peregrines, for 
                                                            
120 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd (ITC) [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
121 ibid. 
122 Zhong Ren, ‘Minshi Susong Chengshixinyong Yuanze de Shishi’ [Application of the Principle of Good 
Faith in Civil Litigation – A Study of German Law Practice] (2014) 4, Fa Xue Jia, 166.  
123 W. Tetley, ‘Good faith in Contract, Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering’ (2004) 
35(4) JMLC 561. 
124 Edward J. Imwinkelried, ‘The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law: Is It Time to Write Its 
Obituary?’ (2009) 42 Tex Tech L Rev 1. 
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which the law had never created a right of action.125 Contracts of good faith were 
born on the basis of these good faith rights of action. In this type of contract, the 
judge’s interpretation is thus dominated by the notion of good faith.126  
 
Under the law of actions, a good faith contract was distinguished from a stricti 
iuris (formal) contract.127 A classic example of using good faith was a sale 
contract, in which the seller was required, by the Roman law, to inform the 
buyer with regard to the hidden defects guarantee and of any event that could 
disrupt its newly acquired right.128 The bona fides forces the judge to determine 
what obligations each party owes to the other.129 It is apparent that during this 
period, good faith allowed the judge to actively intervene in legal relations 
protected by good faith rights of action, especially in the determination of the 
amount of damages, and in the creation of new obligations founded on morality. 
The good faith right of action also allows the judge to determine whether one 
party’s behaviour is in keeping with the attitude of an ‘honest man’.130 It is not 
too difficult to see that good faith operated not as “a yardstick merely for 
interpretation”, but “as a standard to create an obligation binding the parties and 
giving the Roman judge ample discretion to deal with informal contracts.”131  
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Form the 12th century onwards, in addition to the enrichment of good faith, 
Medieval law has also developed a notion of aequitas. There was, however, on 
a practical level, confusion between these two concepts. While the Germans 
were treating the two notions differently, the French Romanists considered that 
good faith was “simply a manifestation of equity”.132 In practice, the functions of 
these two notions were largely overlapping because of the enlargement of the 
notion of good faith. 133  This historical confusion between “good faith” and 
“equity” thus caused problems, e.g. terminological distinction, in certain 
contemporary jurisdictions.134 
 
2.2.2 Definition of good faith 
“These words, good faith, have a very broad meaning. They express all 
the honest sentiments of a good conscience, without requiring a 
scrupulousness which would turn selflessness into sacrifice; the law 
banishes form contracts ruses and clever manoeuvres, dishonest 
dealings, fraudulent calculations, dissimulations and perfidious 
simulations, and malice, which under the guise of prudence and skill, 
takes advantage of credulity, simplicity and ignorance.”135 
The famous Roman orator Cicero has left this broad conception of good faith.136 
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Good faith has been described as a “protean” phrase,137 and the content of the 
duty is heavily dependent on context.138 Defining good faith is a “formidable” 
task.139 Many legal systems around the world have good faith requirements in 
their domestic law without a definition. The Sales of Goods Act 1979 (SGA 
1979) vaguely defines good faith as “honestly, whether it is done negligently or 
not”. It is appears that “honesty” is more of a “moral category” 140 rather than a 
legal term. Questions arising here are whether the purpose of the doctrine of 
good faith is to regulate standards of morality so as to strike the right balance 
between commercial certainty and limiting unethical behaviour, and how this 
standards of morality could be regulated, and finally to what extent. Additionally, 
it must be determined how the duty of good faith would apply. It can be a pre-
contractual duty to negotiate, a post-contractual duty to perform, or a method for 
interpreting commercial contracts.  
 
Good faith sometime is defined by what it is not. The concept of bad faith is 
used to show what is not good faith. The duty has been described vaguely in 
contract law in some jurisdiction, as a phrase with no general meaning but 
which operates to exclude various forms of bad faith.141 Good faith has also 
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been compared, among those counties that recognise it, with unconscionability, 
“fairness, fair conduct, reasonableness, reasonable standards of fair dealing, 
decency, decent behaviour, a common ethical sense, a spirit of solidarity, 
community standards of fairness” and “honesty in fact”, indicating that good 
faith is an “extremely versatile concept”.142 The various meanings of good faith 
stated above all involve some form of honesty in contracting, whether it is pre-
contractual or performance based. Contracting parties expect “the other will 
honestly and fairly perform his duties under the contract in a manner that is 
acceptable in the trade community”.143 Historically, it seems that good faith is 
simply a manifestation of fairness, honest belief and the absence of malice. The 
requirement of good faith is one of many ways to reconciling morality with the 
law. Good faith is probably not a principle that can be defined with any degree 
of precision,144 and this thesis does not seek to do so.  
 
2.3 The good faith obligation around the world 
The concept of good faith, known as the so-called “empire/king principle of the 
civil law”, has been asserted to be “one of the bases of our civilised society”.145 It 
is therefore widely used nationally and internationally. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that almost all international private law instruments make reference to the good 
faith doctrine. For example, the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
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International Sales of Goods (hereinafter CISG) 146  states that in its 
interpretation, regard is to be had to “the observance of good faith in 
international trade”.147 Further, the doctrine of good faith are commonly used for 
various purposes by the European Union, for instance, the Principles of 
European Contract Law as proposed by the Lando Commission contain general 
provisions according to which in exercising his rights and performing his duties 
“each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing”.148 The Draft 
Common Frame of Reference, prepared by the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code, also incorporates the use of good faith and fair dealing as a 
standard that parties must meet during transactions. This principle has now 
attracted even more scholarly attention since all member states of the European 
Union have implemented the European Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive) and will thus have to 
come to terms with a general notional of ‘good faith’ in a central area of their 
contract law.  
 
At a domestic level, many civil law countries around the world recognise the 
principle that contracting parties owe each other a duty of good faith in the 
formation and/or the performance or enforcement of the contract. For example, 
the Contract law of the P. R. China 1999,149 in which it provides that “the parties 
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shall observe the principle of good faith in exercising their rights and fulfilling 
their obligations”.150 Beyond the sphere of contract law, good faith affects almost 
all private law outside of the common law world. In China, the principle of good 
faith is enshrined in the GPCL 1986 as one of the basic/fundamental principles 
in the course of civil activities. Other jurisdictions such as the United States also 
recognise a general doctrine of good faith in commercial contracts. It is 
embraced in the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)151, which provided 
that “every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement” 152 However, the US standard fails to cover the 
negotiation stage. Meanwhile the courts in common law jurisdictions such as 
Canada, after a long process, has now recognised a general organising 
principle of common law duty of good faith.153 Further, it is generally understood 
that Scottish law recognised a broad principle of good faith and fair dealing.154 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that certain civil law jurisdictions, China for 
example, including German and Japan, have gone even further by overcoming 
the public law.155  
 
The requirement of good faith is evident in variety of circumstances in many 
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different legal and social traditions in various jurisdictions around the world. A 
more in-depth discussion of various models in contracting will be provided in the 
following section of this chapter in determining the main requirements of a duty 
to act in good faith. Despite the differences on face, the duty of good faith is at 
its core, very similar throughout world.156 The public law practice and other 
models outside contract law field will not be considered in this thesis as those 
scenarios are far beyond the purpose of this research.  
 
2.3.1 The Civil Law Concept of Good Faith 
In Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd, 157  Lord 
Bingham stated: 
“In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside 
the common law world, the law of obligations recognise and enforce an 
overriding principle that in marking and carrying out contracts parties 
should act in good faith. This does not simply mean that they should not 
deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recognise; 
its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical 
colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’, ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s card face 
upwards on the table’. It is in essence a principle of fair and open 
dealing.” 
Civil law regimes take a more expansive approach to the obligation of good faith 
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applying it to both the formation of a contract and its performance, whereas the 
common law jurisdictions prefer a narrower view that the duty of good faith is 
applicable only to the performance of the contract. The primary point of 
divergence between civil law and common law approaches to the good faith 
obligation is derived from their general philosophy of contract law: the civil law 
concept of contract is based on the relationship between the parties. It is 
acknowledged by the courts in civil law jurisdictions that the parties are legally 
bound at an earlier stage of the negotiation process;158 thus, the duty of good 
faith exists in pre-contractual stage, in other words, before the contract even 
exists between the parties.159 
 
2.3.2 The Common Law Approach 
The Courts in some Common law jurisdictions have been reluctant to find an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith during the preliminary stages of contractual 
negotiation. In the United States, this reluctance is supported, as mentioned 
above, by the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Other Common 
law counties may or may not recognise at all the principle of good faith, in either 
negotiating or performance of a contract, in commercial transactions. The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew160 acknowledged for the first 
time in Canada that good faith contractual performance is a general organising 
principle of the common law of contract requiring a common law duty which 
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applies to all contracts to act honestly in the performance of contractual 
obligations, which was described, by Justice Cromwell, as a “modest, 
incremental change” to the existing law. The contract between the appellant and 
the respondent involved a renewal clause providing that the contract would 
automatically renew at the end of the three-year term unless one of the parties 
gave six months written notice to the contrary. Consequently, it is hard to justify 
for now, according to the judgment, whether the Canadian obligation of good 
faith is applicable to the formation of a contract as well as its performance. 
 
In Australia, the courts have not yet committed themselves to a similar concept 
of good faith.161 Although the New South Wales Court of Appeal had once held 
that the principal had a duty to act reasonably and honestly when exercising 
powers under a standard form government contract; and stands for the 
proposition that reasonableness may overlap and be indistinguishable from the 
duty of good faith in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public 
Works,162 this judgment has been disapproved by the High Court of Australia. 
The Australian judiciary has stressed, for many years, the importance of 
recognizing a general principle of good faith in the contractual performance. It 
seems that Australian may eventually be prepared to open its door to the 
general principle of good faith. In January 2015, Standards Australia (SA) 
Technical Committee MB-010 released a draft of its revised conditions of 
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contract, the proposed SA 11000: 2015163, a new suite of Standards, introduces 
a number of key changes, including a new overriding obligation on each party to 
act in good faith towards the other. 164  Whether this express obligation is 
beneficial or problematic is still too early to be justified at this stage. One major 
issue can be seen now is that “good faith” is undefined in SA 11000, thus the 
extent to which the new obligation imposes to both contracting parties are 
relatively unknown, which might trigger contractual disputes in this area.  
 
English courts have made several rejections to the acknowledgement of such 
an overriding principle in commercial contracts in various occasions.165 It is clear 
that the English common law, like the most common law jurisdictions, does not 
recognise the concept of duties of pre-contractual good faith.166 In the absence 
of a general principle of good faith, English courts adopted a series of 
“piecemeal solutions” in order to police the fairness of contracts and their 
performance, including the common law rules on mistake and 
misrepresentation, duress (including economic duress) and undue influence, 
the objective interpretation of contracts, the concept of unconscionability, 
implied terms, waiver and estoppel. 167  A detailed discussion regarding the 
concept of good faith governing contractual performance in English contract 
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law, and its recent developments are considered in the following section. 
 
2.4 English contract law approach: the concept of good faith 
Historically, English courts are generally reluctant to recognise such an 
overarching duty, either in negotiation or performance of a contract, on the 
basis that good faith, as a general principle applicable to all types of contracts, 
does not have a sufficiently clear meaning and is contrary to the overriding 
principle of freedom of contract which allows commercial parties for the most 
part to act solely in their own self-interest in their contractual relations. For 
example, Lord Ackner once expressed his hostility to the concept of duties of 
pre-contractual good faith in Walford v Miles168, where buyers and sellers of a 
company agreed orally for the sellers to deal with the buyers exclusively and to 
terminate any negotiations between the sellers and any other competing 
buyers, by declaring such a concept to be “unworkable in practise” and 
“inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in 
negotiations”.169 For this reason, commercial contracts are not subject to general 
duties of good faith and fair dealing and contracting parties do not have to 
exercise their contractual rights, once properly ascertained, reasonably. Each 
party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long 
as he avoids making misrepresentations.170 Thus, if a party has rights, the law 
will not concern itself with the motivation or rationale lying behind his exercise of 
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them.171 In this traditionalist thought, each party attempts to attain the best 
bargain at the expense of the other party. Therefore, negotiation in good faith 
may not be of the interest to the contractual parties. 
 
It is clear that an agreement to negotiate in good faith for an unspecified period 
was not enforceable, nor could a term to that effect be implied in a lock-out 
agreement for an unspecified period,172 whereas the English courts opened its 
door to the express good faith obligation in an agreement. A subsequent case, 
notably the Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA173, revisited a familiar issue 
whether an express obligation in an agreement between the parties to negotiate 
in good faith was enforceable or not. Petromec had agreed to carry out an 
upgrade of an offshore oil platform in accordance with a different specification to 
that originally agreed. The contract included a provision whereby Petromec and 
Petroleo agreed to negotiate in good faith the amount of any additional costs. 
Reacting to the harsh judgment of Lord Ackner, Longmore LJ indicated in obiter 
that, had it been, he would have been inclined to find the obligation 
enforceable.174  Since then, the parties to the contract may expressly bind 
themselves to negotiate in good faith in limited situations,175 for example, to 
ascertain which extra costs would be recoverable in particular situations or to 
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agree on the future rent under a lease rent review clause.176 
 
The principle of good faith was first laid down, in English legal system, in the 
context of pre-contractual disclosure by Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm177 in 
the 18th century. Surprisingly, this case also appears to be the acknowledged 
origin of the concept of utmost good faith in English common law which is, for 
many years, considered by both the courts and legal writers. The question now 
arising is whether the principle of utmost good faith and that of good faith are 
one principle, or two. If they are two distinguishable principles, what are the 
scopes of these two concepts? How are these principles developed recently in 
England? The first part of this section will consider the origin of the doctrine of 
[utmost] good faith in English contract law, including important distinctions 
drawn between the doctrine of good faith and the common law duty of utmost 
good faith. The remainder of this section will discuss in detail the recent 
development of the concept of good faith in the performance of contracts, as 
regards: terms which expressly formulate the imposition of a duty of good faith; 
the implied duty of good faith; and test of the duty of good faith. 
 
2.4.1 “Good Faith” and “Utmost Good Faith”, two concepts or one? 
There has been much discussion on the subject of good faith and a range of 
opinions as to the meaning of this doctrine. Even within those countries that 
recognise a general principle of good faith, there is no agreed definition of its 
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core principle.178 Nevertheless, it is submitted that “good faith” and “utmost good 
faith” are separate concepts. “Good faith” should be seen as a subjective 
conscious-related standard, as it is exemplified in the example of the bona fide 
purchaser.179 For example, s. 61(3) of Sale of Good Act 1979 state that “a thing 
is deemed to be done in good faith within the meaning of this Act when it is in 
fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not”. “Utmost good faith” 
has been found to be an expression which has conveyed a meaning beyond 
“good faith” for a very long period of time.180 Cook J made a clear distinction 
between these two concepts in SNCB Holding v UBS AG. 181 Earlier in his 
judgment Cooke J had said: 
“A duty to exercise “good faith” in doing something is one which is 
usually to be contrasted with a duty to exercise reasonable care. It 
connotes subjective honesty, genuineness and integrity, not an 
objective standard of any kind, whether reasonableness, care or 
objective fair dealing. It cannot be equated with “utmost good faith” and 
although its exercise in practice may involve different actions or restraint, 
the concept is not one that goes beyond the notion of truthfulness, 
honesty and sincerity.”182 
The judge noted that the claimant had made no allegations of dishonesty or lack 
of belief on the part of UBS as to the justifiability of its position. He held that 
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there were no extra implied terms of good faith based on standards of 
reasonableness that controlled UBS’s exercise of its rights under the funding 
agreement. In the proposition of Cook J, good faith exercise of right, in the 
context of calculating market value of these assets, means no more than 
honesty.  
 
On the other hand, the duty of utmost good faith, in the context of insurance, 
legally obliges parties involved in negotiations for an insurance contract to 
disclose all material facts that might influence the others’ decision to enter into 
the contract. This clearly extends beyond the mere avoidance of 
misrepresentation. The content of the utmost good faith obligation may well be 
vary with the context or contract in which it is found, and it has been held in 
other contexts, when used in commercial contracts, to impose “a contractual 
obligation to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, 
faithfulness to the agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations” of the other party.183 In fact, the duty of utmost good faith requires 
a higher standard of good faith, in either the context of insurance contract or 
that of other commercial contract. 
 
Furthermore, taking a historical prospective,184 the concept of “good faith”, as a 
fundamental principle in human’s life conducting a significant role in commercial 
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transactions nationally and internationally, has long been established by the 
ancient Greeks and well developed in the period of Roman law and Medieval 
Law. In comparison with the principle of “utmost good faith”, it seems that the 
phrases “utmost (good faith)” and the term “uberrimae fidei” had been unknown 
to Roman law and had no equivalent in Roman law.185 
 
2.4.1.1 The beginning: Carter v Boehm, a shared starter 
Unlike most continental jurisdictions, 186  the doctrine of good faith was not 
introduced into English law until 1766. In the landmark case Carter v Boehm187, 
the Court of Kings Bench did not accept the defendant’s arguments and held at 
the conclusion that there was no duty on the part of the claimant to disclose 
those facts as the underwriter ought himself to have been aware of them. One 
of many reasons why this decision significantly influential on the question of 
pre-contractual duty of disclosure is that Lord Mansfield explicitly stated the 
mutuality of such a duty between the insured and the insurer. Moreover, Lord 
Mansfield’s consideration about pre-contractual disclosure was not addressed 
as a special treatment of insurance contracts but generally applicable to all 
kinds of contracts. This becomes clear when he stated that: 
“[t]he governing principle [of good faith] is applicable to all contracts and 
dealings. Good Faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
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knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, 
and his believing the contrary. … The reason of the rule which obliges 
parties to disclose, is to prevent fraud, and to encourage good faith. … 
But either party may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to 
exercise their judgment upon. … This definition of concealment, 
restrained to the efficient motives and precise subject of any contract, will 
generally hold to make it void, in favour of the party misled by his 
ignorance of the thing concealed.”188 
This case is also the universally known acknowledged origin of the insurance 
duty of the utmost good faith in common law jurisdictions, including Australia, 
New Zealand, and some other common law countries. Apparently, this shared 
origin could and has in fact led to confusions and misunderstandings as to the 
terminological in exactitude between “good faith” and “utmost good faith” in the 
realm of insurance contract law.  
 
Clarification is required, however, through the tracing of the doctrine back to 
1766, Lord Mansfield was attempting to import, in Carter v Boehm, into English 
commercial law at the time was the civil law notion of good faith,189 rather than a 
common law concept of utmost good faith, as there was not such a theory in the 
age of enlightenment. His Lordship explained that “the policy considerations 
underlying the duty are the prevention of fraud and the furtherance of good 
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faith: it therefore fulfils a prophylactic role.”190 However, the commercial and 
mercantile law of England developed in a different direction preferring the 
benefits of simplicity and certainty which flow from requiring those engaging in 
commerce to look after their own interests. 191  Therefore, Lord Mansfield’s 
universal proposition was proved unsuccessful and only survived for limited 
classes of transactions, including insurance.192 Insurance contract is a contract 
of uberrimae fides, in which it requires a higher standard of good faith from both 
parties to avoid non-disclosure and misrepresentation by the additional 
obligation to disclose all material facts that would induce the insurers to 
underwrite the risk. This contrasts with the law which applies to other types of 
commercial contracts, where parties must not misrepresent facts, but do not 
own any obligation to disclose related facts to the other party.  
 
2.4.1.2 The origin and nature of the duty of utmost good faith 
The origin of the formulation “utmost good faith” is obscure. It is actually 
surprising that Carter v Boehm 193  is commonly referred to as the leading 
authority for the principle of utmost good faith given that neither the term 
“utmost” nor its Latin expression “uberrimae fidei” was ever mentioned by Lord 
Mansfield in that case. In articulating the civil law principle of good faith, Lord 
Mansfield was primarily concerned with the insured’s pre-contractual disclosure 
obligations in insurance contract, and “there is nothing in the quotation which 
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indicates that the principle is any wider”194.  
 
“Utmost” was a later refinement added in 1798 by Buller J in Wolff v 
Horncastle195, in which from it became widely accepted.196 In the 19th century, it 
then became the most commonly used epithet. The place of the principle of 
utmost good faith has been fixed by its codification in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906,197 together with non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Section 17 of the 
MIA 1906 imposes duties of utmost good faith on both contractual parties by 
stating: “A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost 
good faith…” Sections 18 to 20 of the 1906 Act provides principle in relation to 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation. As enshrined in MIA 1906 s. 17, the 
doctrine imposes obligation on both parties to the contract, the insurers 
therefore are under a corresponding pre-contractual duty to disclose or not to 
misrepresent material facts to the assured. It has been said by the Court of 
Appeal, in La Banque Financière de la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd,198 
that: 
“the duty falling upon the insurer must at least extend to disclosing all 
facts known to him which are material either to the nature of the risk 
sought to be covered or the recoverability of a claim under the policy 
which a prudent insured would take into account in deciding whether or 
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not to place the risk for which he seeks cover with that insurer.”199  
To date there has been, however, no decided case in which the assured has 
rescinded the policy as a result of non-disclosure on the part of the insurer. The 
reason behind that would simply be that, where the insurer has actually 
behaved towards the assured with bad faith before the contract is concluded, 
the assured would want a remedy in damages, not avoidance of the policy. Yet 
English courts provide no such remedy is available for breach of the duty of 
disclosure because of the fact that damages are simply not mentioned in the 
sections of the 1906 Act.200 Thus even deliberate non-disclosure does not give 
rise to liability to damage in English law, as deceit or fraud requires a positive 
misrepresentation.201 So the superficial even-handedness of the doctrine is an 
illusion.202  
 
In the second half of the 20th century, the Courts began to consider the wider 
implications of the principle outside a policyholder’s duty to disclose since s. 17 
of the MIA 1906 failed to confine the principle to pre-contractual negotiation.203 
Unlike the duty of disclosure originally explained by Lord Mansfield, the mutual 
obligation of utmost good faith is not confined to pre-contractual obligation but 
also applies after the contract is made throughout the performance of the 
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contract. 204  Two further categories emerged: post-contractual duty by the 
insured; post-contractual duty by the insurer.205 Though in a post-contractual 
stage, there is considerable uncertainty over its effect.206 Something that has 
been made clear by English courts is that the continuing duty of utmost good 
faith does not extend to fraudulent claims,207 thus the duty of the assured not to 
make fraudulent claim was not governed by s. 17 of MIA 1906 but rather by 
either an implied term or by a special rule of public policy.208 The appropriate 
scope of the common law rule relating to fraudulent insurance claims has been 
held to forfeit the whole of the claim to which the fraud related.209 Now fraudulent 
claims are dealt with by s. 12 of the Insurance Act 2015. Detailed discussion as 
to continuing duty of utmost good faith is provided in chapter 7. 
 
The earliest authorities identify the nature of the principle as a duty imposed by 
the law merchant or natural law. In The Litsion Pride,210 the Court held that the 
duty of utmost good faith is in all cases based upon an implied term of contract, 
and thus damages were made a remedy available for non-disclosure. The 
development of this concept was hampered again by the consideration of the 
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statutory remedy prescribed in s. 17 of the 1906 Act. The Court of Appeal firmly 
rejected the proposition that the duty was founded upon an implied term211 or is 
tortious duty of care in nature,212 and eliminated the availability of a damages 
award. Because of the mutual obligation of utmost good faith arose by operation 
of law as an incident of the contract of insurance.213 In La Banque Financière de 
la Cite SA v Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd,214 the Court of Appeal held that the 
duty is at common law extra-contractual. 215  The only remedy available for 
breach of which was avoidance ab inito. This was confirmed by the House of 
Lords in the case Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co. 
Ltd, 216  and The Star Sea.217  So English Courts have retained the statutory 
remedy with the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith continues to be treated as 
an extra-contractual term, for which no damages claim is available. 
 
Courts have been mindful that the remedy of avoidance ab inito creates legal 
incongruity, 218  and other common law jurisdictions have adopted different 
solutions to resolve it. For example, Australian legislation adopted a different 
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approach to that of English Law, introducing a statutory implied term of utmost 
good faith, making damages available. The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 
fundamentally alters the nature of utmost good faith.219 The duty of utmost good 
faith is stated by s. 13 of the 1984 Act in the following terms: 
“A contract of insurance is based on the utmost good faith and there is 
implied in such a contract a provision requiring each party to it to act 
towards the other party, in respect of any matter arising under or in 
relation to it, with the utmost good faith.” 
Accordingly, utmost good faith is an implied term which applies to both parties 
to the contract. The wording appears to preclude a duty of utmost good faith 
owed by insurers to a third party who is not a contracting party but who may 
have rights under the policy. However, Australian Courts held in a series of 
cases that insurers owe a duty to a third party.220  
 
2.4.1.3 The meaning of utmost good faith 
The attempts to define the meaning of the duty have proven it to be a difficult 
task. Apart from the well-established pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith, 
the definition of this duty remain elusive. The expression “utmost good faith” – 
the enhancements were not used by Lord Mansfield - certainly not appear to 
have derived from civil law - was finalised by s. 17 of the 1906 Act.  Yet the MIA 
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1906 contains no definition of utmost good faith. The coining of the phrase 
“utmost” led to the need to distinguish Lord Mansfield’s principle and the 
principle of utmost good faith which only seem to have become current in the 
19th century. Utmost good faith has been endowed with different meanings in 
different occasions, for example, “greatest good faith”, “the most abundant good 
faith”, “perfect good faith”, “full and perfect faith”, 221  or “the most full and 
copious” good faith. 222  This has been considered and clarified by Lord 
Hobhouse in The Star Sea,223 in which he indicated that “the connotation [of the 
phrases “utmost” good faith] appears to be the most extensive, rather than the 
greatest, good faith.”224 Justice Bollen of the Supreme Court of South Australia 
held, in Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Limited225 that the expression “utmost 
good faith” means what it says – utmost good faith, not a measure of good faith. 
There has been argument for criteria of ‘candour’, ‘absence of recklessness’, 
‘sacrificing commercial advantage’ and so on.226  
 
Recently, there are two prevailing competing theories on the definition of the 
general duty of utmost good faith. One focuses on that the opposite of utmost 
good faith, which arises to some extent from the considerations of the concept 
of “good faith” in other common law jurisdictions outside England.227 In other 
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words, the concept concerns the utmost bad faith, so that “nothing short of 
recklessness or fraud on the part of the party allegedly in breach would 
suffice.”228 For example, in the New Zealand decision of Vermeulen v SIMU 
Mutual Insurance Association,229 the Court held that there was no breach of the 
duty of good faith where the failure to disclose information as required by the 
policy was not dishonest. In fact, it is not surprising that the principle of honesty 
has been seen to be a central tenet of the duty given that the duty of utmost 
good faith had historically been considered primarily in reference to issues of 
disclosure.230 The alternative view sees the duty as a wider concept beyond 
mere honesty. It draws on the principles of “fairness, reasonableness and 
community standard of decency and fair dealing.”231 Acting with utmost good 
faith must involve more than merely acting honestly, otherwise no effect is given 
to the word “utmost”.232 Recently, this proposition has been well illustrated and 
authoritatively confirmed by the High Court of Australia in CGU Insurance Ltd v 
AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd.233 
 
2.4.1.3.1 CGU v AMP 
AMP, the respondent insured, was an authorised securities dealer. AMP’s 
authorised representatives were involved in a failed investment, which resulted 
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in a complete loss for a number of clients. The insured subsequently made a 
claim under its professional indemnity insurance policy with CGU, the appellant 
insurer, in respect of the liability the insured had for the conduct of its 
representative. Although the High Court of Australia held in favour of the insurer 
with a majority of 4:1, all members of the High Court were unanimously 
accepted that acting with the utmost good faith requires an insurer to do more 
than act honestly,234 and may require it to have regard not only to its own 
interests, but also to the legitimate interests of its insured. It will usually “require 
affirmative or positive action on the part of the person owing the duty”.235 
 
The High Court of Australia stated that s. 13 of the ICA does not “empower a 
court to make a finding of liability against an insurer as punitive sanction for not 
acting in good faith”.236 Breach of the duty of utmost good faith by insurers do 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that insurers are liable to indemnify 
assureds without some principled process of reasoning. It shows that the 
essence of the duty from the insurer’s point of view is about process rather than 
substance. Therefore, the proceeding court will review the insurer’s decision-
making process rather than ordering payment for the assured. 237  More 
importantly, in the leading judgment of Gleeson CJ and Crennan J, it was stated 
that “utmost good faith may require an insurer to act with due regard to the 
legitimate interests of an insured, as well as to its own interests” and that  
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“an insurer’s statutory obligation to act with utmost good faith may 
require an insurer to act, consistently with commercial standards of 
decency and fairness, with due regard to the interests of an insured. 
Such an obligation may well affect the conduct of an insurer in making a 
timely response to a claim for indemnity.”238  
Alternatively, Callinan JJ and Heydon JJ introduced an equitable clean hands 
principle suggesting a requirement that a plaintiff seeking relief [must] not 
himself be guilty of improper conduct.239 Borrowing from equity law, the principle 
dictates that “he who seeks equity must do equity”.240 Thus the duty of utmost 
good faith required reciprocity. In the context of claims, this would seem to 
indicate that an insured cannot claim for a breach if they have not conducted 
themselves adequately. Kirby J in his dissenting judgment noted that emphasis 
must be placed on the word “utmost”: “The exhibition of good faith alone is not 
sufficient. It must be good faith in its utmost quality”.241 So whereas the concept 
of ‘good faith’ appears limited to an obligation of honesty, the standard 
expectation in respect of the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ is much higher.  
 
2.4.1.3.2 Implication of CGU v AMP 
First, the requirement is for the insurer to have “due regard” for the insured’s 
interests but does not give rise to a fiduciary duty whereby the insured’s 
interests would usurp their own. Therefore, there is no requirement for either 
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party for forego their own best interests but they must act with “due regard” to 
the other party when asserting their rights. In other words, when exercising a 
right, an insurer should consider the impact on the insured. Accordingly, the 
relationship between insurers and insureds falls somewhere between a 
standard commercial relationship and that of a fiduciary relationship. It seems 
that the purpose of the duty is not to limit the rights of the insurer, but rather to 
guide their actions in exercising those rights. Second, the test of utmost good 
faith is now subjective, requiring parties to comply with “commercial standards 
of decency and fairness”.242 Kirby J interpreted the duty to require efficient, 
reasonably prompt, candid and business-like conduct in determining indemnity. 
The matter was revisited by Supreme Court of New South Wales in the most 
recent decision of Small Business Consortium Lloyd’s Consortium No. 9056 v 
Angas Securities Ltd243, it suggested that not only the subjective state of mind 
of the insurer should be considered when judging its compliance of the duty of 
utmost good faith, but also the objective position might have to be taken into 
account.244 Third, the duty is reciprocal, so that breach by the assured may 
negative the effects of any breach by the insurers.245 Previously, there was little 
authorities to suggest that apart from instances of non-disclosure, an insured’s 
right to damages for a breach by the insurer may be jeopardised should “tainted 
relevant conduct” be found. However, it is for the courts to decide whether 
                                                            
242 ibid, Kirby J referred favourably to the view of Owen J in Kelly v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd that the 
common law duty encompassed notions of fairness, reasonableness, standards of decency and fair 
dealing.  
243 [2015] NSWSC 1511. 
244 ibid [69] 
245 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-011. 
112 
 
coming with “clean hands” is equivalent to acting in line with the duty of utmost 
good faith. It would be likely that the courts hold “clean hands” to be identical to 
the duty because if “clean hands” were held to a higher standard, this would in 
effect replace the duty for insureds by imposing a higher standard. Therefore, 
the practical effect of the introduction of this equitable principle is that in 
instances where both parties are found to be in breach of the duty, relief is not 
available to either of them. 
 
The matter has not been given detailed consideration in England.246 In The Star 
Sea,247 the House of Lords rejected an argument on a very narrow ground that 
the alleged false statements made by the assured in the course of legal 
proceedings on the policy gave the insurers the right to avoid and held that the 
duty of utmost good faith no longer applied once the parties were engaged in 
litigation because the parties were governed by the Rules of Court. It appears 
that to date there is no attempt of definition of utmost good faith in that the vast 
majority of authorities related to the pre-contractual duty of assureds since there 
has been little need for the English courts to do so.248 Unsurprisingly, English 
jurisprudence is not the only one in the world adopted such proposition. The 
Australian courts find an intriguing echo in defining the duty. The High Court’s 
decision in CGU v AMP249 has provided some clarification of the meaning of 
utmost good faith, but it also holds the position that it is not necessary to seek 
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any comprehensive definition of the duty. In fact, it is necessary that the 
terminology employed to define the duty of utmost good faith remain broad and 
imprecise. The duty embraces a standard of conduct in both pre- and post-
contractual negotiations between contracting parties in insurance contracts. Any 
attempt to define the duty with more precision will render the duty too inflexible 
for universal application. Kirby J noted “inflexible formulae and precise rules, 
whilst they may achieve certainty in the marketplace, lend themselves to 
injustices, the applicable doctrine having no inherent flexibility to deal with the 
nuances of differing fact situations.”250 It is better that the jurisprudences that 
recognise the duty of utmost good faith continue to develop it on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
2.4.2 Recent development of the duty of good faith 
Generally speaking there is a considerable body of case law to the effect that 
obligations to negotiate in good faith are, almost without exception, 
unenforceable where the agreement was not sufficiently certain, because there 
were no objective criteria by reference to which the obligation could be policed 
by the court.251 Therefore, it is generally understood that English courts have 
traditionally preferred to impose the duty, between commercial contractual 
parties, only in particular situations, e.g. insurance contracts; or have relied on 
other duties or doctrines, i.e. misrepresentation or estoppel. In addition, even if 
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the parties expressly included an obligation of good faith in their commercial 
contract, there was room for doubt about how such a term would be interpreted 
by a court.252 For example, an English court may not interpret, as it currently 
stands, an express good faith obligation in a way that would require a party to 
give up a freely negotiated right or financial advantage that is clearly 
established in the contract. This view however appeared, according to Leggatt 
J, to be “swimming against the tide”. 253  Judging from the statement and 
reasoning from Leggatt J in this case, it evidently raised the expectations that 
the English courts may be on their way to recognising an overarching duty of 
good faith being implied to commercial contract.  
 
Concerning the theoretical gap between the laws of the Continent and that of 
the British Isles, commentators have suggested for a long time that a general 
duty of good faith would be introduced into English law as a result of efforts to 
standardize contract law within the European Union (EU). In fact, English 
legislative system is increasingly originating from the EU. The requirement for 
contracting parties to act in a fair manner, in accordance with the principle of 
good faith, has already entered into English law, via EU legislation, in consumer 
contracts in order to protect consumers against one-sided contract favouring 
businesses. Section 62(4) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015254 states that “a 
term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
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imbalance in the parties rights and obligations under the contract to the 
detriment of the consumer”. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the 
recent development of the duty of good faith in the commercial sector in English 
contract law. 
 
2.4.2.1 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd 
The most eye-catching authority specifically in this context in England over the 
last couple of years is the Queen’s Bench decision of the case Yam Seng Pte 
Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd,255 in which the High Court has implied 
a duty of good faith into a long term distribution agreement. In this case, Leggatt 
J suggested that, given such duties are increasingly being recognised in other 
common law jurisdictions, the traditional English “hostility” towards a generally 
applicable duty of good faith in performing contracts is “misplaced”.256  The 
acceptance of good faith in its judgment as a source of contractual obligations 
has received judicial attention as well as criticism from commentators nationally 
and internationally. Leggatt J commented that the relevant background against 
which contracts are made include not only matters of fact known to the parties 
but also “shared values and norms of behaviour” including but not limited to “an 
expectation of honesty”,257 derived from “general social acceptance” or from the 
specifics of “a particular trade or commercial activity” or even from “features of 
the particular contractual relationship”.258 Such shared values and norms of 
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behaviour are naturally taken for granted by the parties without being set out 
explicitly in their written agreements.259  
 
It was the first decision to review the general duty of good faith in the 
performance of contracts, and, although the implication of ethical standards into 
commercial parties’ contractual obligations might seem to be novel to English 
case law, concepts herein are not unfamiliar to English courts. The case of HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank260 invoked by 
Leggatt J in exemplifying the recognition of expectation of honesty in 
commercial contracts may not be entirely competent, given an insurance 
contract is a contract of utmost good faith. What is clear is that the fact that 
good faith indeed exists in commercial dealings is incontestable, albeit it may 
appear, the other way round, in different forms of bad faith conducts and be 
described as “improper”, “commercially unacceptable” or “unconscionable”.261  
 
Leggatt J emphasised that “what good faith requires is sensitive to context”. The 
suggested test of good faith is objective in the sense that it depends on 
whether, in the particular context, the conduct would be regarded as 
commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people262 and its content 
“is established through a process of construction of the contract”. 263  The 
approach of the High Court in Yam Seng was endorsed in Bristol Groundschool 
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Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd,264 in which it was held that the contract in 
question was a ‘relational’ agreement which did contain an implied duty of good 
faith.  
 
2.4.2.2 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK & 
Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest)265 
The Court of Appeal did not wait long to give its view, albeit obiter, in Mid Essex 
Hospital, where Jackson LJ dismissed the idea of English contract law knowing 
a general doctrine of good faith. It was held that, as a matter of contractual 
interpretation, clause 3.5 did not impose a general obligation on the parties to 
co-operate with each other in good faith. Rather, the obligation to operate in 
good faith was specifically focused upon the two purposes stated in the clause. 
Thus, in terms of contractual provisions, a specific contractual provision to act in 
good faith in relation to certain specific clauses would probably be more likely to 
be enforceable than a general duty to act in all respects in good faith. If the 
parties wanted to do so, they should have expressly provided for it in the 
contract.266 
 
In MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt,267 the Court 
of Appeal once again made clear that there is no “general organising principle” 
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of good faith in English law, considering risks undermining express terms that 
have been agreed by the parties might be brought by the application of the duty. 
Therefore, the situations where an implied duty could be applied remain very 
limited. The key points to note are that on balance, it is likely that express good 
faith obligations, whilst enforceable, will continue to be interpreted very narrowly 
and implications of good faith terms will only be in particular circumstances. The 
English courts are more likely to be willing to apply good faith obligation to 
dishonest behaviour by a party, if a good faith provision, either express or 
implied, were breached, if it would amount to a repudiatory breach of contract 
entitling the innocent party to terminate the agreement and claim damages. 
 
Generally, an agreement to negotiate in good faith is not enforceable. 
Notwithstanding, Leggatt J was not prepared to conclude that a duty of good 
faith would be implied into all contracts of a commercial nature after all. Instead, 
he accepted the traditional view that good faith only existed in English law in 
certain categories of contract, namely contracts of employment and partnering 
contracts, where the relation of the parties has a fiduciary character; and 
extended the notion to what was termed “relational contracts”, such as joint 
venture agreements, franchise agreements and contracts involving a long-term 
relationship between the parties to which they make a substantial commitment, 
where agreements: 
“may require a high degree of communication, co-operation and 
predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and 
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involving expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the 
express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties’ understanding 
and necessary to give business efficacy to the agreements”.268 
 Leggatt J preferred to imply such a duty in “any ordinary commercial contract” 
by use of the established methodology of English law for the implication of 
terms in fact based on the presumed intention of the parties.269 The law should 
still be developed on a case by case basis in the long run.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
268 Ibid [142] 
269 ibid [131] 
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Chapter 3 Utmost Good Faith and Duty of Fair Presentation 
 
3.1 Prior to August 16: the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906, drafted by Sir Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers, 
was mostly based on principles developed by judges in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries for the purpose of protecting “a fledgling insurance industry 
against exploitation by the insured”.270 Thus, in that case, the law offers wide-
ranging mechanisms for the insurer to avoid the contract and encourages 
unmeritorious refusals. 271  The principle of utmost good faith was highly 
competent in doing this job and was codified in Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 
17: 
 A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good 
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party.  
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the statutory duty is differ from what Lord 
Mansfield was formulated in Carter v Boehm272 in terms of the phrase, the 
remedy and treatments to the notion of deemed fraud.273 It is in particular worth 
noting that the wording of s. 17 of the 1906 Act was not confined to pre-
contractual presentation of the risk, whereas other sections of the 1906 Act 
                                                            
270 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 1.25 
271 ibid paras 1.44 and 1.25-1.26 
272 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 
273 See R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-004. It indicates 
that the statutory duty of utmost good faith is differ from Lord Mansfield’s formulation in four important 
respects: the use of the term ‘utmost’; the remedy is that of avoidance rather than the policy becoming 
automatically void; the removal of the notion of deemed fraud; and the failure to confine the principle to 
pre-contractual negotiation. 
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relating to utmost good faith, namely, ss. 18-20 have been all limited to pre-
contractual negotiations. Over the years, the principle has been developed in a 
series of cases from the 1970’s onwards. The use of the term “utmost” have 
pushed the notion of good faith much further than simply the absence of bad 
faith.274 Despite its name, the 1906 Act has been taken to apply to all forms of 
insurance.275  
 
A number of problems as to the duty of disclosure, which has received major 
criticisms over the years, are here noteworthy. Mainly, the wording of section 18, 
as one of the mechanisms to refuse claims, appears to allow insurers to play a 
passive role without clear indication as to what they wish to know. “This 
encourages ‘underwriting at claims stage’, where insurers ask questions only 
when a claim arises, and then use that information to threaten refusal of the 
claim.”276 Further, the duty was acknowledged to be unclear and difficult to 
comply with. In particular, the effect of section 18 is that policyholders are 
required “to look into the mind of a hypothetical prudent insurer and to work out 
what would have influenced it, with little additional guidance”.277 As a matter of 
fact, most policyholders, consumers in particular, have only little ideas about 
                                                            
274 See Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389 
275 See Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437; Pan Atlantic 
Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427, 447 (Lord Mustill); Manifest 
Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 389 [47] (Lord 
Hobhouse); Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 131 [55]; 
Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros SA (No.2) [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746 [12]; HIH Casualty & General 
Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61 (HL) [42] (Lord Hoffmann); Highlands 
Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 109, 114 
276 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 3.11, point (4) 
277 ibid para 3.8 
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“what is known or ought to have known” so as to satisfy the test.278 Medium or 
large business entities on the other hand may find the duty of disclosure 
appears almost “insurmountable”279  due to the large amount of employees 
working in different countries and difficulties in identifying every piece of 
information that an underwriter might deem material. These initiate the practical 
problem of data dumping. Additionally, avoidance, as “a powerful negotiating 
tool which can be used to reduce the scale of payments”, is often invoked by 
the insurer to decline insurance claims. The single, draconian “all or nothing” 
remedy causes adversarial disputes, even though in practice complete refusals 
are rare. Last but not least, most parties continue to contract on the basis of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerning difficulties of contracting out the default 
regime.280 Problems, including but not limited to above mentioned, caused by 
the 111-years-old act have allowed a series of insurance law reforms to be 
introduced in the UK following an extensive consultation carried out by the Law 
Commissions. 
 
3.2 Outcome of the English business insurance law reform – the IA 2015 
The long-awaited Insurance Act received Royal Assent in February 2015; and 
the vast majority of its provisions came into force on 12 August 2016. This 
eighteen months timeframe was built into the 2015 Act to allow the market time 
to adjust its practices and make necessary changes to their policy documents. 
                                                            
278 ibid para 5.15 
279 ibid paras 3.11 and 5.14 
280 See generally at Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s 
Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) chapter 29 
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Together with the CI(DR)A 2012, it represents the greatest change to insurance 
contract law in England in over a century. Based on recommendations for 
reform by the Law Commissions of England and Wales and of Scotland, the 
Insurance Act aims to align business insurance rules more closely with those 
that govern consumer insurance laws.  
 
Following the Law Commission Report which aimed “at ensuring a better 
balance of interests between policyholders and insurers”,281 the IA 2015 makes 
wide-ranging and fundamental reforms to the insurance contract law relating to 
non-consumer matters, including reinsurance, which, inter alia, makes it harder 
for the insurers to void claims as a result of technical breaches by the insured. 
The 2015 Act applies in full to contracts concluded and renewed after 12 August 
2016, eighteen months after the Act received the Royal Asset.282 Parts three 
and four of the Act apply to variations to insurance contracts made after 12 
August 2016, 283  and the provisions on fair presentation are applicable to 
variations made after that date to existing non-consumer insurance contracts 
entered into at any time.284 In other words, the assured’s pre-contractual duties 
are to be applied purely to the variation and not retrospectively to the contracts 
of insurance prior to its variation. The Insurance Act 2015 was widely supported 
by the industry. The provisions mainly regulate all business and other non-
                                                            
281 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 1.6 
282 Insurance Act 2015, s. 22(3) 
283 Insurance Act 2015, s. 22(2) 
284 Insurance Act 2015, s. 22(1) 
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consumer insurance285 – Insurance Act 2015, ss. 1&2(1) – including micro-
businesses and small or medium enterprises as well as large risks such as 
marine insurance and reinsurance;286 and covers the following issues: the pre-
contractual duty of disclosure; the insurer’s remedies for breach of the duty of 
fair presentation; the law of insurance warranties; “irrelevant” risk mitigation 
clauses; insurer’s remedies for fraudulent claims; good faith and contracting out. 
The Insurance Act 2015 does not exhaustively address every eventuality and 
instead sets out rules intended to be flexible enough to apply broadly to different 
situations. A detailed discussion concerning the development of the duty of fair 
presentation including disclosure and misrepresentation is provided in the 
following section. Issues relating to fraudulent claims are considered separately 
in chapter 7 together with other matters in relation to post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith.  
 
3.3 Fair presentation of the risk  
The original principle of utmost good faith codified in ss. 18-22 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 has now been repealed287 and replaced by ss. 2-8 of the 
Insurance Act 2015. The principle of utmost good faith, now good faith, works 
quite the other way under IA 2015. It applies, as an interpretative principle, to 
both pre- and post-contractual stages of all types of insurance contracts. Details 
as to the new form of utmost good faith – giving life to post-contractual duties, 
                                                            
285 Insurance Act 2015, s. 14, applies to consumer and non-consumer contracts 
286 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 6.4 
287 Insurance Act 2015, s. 21(2) 
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governed by s. 17 of the MIA 1906 as amended by s. 14 of IA 2015, is 
discussed in section 3.3.5 below. Consequently, utmost good faith and the new 
duty of fair presentation are now “entirely independent and unrelated” 
principles.288 As a matter of fact, “fair presentation” is not at all new to English 
jurisdiction. The term is not cut out of whole cloth, nor is it borrowed from the 
concept of other jurisdictions. The duty of “fair presentation” – an evolutionary 
new approach introduced by the Law Commission in their second Consultation 
Paper – as it is referred to by s. 3 of IA 2015, is built on common law 
approaches developed by the English courts and the statutory duty set out by 
the 1906 Act,289 i.e. the duty of utmost good faith in the context of the assureds 
or their agent’s pre-contractual obligations. Notably, the constituent elements 
including positive elements to disclose material information (1906 Act, s. 18) 
and passive elements not to misrepresent them (1906 Act, s. 20) are retained 
yet modified. The duty is now clearly confined to the period “before the contract 
is made”. Under s. 3(1) of the IA 2015, the assured is obliged, before the 
contract is entered into, to make to the insurer a fair presentation of the risk, 
which requires policyholders to volunteer to the insurer every material facts 
known or ought to know to them that would influence the judgement of a 
prudent insurer in deciding whether to insure the risk and on what terms,290 or to 
at least draw attention of a prudent insurer to further enquiries;291 or to make 
                                                            
288 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-006. 
289 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 6.5. 
290 Insurance Act 2015, s. 7(3). 
291 Insurance Act 2015, s. 3(3) as amplified by 3(4), detailed discussions are considered in the following 
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material representation as to a matter of fact is “substantially correct” or that of 
“expectation or belief is made in good faith”.292 The brokers’ independent duty of 
disclosure set out by MIA 1906 s. 19 is abolished and literally replaced with a 
duty of disclosure imposed upon the assured by IA 2015 s. 3. 293  Now, 
knowledge held by brokers is included within the scope of what an insured 
either knows or ought to know, meaning, the insured is now deemed to know 
what the broker knows.294 Thus the assured losses its defence if the broker has 
obtained the knowledge and nevertheless failed to pass it on to the insurer. 
Knowledge of brokers is dealt with as a separate issue in Chapter 6. 
 
Fair representation appeared as long ago as in the seminal judgement of Carter 
v Boehm295. Despite the failure of amplifying its constituents, Lord Mansfield laid 
particular emphasis on the need for a fair presentation of risk in the following 
statement: 
“…whether there was, under all the circumstances at the time the policy 
was underwritten, a fair representation; or a concealment; fraudulent, if 
designed; or, though not designed, varying materially the object of the 
policy, and changing the risqué understood to be run.” 296 
The courts have developed the concept of “a fair presentation of the risk” 
                                                            
292 Insurance Act 2015, s. 3(3)(c). 
293 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018) 
294 Insurance Act 2015, s. 4(2)(b), 4(3)(b) and 4(8)(b). 
295 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
296 ibid 1165 
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thereafter. Lord Esher MR stated in Asfar v Blundell297 as follows: 
“But it is not necessary to disclose minutely every material fact; assuming 
that there is  a material fact which he is bound to disclose, the rule is 
satisfied if he discloses sufficient to call the attention of the underwriters 
in such a manner that they can see that if they require further information 
they ought to ask for it.”  
Then “fair presentation” has been further interpreted in the case of Container 
Transport International Inc and Reliance Group Inc v Oceanus Mutual 
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd298 in the following statements: 
“Having regard to all the circumstances known or deemed to be known to 
the insured and to his broker, and ignoring those which are expressly 
excepted from the duty of disclosure, was the presentation in summary 
form to the underwriter a fair and substantially accurate presentation of the 
risk proposed for insurance, so that a prudent insurer could form a proper 
judgement – either on the presentation alone or by asking questions if he 
was sufficiently put on enquiry and wanted to know further details – 
whether or not to accept the proposal, and , if so, on what terms?”299 
This was borne out by the authorities. The leading authority as to “fair 
presentation of the risk”, on which the English courts have reached a 
                                                            
297 [1896] 1 QB 123, 129 
298 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476. 
299 Ibid 496. 
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consensus,300 is the case of WISE Underwriting Agency Ltd v Grupo Nacional 
Provincial SA301, in which the Court of Appeal affirmed that the test, as to what 
put a underwriter on inquiry about the existence of other material facts, “had to 
be applied by reference to a reasonably careful insurer rather than the actual 
insurer”, and by reference to the actual presentation of the assured together 
with reference to the general knowledge of the insurer. The test is objective. In 
this case, the presentation was considered by the Court of Appeal (by a 
majority) to be unfair, thereby the contract was avoided because of an 
translation error. 
 
The statutory definition of “fair presentation” can be found at the first part of IA 
2015 s. 3 in the following terms: 
(1) Before a contract of insurance is entered into, the insured must make to 
the insurer a fair presentation of the risk.  
(2) The duty imposed by subsection (1) is referred to in this Act as “the duty 
of fair presentation”.  
(3) A fair presentation of the risk is one—  
(a) which makes the disclosure required by subsection (4),  
(b) which makes that disclosure in a manner which would be reasonably 
clear and accessible to a prudent insurer, and  
(c) in which every material representation as to a matter of fact is 
                                                            
300 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 5.50, “the phrase “fair presentation 
of the risk” has appeared in at least 15 cases in the past ten years.” 
301 [2004] EWCA Civ 962 
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substantially correct, and every material representation as to a matter 
of expectation or belief is made in good faith.  
(4) The disclosure required is as follows, except as provided in subsection 
(5)  —  
(a) disclosure of every material circumstance which the insured knows or 
ought to know, or  
(b) failing that, disclosure which gives the insurer sufficient information to 
put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make further enquiries 
for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances.  
It is clear from IA 2015 s. 3(1) that the duty of fair presentation, falling only on 
the assured, is confined to the period prior to the formation of the contract. The 
duty still encompasses both a duty to disclose and a duty not to misrepresent 
material information, retaining essential elements of ss. 18-20 of the 1906 Act.302 
In addition to IA 2015 s. 3, a supplementary provision of the duty of fair 
presentation is provided under s.7 of the IA 2015: s. 7(1) states that a fair 
presentation does not have to be made in a single document or oral 
presentation; s. 7(2) concerns the scope of the term “circumstance”; s. 7(3) 
defines a material circumstance; s. 7(4) sets out examples of things which may 
constitute material circumstances. All of those will be discussed in more details 
below. 
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3.3.1 Disclosure of Circumstances  
The duty of disclosure, as appeared in Lord Mansfield’s seminal judgment of 
Carter v Boehm, 303 was codified in s. 18(1) of the MIA 1906 in the following 
terms: 
“The assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is 
concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the assured, 
and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the 
ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured 
fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.” 
Unlike the position applicable to consumer insurances, the essence of s. 18(1), 
with an importance modification as to the remedy, has now been restated in s. 
3(4)(a) of the IA 2015, as the nature of the duty of full disclosure. The earlier 
reference to “the ordinary course of business” has been dropped. IA 2015 s. 
3(4)(a) serves as the primary means of disclosure.304 In addition, the insured, 
who has failed to satisfy the strict duty set out in s. 3(4)(a) but has nevertheless 
disclosed just enough information which would lead a prudent insurer to make 
further enquiries, which when answered, would reveal the material 
circumstances, is granted an alternative, by s. 3(4)(b), might still comply with its 
duty of disclosure. This is the codification of common law approach – as 
mentioned previously – taken by the courts.305 
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The “fall back duty”306 provides to the insured a cushioning device. Accordingly, 
failing to satisfy the absolute duty set out by s. 3(4)(a) is no longer automatically 
discharge the obligation of the insurer unless appropriate questions have been 
asked. The Insurance Act 2015, s. 3(4)(b) has put the insurers in a position to 
play a more active role in assessing the risk, by which it places an onerous duty 
on the insurers to ask follow up questions. This provision, considered as central 
to the duty of disclosure,307 replicates the common law, in that:  
“If the insurers (thereby) receive information from the assured or his agent 
which, taken on its own or in conjunction with other facts known to them or 
which they are presumed to know, would naturally prompt a reasonably careful 
insurer to make further inquiries, then, if they omit to make the appropriate 
check or inquiry, assuming it can be made reasonably, they will be held to have 
waived disclosure of the material fact which the inquiry would have necessarily 
revealed.”308  
It is therefore notable that this concept is derived from the doctrine of “waiver”.309 
The waiver principle was set out in s. 18(3)(c) of the MIA 1906 and has now 
been re-enacted as s. 3(5)(e) of the IA 2015. Further, English courts, for the 
purpose of mitigating the draconian nature of the remedy of avoidance, have 
bestowed a much broader meaning upon the relatively narrow common law 
doctrine of waiver than it has originally in other areas of law, whereby an insurer 
                                                            
306 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-47 
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may waive by omission in the context of insurance.310 This change makes a shift 
in English insurance law and will doubtlessly encourage insurers to ask specific 
express questions rather than taking a passive stance in relying on the 
assureds and their broker to provide all relevant information.311  
 
3.3.1.1 The “sufficient information” standard 
The duty might be discharged where the assured makes either full disclosure or 
partial disclosure. It is a matter of fact as to what circumstances or information 
are considered to be one of the kinds whereby it will put a prudent insurer on 
notice to further inquire.312 There is no absolute standard as to the precise 
weight prudent underwriters would place to the undisclosed facts. It is generally 
accepted to be sufficient to put the insurers on enquiry about further information 
of the risk, if the omitted information is normal basis of contracting terms, such 
as a lump-sum freight under a voyage charter.313 The question is whether it has 
given the insurer sufficient “signposts” which would lead a prudent insurer to 
make further enquiries which, when answered, would reveal material 
circumstances.314 In WISE Underwriting Agency Ltd v Grupo Nacional Provincial 
SA,315 Rix LJ made it clear that mere possibilities of the existence of other 
material circumstances will not put the reasonably careful underwriter on 
                                                            
310 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) paras 4.20-4.21 
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inquiry.316 The disclosure of facts “would raise in the mind of a reasonable 
insurer at least a suspicion that there were other circumstances which would or 
might vitiate the presentation made to him”.317  
 
Where non-disclosed facts are unusual or special to the circumstances, which 
are not to be expected in ordinary business practice – the presentation is not 
considered to be fair because such a non-disclosure distorts the fairness of 
presentation of risk – the waiver cannot be applied to.318 Apparently, an insured 
intentionally disclose a limited amount of information with an aleatory thought 
would not be protected by this provision as the presentation must be 
“reasonably clear and accessible” to the insurer. 319  This requirement is 
considered in more detail in the following section. Further, assureds or their 
broker who disclose the “bare minimum” information may put themselves in a 
risky and inadvisable position,320 given that the English courts “would treat s. 
3(4)(b) of the Insurance Act 2015 as an alternative only where the insured has 
tried but failed to comply with s. 3(4)(a) of the 2015 Act and shows that it has 
given the insurer a good base on which to make its enquires”. 321 
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3.3.1.2 Form of Disclosure - “A reasonably clear and accessible manner” 
The format of the disclosure, under s. 3(3)(b) of the Insurance Act 2015, must 
be appropriate and “in a manner which would be reasonably clear and 
accessible to a prudent underwriter”, failure to fulfil this requirement will amount 
to breach of duty of fair presentation. This new requirement is independent of 
the duty of disclosure set out by s. 3(4)(a) and (b) and is aimed primarily at the 
practice of “data dumping”.322 Hence, a policyholder is not considered as having 
been satisfied its duty of disclosure by dumping overwhelming amount of 
unsorted information without a well-structured or indexed summary; or with little 
or no signposting undermines the underwriting process, usually with the aim to 
guard against inadequate disclosure but, more rarely, to bury material 
information.323 Consequentially it may be regarded as that the presentation of 
the risk is not fair, which amounts to a breach.324   
 
The question of whether this requirement has been breached will be “highly fact 
specific”,325 but fulfilment of this requirement is nevertheless related to clear and 
effective data sorting methods rather than the amount of information. Insofar as 
“a fair and accurate presentation of a summary” is sufficient if it would navigate 
an insurer to form a proper judgement,326 it might be acceptable in practice that 
a large volume of data accompanied with “an overview highlighting material 
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points”.327 In addition, the 2015 Act does make clear indication, by IA 2015 s. 
7(1), that the disclosure need not be contained within a single document or oral 
presentation, it can be done through a series of exchanges between the parties. 
Further, the assureds’ duty do not extend any further than making material facts 
known to them or ought to know available to the insurer; in other words, the 
assured is not required to emphasis the significance of any particular 
information disclosed.328 Because the point of disclosure in insurance is to make 
the information available so that the underwriter is able to assess the 
significance of the disclosed information and reach a decision on whether to 
insure and on what terms. 
 
3.3.1.3 Knowledge of the assured for the purpose of disclosure 
The 2015 Act prescribes under ss. 4-6 in detail the matters which will be 
regarded as "known" or "ought to be known" by insurers and those who are 
insured, including matters known by employees of insurers and senior 
management of those who are insured. This is a reformulation of “knowledge” 
defined under s. 18(1) of the MIA 1906, and a restatement of the best principles 
of current case law. This section concerns only knowledge of the assured. 
Circumstances which the insurer knows, ought to know and is presumed to 
know are set out in s. 5 of the IA 2015. It is to be noted that knowledge of the 
insurer will be considered in detail under Section 4.1.5.3(b) – knowledge of the 
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insurer for disclosure purposes – in Chapter 4, it thus needs not elaborate any 
further here. 
 
The concept of knowledge is defined in IA 2015 s. 4 as follow. 
Section 4 Knowledge of insured 
(1) This section provides for what an insured knows or ought to know for 
the purposes of section 3(4)(a). 
(2) An insured who is an individual knows only –  
(a) what is know to the individual, and  
(b) what is known to one or more of the individuals who are 
responsible for the insured’s insurance. 
(3) An insured who is not an individual knows only what is known to one 
or more of the individual who are – 
(a) part of the insured’s senior management, or 
(b) responsible for the insured’s insurance 
(4) An insured is not by virtue of subsection (2)(b) or (3)(b) taken to know 
confidential information known to an individual if – 
(a) the individual is, or is an employee of, the insured’s agent; and 
(b) the information was acquired by the insured’s agent (or by an 
employee of that agent) through a business relationship with a 
person who is not connected with the contract of insurance. 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) the persons connected with a 
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contract of insurance are –  
(a) the insured and any other persons for whom cover is provided by 
the contract, and 
(b) if the contract re-insurer risks covered by another contract, the 
persons who are (by virtue of this subsection) connected with that 
other contaract. 
(6) Whether an individual or not, an insured ought to know what should 
reasonably have been revealed by a reasonable search of 
information available to the insured (whether the search is conducted 
by making enquiries or by any other means). 
(7) In subsection (6) “information” includes information held within the 
insured’s organisation or by any other person (such as the insured’s 
agent or a person for whom cover is provided by the contract of 
insurance). 
(8) For the purposes of this section –  
(a) “employee”, in relation to the insured’s agent, includes any 
individual working for the agent, whatever the capacity in which 
the individual acts, 
(b) an individual is responsible for the insured’s insurance if the 
individual participates on behalf of the insured in the process of 
procuring the insured’s insurance (whether the individual does so 
as the insured’s employee or agent, as an employee of the 
insured’s agent or in any other capacity), and 
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(c) “senior management” means those individuals who paly significant 
roles in the making of decisions about how the insured’s activities 
are to be managed or organised. 
Knowledge in this provision, as it is prescribed in IA 2015 s. 6(1), would include 
actual knowledge and “blind eye” knowledge, consisting of “matters which the 
individual suspected, and of which the individual would have knowledge but for 
deliberately refraining from confirming them or enquiring about them”.  
 
Section 4, as one of the key features, has clarified the nature of the assured’s 
knowledge.329 In order to do so the IA 2015 has removed the independent duty 
of an “agent to insure” set out in s. 19 of the MIA 1906, and has replaced it with 
the general agency law concept for attribution of knowledge to the authority, 
and so here to the assured. Thus, “the sole disclosure obligation is on the 
assured.”330 Issues as to the broker’s duty are discussed in that context in 
chapter 6. Moreover, the IA 2015 has drawn a distinction, which did not appear 
in the previous legislation, between the knowledge of an assured who is an 
individual (IA 2015 s. 4(2)) and the knowledge of an assured who is not (IA 
2015 s. 4(3)). 
 
3.3.1.3.1 The assured is an individual  
If the assured is an individual (such as a sole trader or practitioner),331 s/he is 
                                                            
329 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-046 
330 ibid 
331 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para 51 
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treated as knowing: (1) actual knowledge to the individual (IA 2015 s. 4(2)(a)) – 
this reflects s. 18(1) of the 1906 Act; (2) the blind-eye knowledge to the 
individual (IA 2015 ss. 4(2)(a) & 6(1)); (3) matters should reasonably have been 
revealed by a reasonable search of information available to the insured 
(whether the search is conducted by making enquiries or by any other means) 
(IA 2015 s. 4(6)) – this concept is discussed below;  (4) matters known to one or 
more of the individuals who are responsible for the assured’s insurance (IA 
2015 s. 4(2)(b)). By IA 2015 s. 4(8)(b), “an individual is responsible for the 
insured’s insurance if the individual participates on behalf of the insured in the 
process of procuring the insured’s insurance (whether the individual does so as 
the insured’s employee or agent, as an employee of the insured’s agent or in 
any other capacity)”. This provision “catches individuals within the assured’s 
organisation who are responsible for placing insurance.”332  
 
3.3.1.3.2 The assured is not an individual 
If the assured is a legal person, the assured is treated as have knowledge in the 
following circumstances. First, information that is known to one or more 
individuals who are part of the assured’s senior management (IA 2015 s. 
4(3)(a)). By s. 4(8)(c) of the IA 2015, “senior management” is defined as “those 
individuals who play significant roles in the making of decisions about how the 
insured’s activities are to be managed or organised”. In this scenario, “senior 
management” may include, but not limited to, members of the board of 
                                                            
332 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-70 
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directors.333 However, the knowledge of those individuals who do not fall within 
the category of senior management, yet who dose perform management roles 
or otherwise possess relevant information or knowledge about the risk to be 
insured, may be captured by the “reasonable search” referred to in IA 2015 s. 
4(6).334  
 
Second, the assured ought to know, again, as referred to in s. 4(6) of the IA 
2015, information that should reasonably have been revealed through a 
reasonable search of information available to the insured (whether the search is 
conducted by making enquiries or by any other means). IA 2015 s. 4(7) makes 
clear that “information” includes “information held within the insured’s 
organisation or by any other person (such as the insured’s agent or a person for 
whom cover is provided by the contract of insurance)”. The requirement of a 
“reasonable search” potentially imposes a far more onerous obligation on 
insureds comparing to the old law which related to knowledge of the insured in 
the ordinary course of its business. The degree of thoroughness of a 
reasonable search for potentially material information will vary. 335  The Law 
Commission have stated that what is reasonable “will depend on the size, 
nature and complexity of the business … [T]he question should be judged 
objectively, by reference to a reasonable, prudent assured in that class”.336 For 
large insurance contracts, the Law Commission hopes that “the parties will 
                                                            
333 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para 54 
334 ibid para 55 
335 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 8.84 
336 ibid para 8.83 
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discuss and reach agreement on the nature of the search to be undertaken. 
This process would be made much easier by the development of industry-
produced protocols on the types of search which are expected”.337 The concept 
of “reasonable search” is new to English law.338  
 
An assured required to conduct a reasonable search may need to go beyond its 
own business and make reasonable enquiries of its employees or third parties. 
The Law Commission suggested that “any other person” might include brokers 
and other agents such as lawyers, technical advisors and suppliers who may 
know about matters which are relevant to the insurer.339 There is no simple test 
on determining which agents, among that wide range, should be included in the 
search. It will depend on “the circumstances and the type of insurance”.340 
However, the assured cannot be regarded as having unlimited access to its 
agent’s records – the information in this context “must be available to the 
insured”. 341  Further, there is no obligation on an agent to undertake a 
reasonable search, any failure by the agent in conducting the reasonable 
search would be counted as a failure by the insured.342 The notion of a “person 
for whom cover is provided” is left unidentified, but it may well refer to 
beneficiaries under the policy such as directors of a company holding a 
Directors and Officers policy, or sub-contractors to whom cover has been 
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338 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-054 
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extended under a policy issued to the head contractor.343  
 
Third, an assured is deemed to know information known by the individual 
responsible for the insurance which is defined under IA 2015 s. 4(8)(b) – as 
stated previously in the last section. It is to be noted that “this provision is 
concerned with actual and blind-eye knowledge and not matters which ought to 
be known to the person responsible for insurance”.344 This definition is intended 
to catch “all those individuals who participate in the insurance buying process” 
including, for example, the insured’s risk manager or broker,345 albeit a broker is 
not obliged to disclose confidential information acquired through a business 
relationship unconnected to the relevant contract of insurance (IA 2015 s. 4(4)). 
Brokers at this point refer to not only the agent of the assured in placing a risk 
but also the so-called “ad hoc” agents, i.e. “organisation that is only incidentally 
involved in arranging insurance to support a particular transaction,” for example, 
a bank in respect of a loan and a car dealership in respect of motor insurance.346 
Knowledge of any individuals participating in procuring insurance as an “ad hoc” 
agent is deemed to be knowledge of the assured.347 Issues as to knowledge of 
the broker are discussed separately in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                            
343 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-054. 
344 ibid at 7-049. 
345 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
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3.3.1.3.3 Limits of the assured’s knowledge: concealing fraud 
In Re Hampshire Land Co,348 the Court held that where an officer or employee 
of a company commits a fraud upon the company itself then the knowledge of 
his own fraud is not the knowledge of the company. The principle expounded in 
that judgment has become a common law exception to the general rules of 
attribution –i.e. a principal is not deemed to have the knowledge held by an 
agent engaged in a fraud against him349 – known as the Re Hampshire Land 
principle. The principle of Re Hampshire Land in its modern formulation by 
Buckley LJ in Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture350 applied in insurance 
cases. Thus if the underwriting agent acting for an reinsured committed a fraud 
against the reinsured, assuming the fraud is material to the risk, the reinsured is 
under no obligation to disclose that fraud unless he is in possession of that 
information.351 This principle however has extended by Rix J in Arab Bank Plc v 
Zurich Insurance Co352 to cover the agent’s fraud against the insurers with the 
assured is being the secondary victim of that fraud. Such an “extension” was 
subsequently rejected by Court of Appeal in Moore Stephens v Stone & Rolls 
Ltd.353 The Court of Appeal’s decision was upheld on other grounds by the 
House of Lords, albeit Lord Mance, in his dissenting judgment, approved the 
Rix LJ’s approach. The House of Lord’s decision in Moore Stephens was re-
                                                            
348 [1896] 2 Ch 743. 
349 PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 WLR 1136; Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] 1 
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350 [1979] Ch 250, 261. 
351 See PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 WLR 1136. 
352 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262. 
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examined by the Supreme Court in Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd.354 The Court held 
that Moore Stephens should be limited to its facts and be put on one side and 
not looked at again: “it is not in the interests of the future clarity of the law for it 
to be treated as authoritative or as assistance save as already indicated”.355  
 
The principle of Re Hampshire Land has now been put on a statutory footing in 
the new regime under the 2015 Act. Accordingly, IA 2015 s. 6(2)(a) states that 
nothing in the Act relating to the duty of fair presentation “affects the operation 
of any rule of law according to which knowledge of a fraud perpetrated by an 
individual (F) either … the insured … is not to be attributed to the insured … 
where … F is” any of the individuals responsible for the assured’s insurance or, 
in the case of an assured who is not an individual, any individual who is part of 
the assured’s senior management. The legal effect of that section is that the Re 
Hampshire Land rule has been extent to fraud engaged by an employee or a 
member of senior management of the assured. The Law Commission specially 
emphasized that the wider interpretation of the Re Hampshire Land principle 
should not be applied to limit the intentionally designed knowledge provisions. 
Thus it seems that the Law Commission is in favour of wider interpretation of 
the rule in this context. The question then arises on whether IA 2015 s. 6(2)(a) 
applies where the principal is a secondary victim of a fraud directed at another. 
The provision is “potentially of much wider scope than was probably intended”, 
                                                            
354 [2015] UKSC 23. 
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356 if it does. It will be interesting to see how English Courts would interpret s. 
6(2)(a) of IA 2015. 
 
3.3.1.4 Duty of disclosure under Chinese insurance law 
In China, the insured’s duty to disclose and duty not to misrepresent to the 
insurer material information in relation to marine insurance are governed by the 
Chapter 12 of Maritime Code of PRC, namely, Marine Insurance. The Insurance 
Act of PRC 2015 deals with general insurance policies outside the sector of 
marine insurance. It is submitted that there is no disclosure obligation rest upon 
a non-marine assured under Chinese insurance law. Art. 16 par. 1 of the IAC 
2015 states: in concluding an insurance contract, the proposer shall make an 
honest disclosure where the insurer makes inquiries about relevant 
circumstances of the subject insured or matters relating to the insured. The 
phrase “make an honest disclosure” is the English interpretation of Chinese 
characters “如实告知”. The translating method here used is apparently the 
“literal translation”, which led to a loss of faithful translation. Reading the phrase 
in between the lines – special attention should be paid to the wording “where 
the insurer makes inquiries about the relevant circumstances…” – “如实告知” 
simply refers to “an honest statement” in answering questions arose by insurers, 
which just happen to be consistent with the duty not to make false statement set 
out in s. 20 of the MIA 1906, as restated in s. 3(3)(c) of the new regime in 
Insurance Act 2015.  
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Unlike the Insurance Act of PRC 2015, Maritime Code 1993 has adopted the 
duty of disclosure, which is provided in art. 222 in the following terms: 
“Before the contract is concluded, the insured shall truthfully disclose to 
the insurer the material circumstances which the insured has knowledge 
of or ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business practice and 
which would influence the insurer in deciding the premium or determining 
whether or not he will take the risk. 
The insured need not disclose to the insurer facts which the insurer has 
known of or the insurer ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary 
business practice if about which the insurer made no inquiry. 
This section is, to a large extent, a copy of s. 18 of Marine Insurance 1906, 
although the remedy is missing in that provision. In accordance with art.1 of the 
Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues about the Trial of 
Cases Concerning Marine Insurance Disputes, the governing law for marine 
insurance disputes is the Maritime Code 1993; if there is any issue that is not 
prescribed in the Code, the courts shall seek to apply relevant provisions in the 
Insurance Act of PRC; if there is no such provision in both the Code and the 
Insurance Act, rules in Contract Act 1999 shall be applied. Thus insurers might 
entitle to rescind the contract for breach of the duty of disclosure in the context 
of marine insurance. It is noteworthy that the Maritime Code is now going 
through a historic legislative reform undertaken by the NPC. 
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3.3.2 Misrepresentation 
The law of misrepresentation under the Insurance Act 2015 remains largely 
untouched. The duty not to make false statement set out in s. 20 of the 
MIA1906 is now restated in s. 3(3)(c) of IA 2015. There is a fair presentation of 
the risk where “every material representation as to a matter of fact is 
substantially correct, and every material representation as to a matter of 
expectation or belief is made in good faith.” S. 7(3) of the IA 2015, mirrored ss. 
18(2) and 20(2) of MIA 1906, articulates the definition of materiality as that “a 
circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgement of 
a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what 
terms. The test is, again, objective. Although “representation” is not defined in 
the IA 2015, it is not difficult to notice an echo of s. 20(3) of MIA 1906, in which 
it reads that “a representation may be either a representation as to a matter of 
fact, or as to a matter of expectation or belief”. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy at 
this point that not every statement said by the assured is capable of being 
referred to as a representation.357 A statement for these purposes must be 
specific and “made in circumstances that is appropriate for a reasonable insurer 
to rely upon it”.358 A general statement which is not one that was reasonably 
designed to be relied upon is not a representation but a mere “puff”.359 Further, 
any representation made by the assured’s broker has to be on behalf of the 
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assured.360 
 
“In practice the distinction between misrepresentation and non-disclosure may 
be blurred.”361 English courts have acknowledged that silence could amount to 
misrepresentation where an express question is deliberately left blank. 362 
Further, where a statement was correct at the time when it was made and yet 
rendered untrue before the contract is concluded, failure to correct such a 
statement which the assured is under a duty to do so, is classified as 
misrepresentation rather than non-disclosure. 363  Thus a partially corrected 
statement might probably be classified as a misrepresentation.364 Further IA 
2015 s. 7(6), repeating MIA 1906 s. 20(6), states that “a representation may be 
withdrawn or corrected before the contract of insurance is entered into”. Thus if 
a representation made during the placement may be initially correct, but then 
subsequently become incorrect prior to the conclusion of the contract, the 
insured is under an obligation to correct it by the date of the contract.365 If he/she 
does so, there is no breach of duty. 
 
3.3.2.1 Misrepresentation in China 
In respect to non-marine insurance, making an honest representation, as being 
the only duty in transmitting information by the assured prior to entering into an 
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364 ibid 
365 Limit No 2 Ltd v AXA Versicherung AG [2007] EWHC (Comm) 2321, [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 330 [89]-
[102] 
149 
 
insurance contract, is stated in art.16 of the IAC 2015 in the following terms, 
Article 16366  
In concluding an insurance contract, the proposer shall make an honest 
disclosure thereof where the insurer makes inquiries about relevant 
circumstances of the subject insured or matters relating to the insured.  
The insurer shall have the right to rescind the insurance contract if the 
proposer fails to perform the obligation of making an honest disclosure 
as prescribed in the preceding paragraph intentionally or [through] gross 
negligence (recklessly), thereby materially affecting the insurer's decision 
on whether or not to underwrite the risk or to increase the premium.  
The right to rescind an insurance contract as prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph shall be annulled after 30 days or more from the day when the 
insurer knows the cause of rescission. After two years or more from the 
day when an insurance contract is entered into, the insurer shall not 
rescind the contract; where an insured incident occurs, the insurer shall 
be liable for paying indemnity or insurance money.  
Where the proposer intentionally fails to perform the obligation of making 
an honest disclosure, the insurer shall not be liable for paying 
indemnities or insurance money for an insured occurring prior to the 
rescission of the contract, and shall not refund the insurance premium. 
                                                            
366 Author translation, with reference to various versions of English translation of IAC 2015 art.16 including 
the official one undertaken by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council – Laws and Regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China (Civil and Commercial Law). References used in translating this provision 
are provided in Appendix 1 incorporated in this thesis.  
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Where the proposer fails to perform the obligation of making an honest 
disclosure for gross negligence, which has a material effect on the 
occurrence of an insured incident, the insurer shall not be liable for 
paying indemnities or insurance money for the insured incident occurring 
prior to the rescission of the contract, but shall return the insurance 
premium.  
Where the insurer, knowing the truth that the proposer failed to make an 
honest disclosure, enters into an insurance contract with the proposer, 
the insurer shall not rescind the contract, and if an insured incident 
occurs, the insurer shall be liable for paying indemnities or insurance 
money.  
An insured incident means an event falling within the agreed coverage 
under the insurance policy. 
The law is silent on whether the duty continues after the contract is concluded. 
Unlike the current English position, consumer insurance is not separated as a 
distinctive issue from commercial insurance matters under IAC 2015. There is 
no evidence showing in the provision that the duty not to misrepresent should 
be carried mutually by both the assured and the insurer. Thus it rests upon the 
insured only.367 This is similar to the new duty of fair presentation under the 
English regime of IA 2015. Pursuant to IAC 2015 art. 16 par. 6, if insurers were 
aware of the breach at the conclusion of the contract, they cannot rescind the 
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contract on the basis of misrepresentation. The purpose of this rule is to 
discourage any potential abuse of the defence of misrepresentation. 
 
Bearing in mind that the inappropriate English translation mentioned earlier, the 
pre-contractual duty is imposed upon the insurance applicants to provide honest 
statements in responding to specific enquiries made by the insurer. Art.4 par.1 
of the Court Hearing Guidance on Insurance Disputes (Trial) 368, published by 
Shandong High People’s Court, provides that the insurance proposers’ duty of 
making an honest representation is limited only to the matters about which the 
insurer raises inquiries. Insurance applicants are not obliged to volunteer 
information to the insurers in the absence of inquiry. The construction of art. 16 
par. 1 is affirmed by the SPC in the Interpretation II.369 The burden of proof as to 
the scope and content of the inquiries rests upon the insurer.370  Hereinafter 
such a duty will be referred to as the duty of making an honest representation. 
 
In practice, the key problem in performing the duty not to misrepresent is that, 
for most non-marine insurance contracts, the applicants are required to 
complete an application form, in which they are asked to answer accordingly, in 
good faith, all questions arose by the insurer. Notably, a common problem 
arose at this point in determining on whether or not the duty has been satisfied 
is the open-ended question that exists in the standard application form of 
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certain types of insurance policies. A classic open-ended question, which is 
generally phrased as “any other information or circumstances related to the 
matter mentioned above”, appears normally in the last section of a clause of 
insurance contracts, such as a question related to medical history in a life 
insurance policy. It may give rise to difficulties and complications in legal 
practice. What has happen to Mr Bai in Yong BAI v China Life Insurance (Group) 
Co Shanghai Sub-office371 is a classic example of the kind. 
 
3.3.2.1.1 Yong BAI v China Life Insurance (Group) Co Shanghai Sub-office 
On December 10th 1996, Mr Bai, known as the proposer and the assured, 
sought a life insurance policy with three special extraneous risks against 
Medicaid plus an additional cover against hospital care expenses from China 
Life Insurance (Group) Co. Shanghai Branch (the “CLSH”), which covered the 
cost of his hospitalisation and that of his medical treatment expenses. The 
period covered in the insurance policy is one year. The policy was then 
renewed afterwards. In the policy, there is a Health Condition Clause in which it 
provided ten types of diseases listed in section (a) to (i) with an open-ended 
question in relation to his medical history contained in section (j) – the last 
section of the Health Condition Clause. The assured had had medical 
treatments for 60 days due to duodenal ulcer (with haemorrhage), which was 
not listed in section (a) to (i), from 9th June to 7th August 1998. Consequently, 
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the assured made a claim to CLSH against ￥4,486.92 medical expenses, but 
was declined by the insurer on the ground of the failure to comply with his 
obligation set out in IAC 2015 art. 16 par. 1. The court of first instant held that 
the applicant had fully complied with the duty as duodenal ulcer was not 
expressly listed in the health condition clause. Thus, the insurer is obliged to 
pay the claim. The appeal court overrode the decision and held that duodenal 
ulcer is considered to be included in section (j), the open-ended question, of the 
Health Condition Clause. Given that the assured knew clearly that he had 
serious duodenal ulcer owing to his persistent pain over the last twenty years 
and his long-term prescription, even though it was prescribed in 1988, the 
assured deliberately kept back his medical history; thereby the assured is not 
entitled to the claim.  
 
3.3.2.1.2 Trial guidance on performance of open-ended questions 
The issue of open-ended questions had increasingly caught Chinese courts’ 
attention. As early as 2004, Beijing High People’s Court made it clear in its 
‘Court Hearing Guidance on ‘A Number of Issues Concerning Insurance 
Disputes (Trial)’ that any provision designed to cover open-ended questions in 
an insurance proposal form, which is to be phrased as “other [circumstances 
relating to the matter mentioned above]” shall be deemed invalid as a result of 
that open-ended questions violate the “limited duty of disclosure”372, namely the 
assured is only required to answer specific questions made by the insurer in 
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good faith. In 2011, Shandong High People’s Court adopted a similar approach 
in its ‘Court Hearing Guidance on Insurance Disputes (Trial)’,373 inter alia, art.4 
para.2 provides that any open-ended questions stated in the Inquiry Form or 
Information Notice using the term “others” or “besides [the above mentioned]” 
are deemed to be that no question has ever being asked. High people’s courts 
in other provinces had nevertheless been reluctant to deal with such an issue in 
implementing art. 16 par. 2 of IAC 2015. Apparently, the inconsistency will lead 
to legal uncertainty in practice as the insured may face a totally opposite 
decision in different regions of China, and Mr Bai would indeed have been paid 
should the case be heard in Beijing instead of Shanghai. The legal uncertainty 
brought by the inconformity of the laws did not resolve until, in 2013, the 
problem was eventually recognised by the Supreme People’s Court. In the 
Interpretation II, the SPC indicates that in the event that the insurer seeks to 
rescind the insurance contract on the ground of misrepresentation by the 
assured in answering a generalised question – questions arose by the insurer 
has to be clear and specific – contained in the Inquiry Form, the people’s courts 
shall not uphold. The issue of open-ended questions in the context of a 
consumer insurance contract under English law is considered in Chapter 8.  
 
3.3.2.1.3 Incontestability provision 
A more important change made by the 2009 Amendment, and preserved by IAC 
2015, in respect with the duty of representation was the addition of the 
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incontestability provision. Art. 16 par. 3 provides two time limits on the insurer’s 
right to rescind the contract upon an insured’s misrepresentation: (1) at least 
thirty days from the day when the insurer knows the cause of rescission, or (2) 
at least two years from the date of contract formation. These changes are 
intended to prevent insurers from abusing their right to terminate policies and 
create new incentives for insurers to be diligent when underwriting new 
business.374  However, it is not clear if the provision equally applies to property 
insurance while it applies to life insurance.375 In England, incontestability clause 
is often used in life insurance.376  
3.3.2.2 “Substantially correct” 
Every representation must be “substantially correct”, if as to a matter of fact.377 
That is expressed in the new regime of 2015 Act. IA 2015 s. 7(5), restating s. 
20(4) of the MIA 1906, provides that “A material representation is substantially 
correct if a prudent insurer would not consider the difference between what is 
represented and what is actually correct to be material.” It is clear that a literally 
correct but nevertheless highly misleading statement made by the assured 
towards a clear and specific question is to be regarded as a 
misrepresentation.378 In Commonwealth Insurance Company of Vancouver v 
Groupe Sprinks SA and Compagnie Française d’Assurances Européenes and 
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Others,379 the broker for the plaintiff proposer stated that the gross ratio on the 
previous year’s quota share reinsurance stood at 69.30 per cent settled with 
20.65 per cent outstanding, but that these figures failed to take account of the 
fact that 10 per cent of the income on the reinsurance was still to be received. 
The broker therefore effectively represented the gross loss ratio to be 85 per 
cent, while in fact figure was 108 per cent. Lloyd J held that the difference 
between the represented and actual information was not material, and that the 
representation was therefore substantially correct. There is no single test for the 
correctness of a statement. Whether or not a representation made by the 
assured is “substantially correct” is to be assessed “in the context of the custom 
and practice of the trade to which it relates.380 Thus in Iron Trades Mutual 
Insurance Co Ltd and Others v Companhia de Seguros Imperio381, Hobhouse J 
held that whilst a representation that the cedant’s retained line under a 
retrocession was 50 per cent when in fact it was 6.5 per cent was material, 
where the retention was in fact 40 per cent the misrepresentation was not 
material. 
 
3.3.2.3 “Expectation or Belief” 
S. 3(3)(c) of IA 2015, restating Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 20(5), provides 
that every material representation as to a matter of expectation or belief must 
be made in good faith. This reflects the common law rule that if the assured is 
                                                            
379 [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 
380 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-071 
381 [1991] 1 LRLR 213 
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required to state his intention or opinion, the test for falsity is whether or not the 
assured held that intention 382  or opinion. 383  The distinction between a 
representation of fact and one of belief is a matter of construction.384 In terms of 
determination of “good faith” in this context, the Law Commission suggested 
that the representation might be made in good faith, if the relevant information 
did not reveal by a reasonable search.385 However, a representation made 
merely on a reasonable ground does not suffice, although a reasonable 
ground386 is necessary.   
 
3.3.2.4 Warranties and representations 
The common law allowed a representation to be converted into warranties, 
regardless the misstatement is material or not. 387  That practice continued 
operating in the business insurance world after its abolition in the consumer 
realm in 2012. With the born of the Insurance Act 2015, the basis of the contract 
clause has now officially stepped down from the stage of history. The necessary 
measure is provided in IA 2015 s. 9, repeating the equivalent provision 
applicable to consumer insurance in CI(DR)A 2012 s. 6. Details are provided in 
that context in Chapter 8. 
9  Warranties and representations 
                                                            
382 Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No.2) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 667. 
383 Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177; Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Games Video Co (GVC) SA, (The 
Game Boy) [2004] EWHC 15 (Comm). 
384 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 7.48 
385 ibid para 7.53 
386 ibid para 7.57 
387 Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413, 1922 SC (HL) 156 
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(1) This section applies to representations made by the insured in 
connection with –  
(a) a proposed non-consumer insurance contract, or  
(b) a proposed variation to non-consumer insurance contract. 
(2) Such a representation is not capable of being converted into a 
warranty by means of any provision of the non-consumer insurance 
contract (or if the terms of the variation), or of any other contract (and 
whether by declaring the representation to form the basis of the contract 
or otherwise). 
In accordance with s. 16(1) of the IA 2015, the parties cannot contract out of the 
prohibition on basis of the contract clauses. However, it is still possible for the 
insurer to use warranties of past or present fact, but they must be included 
specifically in the contract.388 It is to be noted at this point that if a warranty is 
included in a policy, then it is subject to the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the IA 
2015. 
 
3.3.3 Remedy for breach of the duty of fair presentation 
In China, the insured’s state of mind requirement was introduced by the 2009 
Amendment. The purpose is to limit the ability of insurers to unilaterally 
terminate policies, effectively increased feasibility of sound underwriting 
practices. Art. 16 pars. 4-5 of the 2009 Amendment provides that the insurers 
                                                            
388 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) paras 15.3 & 16.11 
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can only rescind the contract where insureds intentionally made material 
misrepresentation, and breach the duty of honest representation through gross 
negligence, and the misstatement made thereon would have had an impact on 
the insurer’s decision to underwrite the risk or set the premium. Previously, 
mere negligent of omission of such information by the insured was sufficient to 
trigger the insurer’s right to rescind the insurance contract.389 This provision 
stays untouched in the Insurance Act of PRC 2015. 
 
At common law, the assured’s state of mind was irrelevant. Since IA 2015, it is 
no longer the position. The 2015 Act adopted a proportionate approach based 
on degrees of culpability of the insured, which expressly stated in ss. 8(4)-(5) as 
follow: 
 (4) A qualifying breach is either –  
(a) deliberate or reckless, or 
(b) neither deliberate nor reckless 
(5) A qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the insured –  
(a) knew that it was in breach of the duty of fair presentation, or 
(b) did not care whether or not it was in breach of that duty. 
This reflects the approach set out by s. 5(1) of 2012 Act, namely, classification 
of qualifying misrepresentations. By s. 8(6), it is for the insurer to show that a 
                                                            
389 Insurance Act of PRC 1995, art.17 para 4, provided that Where the proposer fails to perform the 
obligation of making an honest disclosure negligently, materially effecting the occurrence of an insured 
incident, the insurer shall not be liable for paying indemnities or insurance money for the insured incident 
occurring prior to the rescission of the contract, but shall return the insurance premium. Art.17 remained 
untouched in 2002 Amendment.  
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qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless, while, on the other side, the 
insured is going to prove that they were not being deliberate or reckless in 
providing information.390 Remedy for a deliberate or reckless qualifying breach is 
set out in Schedule 1 para.2 as follow:  
 Schedule 1 
 “2 If a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless, the insurer –  
(a) may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and 
(b) need not to return any of the premiums paid.” 
IA 2015 confines the common law automatic right of avoidance to deliberate or 
reckless breaches of duty. The Law Commission have suggested that a 
deliberate breach of the duty of fair presentation could involve intentionally: 
refraining from disclosing a circumstances which the insured knows to be 
material; making a data dump or otherwise presenting risk in a particular way in 
order to conceal certain information (as in the case where a summary is very 
misleading); or lying about a material representation, either in the initial 
presentation or by knowingly giving a false response to an insurer enquiry.391 
Recklessness indicates circumstances where the insured “did not care” whether 
the statement is true of false, but the phrase “did not care” does not refer to 
“careless” actions, but to a “greater degree of culpability than acting 
‘carelessly’”.392 “Deliberate and reckless” will include fraudulent behaviour.393 As 
                                                            
390 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-198 
391 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 11.43. 
392 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015, para 80. 
393 Ibid. 
161 
 
to meaning to the question of what a deliberate or reckless should be left to the 
courts, applying common law principles.394 
 
Where the breach is neither reckless nor deliberate, the remedies set out in IA 
2015 are less draconian. They are intended to be proportionate and to reflect 
what the insurer would have done if he had known the undisclosed information 
or the misrepresentation at the conclusion of the contract. If the insurer is 
unable to show a deliberate or reckless breach, it may only refuse the claim in 
its entirety and avoid the policy if it can show that he had been induced, and 
therefore would not have written the policy at all. If the insurer would have 
written the policy only on different terms and/or charged a higher premium, the 
contract is treated as entered into on those terms or the claim is reduced 
proportionately in line with the higher premium. One thing that is worth noting at 
this point is that “if there would have been a contract but on different terms, the 
insurer is entitled to the benefit of those different terms, but that may not give 
the insurers a defence to the claim in question if the loss was entirely unrelated 
to the terms to be added”.395 Under CI(DR)A 2012, innocent insured has a good 
claim and negligent insured has a proportionate remedy. IA 2015 does not draw 
such a distinction between honest breaches and negligent breaches. Thus 
innocent breach of the duty of fair presentation under IA 2015 would result in a 
reduction of the amount paid out on the claim.  
                                                            
394 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 11.45. 
395 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-200. 
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3.3.4 Contracting Out 
In contrast with position of consumer insurance, parties is entitled to agree 
terms which are less favourable to the insured than those set out in the 2015 
Act subject to certain transparency requirements set out in s. 17. Restrictions to 
the use of contract terms in relation to business contract and other non-
consumer contacts of insurance are prescribed in s. 16 of the IA 2015. Other 
provisions of the 2015 Act can be contracted out but only if:  
• the insurer takes sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the 
attention of the insured (or its broker) before the contract is entered into 
or the variation agreed;396 and 
• the disadvantageous term must be clear and unambiguous as to its 
effect in the contract.397 
Thus, it will not be possible for insurers to avoid provisions of IA 2015 by 
introducing a simple additional clause into their policy documentation excluding 
the application of the 2015 Act without bringing it to the insured’s attention. 
“Sufficient steps” depend on the characteristics of the insured and the 
circumstances of the transaction,398 as steps that are sufficient for one insured 
may not necessarily be sufficient for another. The Law Commission has 
explained further in different scenarios that additional steps by the insurer would 
be needed where a small business purchases insurance online but, conversely, 
                                                            
396 Insurance Act 2015, s. 17(2). 
397 Insurance Act 2015, s. 17(3). 
398 Insurance Act 2015, s. 17(4). 
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more leniency will be allowed where a sophisticated insurance buyer purchases 
cover through Lloyd’s. The more lenient approach applies where a broker is 
involved, even if the insurance buyer is unsophisticated.399 
 
3.3.5 Good Faith 
Section 14(1) of the Insurance Act 2015, reshaping the section 17 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, provides that any law permitting an insurer to avoid a policy 
on the basis that the duty of utmost good faith had not been observed by the 
other party has been abolished. Thus a breach of the duty utmost good faith 
can no longer give rise to the remedy of avoidance. In other words, any rule of 
law, including s. 17 of MIA 1906 and any other similar provisions with the same 
effect, which would have entitled the insurer to avoid the contract for breach of 
utmost good faith, can no longer be relied upon. The duty of good faith is now 
concerned to be a general interpretative principle,400 and to that extent the 
contracts of insurance remain contracts of utmost good faith. 401  As noted 
throughout this chapter, it was noted that insured’s pre-contractual duty to 
disclose and not to misrepresent, which transformed under IA 2015 as an 
independent duty of fair presentation, has been pulled away from the general 
concept of utmost good faith. Thus the removal of the avoidance remedy from s. 
17 of the MIA 1906 by IA 2015 s. 14 – meaning there is no alternative remedy – 
places utmost good faith in a brand-new position to play a more flexible role in 
                                                            
399 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) paras 29.62-29.67 
400 ibid paras 30.22-30.24  
401 Insurance Act 2015, s. 14(2). 
164 
 
relation to the insurer’s pre-contractual duties and the post-contractual conduct 
of both parties. The further operation of utmost good faith remains uncertain 
and will likely need to be tested in court proceedings to better understand how it 
will be interpreted and applied to different scenarios. 
 
3.3.6 The Third Parties (Right Against Insurers) Act 2010 
The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (the TPRAIA 2010 or the 
2010 Act), intended to enable victims of wrongdoers (third parties) to proceed 
directly against insurers of liabilities in the case where the insured has become 
insolvent by removing the restoration requirement, received Royal Assent on 
March 25, 2010; but has not yet come into force due to a number of technical 
deficiencies. The 2015 Act rectifies the deficiencies, namely, amended the 
definition of the “insured” and, more specifically the type of insolvency event 
which the insured must undergo in order to trigger the application of the 2010 
Act.402 Thus, the TPRAIA 2010 is up to date with all changes known to be 
eventually in force on August 1, 2016.403  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
402 The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, part 6, ss. 19-20 
403 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/changes-to-the-third-parties-rights-against-insurers-act-2010> 
assessed 9 Dec 2017 
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Chapter 4 Business Insurance: Materiality and Inducement 
 
4.1 Materiality and inducement 
The Marine Insurance 1906 referred only to the test of materiality. Inducement, 
as the second limb of the test, was added by the decision of the House of Lords 
in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd.404 Now both tests 
have been codified in the new business insurance regime of Insurance Act 2015.  
 
4.2 Materiality 
It has always been a crucial qualification to the right to avoid a contract of 
insurance, that the breach of the duty of utmost good faith, now as the duty of 
fair presentation, was “material to the risk”.405 Prior to 12th August 2016, the 
central element of utmost good faith was Section 18 of Marine Insurance Act 
1906, in which it places an onerous duty on the assured to volunteer to the 
insurer every material fact which the assured known or ought to know in the 
ordinary course of business before concluding an insurance contract. Every 
circumstance is material if it would influence the judgment of a hypothetical 
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the 
risk.406 Thus, the meaning of materiality as it is applied to insurance contracts is 
inextricably tied to a standard of prudence. Materiality is tested by reference to 
the mind of a hypothetical prudent insurer, which had been widely criticised on 
                                                            
404 [1994] 3 All ER 581 
405 ss. 18 and 20 of the MIA 1906; Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1984] Lloyd’s Rep 476; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance 
Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501; S 13 of the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Australia);  
406 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 18(2) 
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the basis that the assured has little idea about the mind of a hypothetical 
prudent insure in assessing the risk.407 Consequentially, the Law Commission 
introduced a new test of materiality in its first Consultation Paper in 2007, in 
which the “prudent insurer” was replaced with a “reasonable insured”. Instead of 
asking whether the information was something that would influence the 
judgement of a prudent insurer, the question became what a reasonable 
insured in the circumstances would consider to be relevant to the insurer. It 
was, however, recognised that this approach would bring “an unknown and 
untested concept” which did not materially assist given the numerous different 
factual situations and risks.408 That proposal was not taken forward. Under the 
Insurance Act 2015, the test is being continued “to be defined by reference to 
circumstance which would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer”.409  
 
Over the years, the test of materiality has been variously defined in series of 
cases in common law jurisdictions in the following phrase: something a prudent 
insurer would have wanted to be aware of; 410  something which would 
reasonably affect a prudent insurer, 411  or at least which has the capacity 
reasonably to affect a prudent insurer;412 or something that “has influenced a 
                                                            
407 Joel v Law Union & Crown Insurance Company [1908] 2 KB 863; Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance Co 
Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 440, 475 (Forbes J). 
408 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 5.48 
409 ibid para 6.5 
410 Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
[1984] Lloyd’s Rep 476; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501; St 
Paul Fire & Matine Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd v McConnell Dowell [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116 
411 St Paul Fire & Matine Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd v McConnell Dowell [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116; Randall v 
Atlantica Insurance Co Ltd (1984) 80 F.L.R. 253; Barclay Holdings v British National Insurance Co Ltd 
(1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 514; Akedian Co Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 148 A.L.R. 480 
412 Itobar Pty Ltd v Mackinnon & Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc (1985) 3 A.N.Z. Ins. Cas. 60-610 
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reasonable insurer to decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher 
premium”;413 or something which is determinative of the acceptance or rejection 
of the risk by a prudent insurer;414 and one case does not attempt a definition 
but merely refers to circumstances which are either “obviously material” or 
not. 415  To summarise, the key point is whether the non-disclosed or 
misrepresented circumstances would have been taken into account by a 
prudent insurer when assessing the risk. It seems unnecessary “for the [English] 
court to distinguish between the various interpretations of the test so minutely 
examined in the arguments”.416 Nevertheless it continues to be worth taking a 
closer look at the leading authorities and Acts 417  together with Chinese 
approaches with respect of materiality from perspective of a comparative law. 
Materiality is relevant to both consumer insurance under CI(DR)A 2012 and 
business insurance under IA 2015. However, the two regimes approach the 
matter in different ways.418 The following discussion is therefore focused on 
business insurance. Materiality as to consumer insurance is considered in that 
context in chapter 8. 
 
4.2.1 Statutory guidance on materiality in the Insurance Act 2015 
The objective test of materiality has been retained by s. 7(3) of IA 2015, in 
which it has been stated in similar terms that “a circumstance or representation 
                                                            
413 Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v Ontario Metal Products [1925] A.C. 344 
414 Barclay Holdings v British National Insurance Co Ltd (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 514 (per Kirby J) 
415 Visscher Enterprises Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Insurance Co Ltd [1981] QD. R. 561 
416 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 541 (per Mustill LJ) 
417 Marine Insurance Act 1906; Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012; 
Insurance Act 2015  
418 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-102. 
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is material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining 
whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms.” In IA 2015 s. 7(2), repeating 
MIA 1906 s. 18(5), the term “circumstance” includes any communication made 
to, or information received by, the insured. A detailed analysis of the degree of 
“influence” is considered below. A further discussion of prudent insurer test and 
differences between Chinese law and English approaches are provided 
thereafter. 
 
The Insurance Act 2015, for the first time, provides some statutory guidance on 
materiality. S. 7(4) of the Act lists indicative and non-exhaustive examples, 
emerging from relevant case law, which may be considered to be ‘material 
circumstances’ in the following context:  
(a) special or unusual facts relating to the risk; 
(b) any particular concerns which let the insured to seek insurance 
cover for the risk, and; 
(c) anything which those concerned with the class of insurance and 
field of activity in question would generally understand as being 
something that should be dealt with in a fair presentation of risks 
of the type in question. 
 
The Law Commission expected that the Act will be backed up by industry 
guidance developed by insurers and insurance buyers, so that insurers, brokers 
and policyholders could work together to provide further guidance, protocols 
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and understandings of this type over what a standard presentation of a risk 
should include in certain circumstances.419 Perhaps different protocols would 
cover different types of insurance.420 
 
4.2.2 The test of materiality under Chinese insurance law 
In China, the duty of disclosure and the duty not to misrepresent in relation to 
marine insurance are governed by the Maritime Code of PRC 1993. The 
Insurance Act of PRC deals only with general insurance policies outside the 
sector of marine insurance.  
 
4.2.2.1 Non-marine insurance – The Insurance Act of PRC 2015 
The definition of materiality as to the non-marine insurance policy is stipulated 
in art. 16 par. 2 of the IAC 2015, which is stated in the following phrase, 
“Where insurance applicants fail to comply with the duty imposed by 
subsection (1) intentionally or [through] gross negligence (recklessly), 
which sufficiently influences the insurer’s decision on whether or not to 
take the risk or charge for a higher premium, the insurer is entitled to 
rescind the contract.” 
The test of materiality, first set out by art. 17 par. 2 of the IAC 1995, is being 
retained in all three subsequent Amendments including the large-scale 
amendment in 2009 and the latest revision in 2015. There are two things need 
                                                            
419 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 6.41 and 7.30. 
420 ibid para 7.29. 
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to be clarified at this point; and both of which are considered thereinafter in this 
chapter. First, it is vague and equivocal on whether the test is a mere influence 
test or the decisive one; and second, it is also ambiguous whether the insurer 
defined in this provision is a hypothetical prudent insurer or the actual insurer 
who in fact entered into the insurance contract with the assured.  
 
4.2.2.2 Marine insurance - Maritime Code 1993 
Unlike the Insurance Act of PRC, art.222 par.1 of MC 1993 adopted a different 
approach. Its English interpretation is as follow,  
“… the insured shall truthfully disclose the insurer of the material 
circumstances which the insured has knowledge of or ought to have 
knowledge of in his ordinary business practice and which would influence 
the insurer in deciding the premium or determining whether or not he will 
take the risk.” 
It means that, to constitute materiality, a circumstance which the insured knows 
or ought to know has to affect the insurer in deciding the premium or 
determining whether to take the risk. Thus, whether or not a fact amounts to 
material circumstance is judged by either of the following two criteria, which are, 
first, whether such a fact makes an impact on the insurers’ willingness to insure 
and if so, on what premium rate. This Section is, to a large extent, a copy of s 
18 of Marine Insurance 1906. Consequently, it is worth taking a closer look at 
common law approaches as to test of materiality in two aspects, in particular, 
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the degree of influence, and identity of underwriter.  
 
4.2.3 The degree of influence  
The insured must disclose material information that he knows or ought to know. 
Materiality is decided by reference to the judgment of the prudent insurer. Lord 
Mustill has amplified, at some length, the test of materiality as laid down in ss. 
18(2) and 20(2) of MIA 1906 and pursed a “purely verbal analysis” to the words 
“influence the judgment of prudent insurer in…determining whether he will take 
the risk”. He stated in his judgment, 
“To my mind, this expression clearly denotes an effect of the thought 
processes of the insurer in weighing up the risk, quite different from 
words which might have been used but were not, such as ‘influencing the 
insurer to take the risk.’”421 
In this case, it is interesting to see how the English courts would interpret the 
modified provision “influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining 
whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms” as it is set out in IA 2015, s. 
7(3). Given that the 2015 Act has just come into force on 12 August 2016, it is 
still too early to perorate if the omission of the word “will” might affect the current 
common law in terms of the test of influence. Other than that, IA 2015 makes no 
change in the law and indeed to be taken as preserving the common law 
position described below.422 
                                                            
421 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 531 
422 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-081 
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The pre-2016 leading authorities as to the test of materiality are Container 
Transport International Inc v Oceanun Mutual Underwriting Association 
(Bermuda)423 and Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd424. 
While the 1906 Act laid down the guidelines governing materiality of facts in ss. 
18 and 20, it failed to address the critical issue, namely, definition of ‘influence’. 
The degree of influence therefore is limitless as there is no absolute standard in 
the Act. There are broadly speaking three possibilities: first, the undisclosed 
information is material which leads to the refusal of the contract; second, the 
non-disclosure is material which causes the adjustment of the contract terms, 
especially as to the premium; third, the information is not so material thereby 
the insurer would have considered it relevant rather than to have refused the 
contract or insisted on different terms.425 The test has been widely argued about 
in respect of the term “influence”, of which the meaning to the term received 
extensive consideration in CTI v Oceanus. 
 
4.2.3.1 CTI v Oceanus – the “decisive” influence test 
An early formulation of the “decisive influence” test was set out by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v Ontario 
Metal Products 426for the purposes of life insurance in the year of 1925. This test 
                                                            
423 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178 
424 [1995] 1 A.C. 501 
425 Malclom Clarke, ‘Failure to Disclose and Failure to Legislate: Is it Material? – II’ [1988] JBL, 298-299 
426 [1925] A.C. 344, (1925) 1 D.L.R. In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 
1 A.C. 501, 539, Lord Mustill quoted that Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v Ontario Metal Products 
[1925] A.C. 344 was ‘the most important case by far’. 
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was later employed by Lloyd J at first instance in CTI v Oceanus 427  and 
reaffirmed by him in his dissenting speech in Pan Atlantic v Pine Top.428 In CTI, 
the question was whether ‘influence’, resulting from non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation, on the hypothetical prudent insurer has to be ‘decisive’ for it 
to be a breach of utmost good faith. Lloyd J held that a circumstance was only 
material if “the mind of the reasonable insurer must have been influenced so as 
to induce him to refuse the risk or alter the premium”.429  
 
The Court of Appeal later rejected the stiff test for materiality. Kerr LJ explained 
further in his judgment as to the interpretation of the meaning of “judgment” 
referred to in s. 18(2) as “the assessment or evaluation of the risk” – i.e. the 
prudent underwriter’s thought processes – rather than the “final decision” of a 
underwriter; 430  and defined, quoting particularly, that “the word ‘influenced’ 
means that the disclosure is one which would have had an impact on the 
formation of his opinion and on his decision-making process in relation to the 
matters covered by s. 18(2).”431  
 
4.2.3.2 Pan Atlantic v Pine Top – the “mere” influence test 
The rejection of the “decisive influence test” by the Court of Appeal in CTI v 
Oceanus was further affirmed on a bare majority by the House of Lords in Pan 
                                                            
427 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178 
428 [1995] 1 A.C. 501 
429 Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
[1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 178, 187-189 
430 Container Transport International Inc. v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
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Atlantic v Pine Top as a result of that such a test placed “an almost impossible 
task”432 on the shoulder of the prospective assured, before the event,433 to 
prognosticate a certain circumstance is material in the eyes of a prudent 
underwriter when fixing a premium or determining whether to accept the risk. It 
seems more feasible for the assured to consider circumstances that may be of 
interest to a prudent underwriter. Given that materiality of a circumstance is a 
matter of fact in each case, “experienced and prudent underwriters are just as 
likely… to disagree about what they would want to know as about what they 
would have done”.434 
 
Further, Lord Mustill concluded the interpretation of the statutory material test in 
terms of the degree of influence as follows:  
“I can see nothing in them [authorities and textbook] to suggest that 
before 1906 materiality was understood as extending only to such 
circumstances as would definitely have changed the underwriter’s mind; 
and they furnish substantial support for the view that the duty of 
disclosure extended to all matters which would have been taken into 
                                                            
432 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 531 per Mustill LJ; also 
in CTI v Oceanus [1984] Lloyd’s Rep 476 (CA), 526-527, Stephenson LJ provided two considerations 
preventing him from adopting the decisive influence test, “The first, stressed by my brethren, is the 
practical difficulty, if not impossibility, of deciding what factors would affect the result of a hypothetical 
prudent insurer’s consideration of a risk, whether to accept it and on what terms; whereas there is no great 
difficulty in answering the question whether any particular factor would be one which he would want to 
know and take into consideration in determining whether to accept a risk and on what terms, without 
having to decide whether he would ultimately disregard it altogether or give it much or little weight. The 
second consideration is the overriding duty of utmost good faith imposed by s. 17. That duty seems to 
require full disclosure and full disclosure seems to require disclosure of everything material to the prudent 
underwriter’s estimate of the character and degree of the risk; and how can that be limited to what can 
affirmatively be found to be a circumstance which would in fact alter a hypothetical insurer’s decision?” 
433 ibid, at 531 
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account by the underwriter when assessing the risk (i.e. the “speculation”) 
which he was consenting to assume. This is, in my opinion, what the Act 
was intending to convey, and what it actually says.”435 
The House of Lords held that the correct test for materiality to both marine and 
non-marine insurance is based on the natural and ordinary meaning of section 
18(2) of the 1906 Act, whether a “material circumstance” was one that would 
have an effect on the thought process of a prudent insurer in weighing up the 
risk in question.436 The word “influence” in its ordinary meaning did not mean 
“change the mind of”, therefore a decisive effect on the acceptance of the risk or 
on the amount of premium is not necessary. The main concern as to the “mere” 
influence test was as being too favourable to insurers.437 For example, insurers 
could excise the remedy of avoidance without prejudicing their consent in 
concluding the contract where underwriters decide to take the risk on the same 
term after taking the withheld or concealed information into account. One may 
argue that the threshold is too low and an insurer, who could avoid the 
insurance contract, was not required to prove that the withholding or 
misstatement of circumstances in question have had a decisive influence upon 
the judgment of the prudent underwriter in calculating the premium or in his 
decision to accept or reject the risk.438 Thus, the House of Lords introduced a 
further requirement for the insurer to prove that he has been induced to enter 
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into the contract, if the insurer could avoid. The concept of inducement is 
provided in detail in the second part of this chapter. 
 
There was strong dissent from Lord Templeman and Lord Lloyd, both of whom 
suggested that nothing could be construed as being decisive if the insurer 
would not have acted differently. 439  In other words, a circumstance is not 
material if it would not have affected acceptance of the risk or the amount of the 
premium. It is precisely not an easy task, in practice, to determine the status of 
the insurer’s belief, given the increasing number of contested cases of non-
disclosure after the decision of CTI v Oceanus.440 Lloyd LJ analysed the phrase 
word-by-word and stated in his judgment that “the ordinary meaning of 
‘influence’ is to affect or alter.”441 The difficulty arises here is the problem of 
proof, especially when there is conflicting expert testimony, therefore it will 
always be for the court to decide what evidence to accept. The Court seems to 
have opted for proof as an expedient measure merely because that a prudent 
underwriter would want to have known about the circumstance and not that the 
non-disclosure or misrepresentation would have led to a different decision or 
have had a decisive influence on the prudent insurer.442  
 
4.2.3.3 The undefined degree of influence in China 
Clearly, the IAC 2015, so far as the degree of influence is concerned, failed to 
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clarify whether the phrase “sufficiently influence” referred to in art. 16 par. 2 
presents the “decisive influence” test or the “mere influence” test. Theoretically, 
pursuant to the Contracts Act 1999, without knowing the non-disclosed or 
misstated facts insurers would highly likely enter into the contract against his 
true willingness.443 Thus, it is generally accepted that the meaning of this Article 
is that the insurer must prove, before the contract is rescinded, that he would 
not underwrite the same risk or will do so only with a higher premium had he 
known the fact concealed or withheld by the proposer. The burden is upon the 
insurer. Compare to the common law approaches, it seems that the phrase 
“sufficiently influence the insurer’s decision”, in its ordinary meaning, literally 
leads to the “decisive influence” conclusion, which has further been confirmed 
by regional courts in the implementation of the Insurance Act. For example, 
both Guangdong and Zhejiang High People’s Courts emphasised, in their 
Guidance as to Adjudication of Insurance Disputes444, a circumstance is material 
if it would influence the judgment of an insurer decisively in fixing the premium 
or determining whether he will enter into the same contract.  
 
With regards to the assured’s duty of disclosure laid down in art.222 of MC 
1993, the term “influence” is left unadorned. Despite absence of indication in the 
provision as to the degree of influence, it is evident that without the term 
“sufficiently”, the information is material if it is of interest to the underwriter, not 
whether it would have had any form of influence on his decision. In spite of the 
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ambiguity in statutory legislation and the lack of authoritative judicial 
interpretation concerning this issue, many Chinese scholars, however, are in 
favour of the “decisive influence” test 445  with various reasons. A pertinent 
observations is that the “decisive influence” test is consistent with the general 
contract law principle in which contracts can only be rescinded in cases of 
radical breach. In other words, if the concealed or misrepresented 
circumstances are the influential factors to the decision as to whether to take 
the risk or to the assessment of the rate of the premium, non-disclosure is 
considered, in this case, to be a “material” breach of contract. In Chenco 
International Inc v China Pacific Insurance Co., Shanghai Branch,446 regarding a 
vessel insurance contract, Shanghai Maritime Court has adopted the approach 
of “decisive influence” and held that any circumstance is to be material if it 
increased the risk insured, thereby the underwriter would have charged a higher 
premium. A similar proposition was once provided by Lloyd J in CTI v 
Oceanus,447 and was rejected by Steyn LJ in the Court of Appeal in his principal 
judgment of Pan Atlantic v Pine Top.448 Steyn LJ clarified the test employed in 
the former in an important respect, namely, not every fact which an underwriter 
might wish to take into account was material; only those facts which might 
“increase the risk”, or make it a different risk from that which the underwriter had 
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agreed to accept, were material.449 Nevertheless, this test was not mentioned by 
the House of Lords. The House of Lords, however, confirmed the objective 
nature of the test laid down in CTI v Oceanus450 for the purposes of assessing 
materiality, along with the introduction of an extra, subjective, element of actual 
inducement to the insurer. 
 
In fact, the mind of an insurer could be influenced by many factors such as 
market fluctuations, economic aims, and political elements when assessing a 
risk. Thus the universal standard of the decisive influence test is practically 
problematic. To meet the materiality requirement is certainly not an easy task 
for the insurer as the Chinese courts usually have sympathy for the assured. 
The Courts have held that the sailing date451 and the carrying vessel452 are not 
deemed to be material circumstances.  
 
4.2.4 Identity of the insurer 
In China, neither Insurance Act of PRC including its amendments, nor Maritime 
Code of PRC clarifies whether the term “insurer” as referred to in the articles 
denotes as a hypothetical “prudent insurer” or an “actual insurer”. For a long 
time, the formulation of “prudent underwriter” test has been widely discussed 
theoretically by Chinese scholars. In Art.9 of the ‘Answers to Practical Issues of 
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Maritime and Admiralty Trials concerning Foreign Affairs’, the Supreme 
People’s Court of China clarified that the insured, in a contract of marine 
insurance, must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, 
material circumstances which affect the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing 
the premium or determining whether to take the risk. By contrast, there is no 
clear indication made for general insurance contracts as to the identity of the 
insurer. It is nonetheless that the definition of “prudent insurer” is omitted from 
the acts, marine or non-marine. 
Unlike the Chinese statutes, the phrase “prudent insurer” was set out by ss. 
18(2) and 20(2) of Marine Insurance Act 1906. However, that English statute 
was also silent on what is meant by prudent insurer. The same approach is 
adopted by Marine Insurance Act 1909 in Australia. By contrast, another 
Australian statute – the Insurance Contract Act 1984, instead of the long-
established common law prudent insurer test for what must be disclosed, 
adopted the “reasonable assured” test.453 The utility of the “prudent insurer” test 
and that of the “reasonable insured” test are widely discussed in various cases 
across different jurisdictions such as England and Australia. A detailed analysis 
as to the two seminal tests is provided in the following paragraphs.  
 
4.2.4.1 The “reasonable insured” test  
In Australia, the ICA 1984 has dramatically altered the law on misrepresentation, 
in particular by abolishing the long-established common law test of prudent 
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underwriter. Instead, it is replaced with a reasonable insured test which echoes 
the test applicable to disclosure, which was found working well in the Australian 
market up until 2005.454 Then the Review Panel, in the final report on the review 
of the ICA 1984, have noted that the main criticism is that it put an 
unreasonable burden on insured by the expectation of knowledge as to what 
the insurer regards as relevant. Since 2006, two Bills have been proposed to 
amend s. 22 of the 1984 Act and to clarity how the test should be applied, 
though neither has been enacted.  
At one time, particularly as regards life insurance, the English courts were 
attempted to modify the test of materiality, by substituting the test of prudent 
assured’s opinion, for that of the prudent underwriter. 455  For example, the 
approach adopted by Fletcher Moulton LJ in Joel v Law Union and Crown 
Insurance Co, 456  when considering the measure of the insured’s duty of 
disclosure, proceeds on the basis that “if a reasonable man would have 
recognised that the knowledge in question was material to disclose, it is no 
excuse that you did not recognise it.” Accordingly, the question should be 
whether a reasonable man in the position of the insured ought to have realized 
that the alleged facts were material to the risk. The assureds obtain benefits 
from this test in at least two aspects: it considers, first, the actual knowledge of 
the insured; and second, the difficulties the assureds are facing when 
considering whether a circumstance would be considered material in the eyes 
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of the insurer. The latter was discussed again by Lord Justice Mustill during his 
leading judgment in Pan Atlantic v Pine Top.457 Even though the test adopted by 
Mustill LJ was the prudent insurer mere influence test, he recognised that:  
[i]t is not the court after the event, but the prospective assured and his 
broker before the event, at whom the test is aimed; it is they who have to 
decide, before the underwriter has agreed to write the risk, what material 
they must disclose. 
The “reasonable man” test was considered again in Horne v Poland458 by Lush J, 
in which he embraced the two tests with no clear line drawn between the view 
of a reasonable assured and that of a prudent underwriter.459 In 1975, the 
“reasonable assured” test suffered a fatal blow from the Court of Appeal in 
Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd460. Here, it was clarified that the 
definition of materiality, irrespective of the kind of risks, is rested with the 
influence to the judgment of a prudent insurer after re-examination of the 
necessity for introducing reasonable insured test to different types of risks. This 
approach has not been followed in more recent cases in England.461 
 
In 2007, the Law Commissions proposed the same approach to replace the 
problematic prudent insurer test with a more flexible test based on the mind of a 
reasonable insured considering variety of policyholders in so many different 
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situations.462 With regard to the extent of the knowledge of a reasonable insured, 
it would count with the knowledge of the broker. Further, although it was made 
clear in the Consultation Paper that definition of materiality depends upon the 
objective view of a reasonable person in the position of the insured in question, 
the Law Commission expected the courts to take into consideration in the 
proceedings other ingredients such as professional advise received from 
intermediaries and insurer’s explanations, quoting particularly that “this 
evidence may be given by a range of experienced professionals, including 
insureds, brokers or underwriters.”463 This proposal proved more controversial 
than the prudent insurer test set out originally in Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
The flexibility brought great uncertainties to the then current law in assessing 
the mind of a reasonable man in the circumstance of the insured in question. 
The main argument against the reasonable insured test is that as there was no 
paradigm of reasonable insured can be recognised in the insurance market, 
judges would substitute their own version of the test. Moreover, whether or not 
a broker is involved in the business transaction and difficulties of obtaining 
expert evidence would leave the trial judge a very wide discretion in each 
case. 464  “This reduced the justification for introducing such a fundamental 
reform”;465 and the reasonable insured test did not move any further. 
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The “reasonable insured” test is arguably unfeasible in common law 
jurisdictions in several ways. Difficulties will certainly arise where expert 
evidence provided by the reasonable insureds, depending on availability, 
considerably distinguish from that given by brokers or underwriters. Thus, it 
would not be an easy road ahead to apply such a test in China. “It would take 
time for judges to develop a consistent approach, and during this time it would 
be even more difficult to advise businesses about what they were expected to 
disclose”.466 
 
4.2.4.2 The “prudent insurer” test 
The prudent insurer test, operating in common law in determining the materiality 
of a circumstance undisclosed or misrepresented, was first formulated by 
Blackburn J in Ionides v Pender467 in England. The essential purpose of the test 
was to establish an objective test of materiality of the withheld or misstated 
circumstances, thus the subjective views of the particular insurer is irrelevant.468 
With absence of a statutory definition, Atkin J however, imposed a standard of 
prudence in the case of Associated Oil Carriers Ltd v Union Insurance Society 
of Canton Ltd, 469 in which he stated, 
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“I think that [the alleged] standard of prudence indicates an under-writer 
much too bright and too good for human nature’s daily food. There seems 
no good reason to impute to the insurer a higher degree of knowledge and 
foresight than that possessed by the more experienced and intelligent 
insurers carrying on business at that time . . . [If] the standard of prudence 
is the ideal one contended for . . . there were in July 1914, no prudent 
insurers in London, or if there were, they were not to be found in the usual 
places where one would seek for them.” 
Under the prudence standard provided in this paragraph, the prudent insurer 
will be the one that “possessed by the more experience and intelligent” acting 
with care, skill set and diligence under the circumstances, rather than an 
omnipotent underwriter that stays above such humanlike constraints. Therefore,  
“in assessing what is objectively material, it may be necessary for a comparison 
to be made with other insurers in the market who operate the same approach to 
underwriting and risk assessment. Although the test is expressed objectively, it 
may also be necessary to consider special characters of the insurer in question 
so that a proper comparison can be made. If the insurer’s approach is unique, 
that may give rise to difficulty.”470 
 
In recent years, new forms of marketing insurance products rely less on face-to-
face dealings, and increasingly on impersonal interactions such as online 
applications. This emerging reality for marketing insurance products, coupled 
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with the insurer’s right of nullification of the insurance contract in the event of 
breach of the duty of disclosure, rises to the question of whether the prudent 
insurer test should still be used to determine materiality. Technically, the 
prudent insurer test for determining materiality of the withheld or misstated facts 
will not benefit all insureds. Be that as it may, the Law Commission, after some 
vacillation, has intentionally taken the concept of “prudent insurer” from the MIA 
1906 and kept it in the IA 2015, ss. 3(3)(b), 3(4)(b), 7(3) and 7(5), for the reason 
that, in a business context, many insureds are represented by large brokers 
“with strong negotiating power”471 and considerable knowledge of what might be 
material to a prudent insurer.472 As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the prudent 
insurer test under IA 2015 acted multi-functionally in determining not only the 
materiality of a false statement but also whether the false statement is 
substantially correct. Further, it is also used to test the clearness and 
accessibility of the manner in which the disclosure is made by the assured; and 
lastly, whether the disclosure made by the assured would have given cause for 
further questions to be asked.473 It is to be noted that, as mentioned earlier, 
there will be no further duty for the assured to point out to the insurer the 
significance of that information as the insurer is required to make the 
underwriting decision for themselves.474 
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4.2.5 Material facts 
Materiality, in every case, is a matter of fact, to be decided by the courts. There 
are, however, some categories of facts that are obviously material, and others 
which have arisen frequently in decided cases that they would normally be so 
regarded. Thus, it is appropriate to describe and illustrate some of these 
categories. In practice, some insurers or insurance brokers may in fact provide 
a list of examples of material facts. 
 
Material circumstances, based on the relevance of a fact to the calculation of 
the premium or acceptance or rejection of the risk, have been held in general to 
be consisted of two classes of fact, namely, the physical hazard, those which 
concerns facts increase the risk of loss of the insured subject matter; and the 
moral hazard, a category of material facts which is more likely related to the 
“character of the assured”475 including, in general, matters such as criminal 
record, previous refusal of insurance and history of insurance claims. In this 
case, the proposer is considered as a highly undesirable person with whom to 
have contractual relations.476 A detailed consideration is provided as follows. 
 
4.2.5.1 Physical hazard 
Physical hazard refers to risks that are related typically to the physical features 
of the subject matter insured, therefore these may be found in all varieties, and 
in different types of insurance. Matters affecting the most physical hazards have 
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long been subject to questions expressly asked by underwriters in the proposal 
form, and are thereby presumed to be material to the risk insured, for example, 
in the case of life insurance, risks would be assessed in terms of the age, health 
conditions or the results of health tests, medical history, occupation, excessive 
consumption of alcohol. With respect to property insurance, the construction, 
location and use of property are obvious examples. Concerning marine 
insurance, the weather conditions in particular seasons, the location of the 
vessel and the loading and destination ports may be regarded material. It is 
clear that particular features of the port and detentions within the period twelve 
to eighteen months before the inception date of a policy were held as being 
material, which should be disclosed.477 The list of examples is non-exhaustive. 
By contrast, facts as to the moral hazard of the applicant are less likely to be 
solicited by express questions. 
 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in Zeller v British Caymanian Insurance Co Ltd,478 
delivered the principal opinion as to the interpretation of an express question, 
and clarified that the duty of an applicant was to answer questions honestly and 
to the best of his knowledge. Thus, it appears that the Court have already taken 
into consideration in assessing the answers consumer give to questions 
presented in the proposal form. “The applicant is expected to exercise his 
judgment on what appears to him to be worth disclosing. He does not lose his 
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cover if he fails to disclose a complaint which he thought to be trivial but which 
turns out later to be a symptom of some much more serious underlying 
condition”,479 so to that extent there is a duty for the insured to disclose relative 
information, applying to issues both consumer and commercial related. The 
underwriter will need to be as specific as possible in drafting question in their 
proposal form, and to an insured's responses to questions, because English 
courts are unwilling to allow insurer to reject claims where the insured has acted 
honestly and to their best knowledge and belief in answering the proposed 
questions. 
 
4.2.5.2 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is somewhat inherent in human nature.480 An Insurance contract is 
a personal contract between the insurers and the assureds for the payment of a 
sum of money,481 which underwrites the insured against losses arising from his 
relationship with the subject matter insured, rather than the safety of particular 
objects. The nature of the insurance contract brings into operation an 
assessment of particular character of the assured. The best definition of “moral 
hazard” was perhaps given by Slesser LJ in the following phrase, 
“It is elementary that one of the matters which may be considered by an 
insurance company in entering into contractual relations with a proposed 
insured is the question of his moral integrity – what has been called the 
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moral hazard.”482 
The overall integrity of the insured was material to the risk insured as part of the 
moral hazard. This is a matter of fact in each case. The general question is 
whether the assured is a person with whom the insurers would be happy to do 
business.483 Thus the identity of the insured person is necessarily a material 
fact, particularly to a motor insurance policy. 
 
Moral hazard is occasionally regarded by the underwriter as being of greater 
importance than physical hazard. Thus, a history of previous claims will 
certainly put an insurer on his guard.484 In certain circumstances, the nationality 
of the assured may be considered material, or even his name.485 However, it is 
clear that, on the particular facts of the case, the failure of the insured to pay 
premiums under an earlier policy was held not of itself to be a material fact for 
the reason that late payment was not sufficient to substantiate an assertion of 
shortage of financial resources.486 Characteristics of the proposer such as age, 
gender and disability may now be affected by legislation, for example, 
discrimination against proposer on the grounds of sex and race is prohibited by 
the Equality Act 2010.487  
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(a) Past Criminal convictions and dishonesty 
Convictions for criminal offence previously committed by assured will be a 
material fact in almost all circumstances and must be disclosed. 488  The 
materiality of a criminal conviction will depend upon its nature, its seriousness 
and the date on which it occurred,489 although this will ultimately depend on the 
facts. Proven dishonesty, even in the absence of a criminal conviction, may be 
a material fact. In Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands v Royal Hotel 
Ltd,490 a director of the insured, who was also its company secretary, had 
prepared false invoices in order to give the insured’s bankers a more favourable 
impression of its profitability. Although these had not been used by the time of 
the insurance proposal, and no criminal offence had actually been committed, it 
was held that dishonesty was material. Moore-Bick J later reaffirmed this finding 
in James v CGU Insurance plc.491 Here, the Court held that the fact that Mr 
James deliberately failed to process many of the warranties was essentially 
dishonest, which was relevant to moral hazard and therefore material. Thus the 
policy could be avoided. The ruling demonstrates the potential width of the 
moral hazard principle.492 It is clear that an insured who has been guilty of 
dishonesty, regardless whether or not he has been prosecuted for it, has to 
disclose that dishonesty to the underwriters. Failure to do so will render the 
contract avoided. However, there are two important qualifications to it. 
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First, it is noteworthy that the duty of disclosure in respect of criminal 
convictions may be affected by the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act 1974 (The “1974 Act” or “ROA 1974”). Under the 1974 Act, as amended, 
minor convictions are to be regarded as “spent” after a specified period of time, 
known as the “rehabilitation period”, and the length of which varies depending 
on the nature of the conviction or caution imposed. 493  Once, spent, the 
conviction is treated for all legal purposes as never having occurred. 494 The 
proposer, therefore, is not required to disclose previous convictions which are 
‘spent’. 495  Any express questions seeking information with respect to an 
insured’s previous conviction is to be treated as not referring to such a 
convictions. No liabilities are to be placed on the insured if he failed to disclose 
it.496 In the case of business insurance, the fact that the assured has not 
disclosed an unspent conviction to an insurer may be material in relation to 
applications for later insurance covers, even at a time when the conviction itself 
is spent.497 However, s. 7(3) of the 1974 Act confers discretion on the court to 
admit evidence as to spent convictions if the court is satisfied that “justice 
cannot be done in the case except by admitting it”, although it is difficult to see 
how justice can so require when the insured has no duty to disclose the 
conviction. 
 
Second, insurers may fail to persuade the courts that a conviction for a 
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relatively trivial offence of dishonesty in the remote past would influence the 
judgment of a prudent underwriter. In Corcos v De Rougement,498 the assured 
claimed under a motor insurance policy in respect of a genuine loss. The 
insurer alleged that the assured had failed to disclose the fact that she had for 
prolonged periods of time driven a motor vehicle without a driving licence in 
breach of the law. McCardie J expressed his view as to past convictions in his 
judgment considering materiality of the alleged non-disclosure, as follow: 
“… in considering the question of materiality one must look at the 
consequences. If there is a duty on the part of one to disclose that when 
driving one had on licence, it would lead to curious results. [It has been 
submitted] that where people had been guilty of any breach of law it 
should be revealed to the insurance companies so that they might 
ascertain the character of the person proposing. But the result of that 
would be that not only must you reveal to the insurance companies that 
omission to take out a driving licence but any breach of law with regard 
to anything; and I cannot myself see where the result would end if a 
person’s character is to be weighed in connection with the insurance of a 
car; and [the] argument comes to this, that he would say it was the duty 
of a person to reveal to the insurance companies every irregularity in his 
past life.” 
McCardie J held, at least in respect of motor insurance policies, that the 
assured is not obliged to reveal every illegality or irregularity in his past life. On 
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the other hand, there are occasions where previous conviction should be 
disclosed. It is a question of degree.499 In Regina Fur Company Ltd v Bossom,500 
given that the conviction of receiving stolen furs was so related to the risk 
insured, Mr. Justice Pearson, took into consideration the special facts in this 
case, and held that Mr Waxman held a predominant position within the assured 
company and the previous conviction was material to a proposal for all risks 
insurance on furs, although such a conviction, being twenty years old, was too 
ancient and remote. This decision may not have been so concluded today 
taking into account the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.  
 
(b) Allegations of criminality and rumours  
The courts are inconsistent as to whether there is a duty to disclose the 
allegation, if it is devoid of merit, if an allegation has been made against the 
assured and the allegation is proved unfounded and false. 501  Evidently, 
allegations of criminality attributable to materiality of a given circumstance must 
be determined by reference to the position as it existed at the time of the 
placing of the risk.502  Thus only acquittal, which has been justified, before 
placement of the insurance contract renders the fact immaterial.503  
 
                                                            
499 Gate v Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd [1995] LRLR 385; Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands Ltd 
v The Royal Hotel Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep IR 151, 156-158 
500 [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 466 
501 Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 440, 459-460 (Forbes J); Strive Shipping 
Corporation & Another v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (The Grecia Express) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 88 (QB Comm); Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros SA (No.2) [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746 
502 Strive Shipping Corporation & Another v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (The Grecia Express) 
[2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88 (QB Comm), at 131, per Colman J; Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros SA 
(No.2) [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746 
503 Lynch v Dunsford (1811) 14 East 494, also see ‘Materiality, Non-disclosure and False Allegations: 
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In Strive Shipping Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (The Grecia 
Express),504 Colman J concluded, which was later overruled by the Court of 
Appeal in the case of Brotherton v Aseguradora Colseguros SA (No.2),505 that 
there was no duty for the insured to disclose facts merely because they are 
objectively suspicious as to his previous misconduct if it could be proved at trial 
that the supposed suspicion were groundless. By contrast, Phillips J, in 
Inversiones Manria SA v Sphere Drake Ins (The Dora), 506  following the 
approach of May J in March Cabaret Club v London Assurance,507 held that 
even unfounded allegations should be disclosed because the question is 
whether or not the prudent underwriter would have wished to have all material 
facts disclosed and whether they would have influenced his assessment of the 
risk at the time of placing. Colman J clarified, in The Grecia Express,508 that if 
the assured knows of facts which would increase the magnitude of the risk and 
the known facts would have influenced the judgment of a prudent underwriter, 
“the known facts do not cease to be material because it might ultimately be 
demonstrated that the suggested facts did not exist”. This approach has 
received some support from the Court of Appeal in Brotherton v Aseguradora 
Colseguros SA (No.2). 509  In considering materiality in terms of a perverse 
acquittal or conviction, Mance LJ summarised the following principles: 
(a) If, at the time of placing, the insured himself or his employee was 
                                                            
504 [2002] 2Lloyd’s Rep 88 (QB Comm), 132. 
505 [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746. 
506 [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 69, 93. 
507 [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 169,177, May J stated that a pending prosecution, particularly for an offence 
involving dishonesty, would normally be material, even if the defendant were in fact innocent. 
508 [2002] 2Lloyd’s Rep 88 (QB Comm), 132. 
509 [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746. 
196 
 
under investigation for or had been charged with an offence, even if 
the assured knows that he is innocent, and of which he was 
subsequent to the placing indeed acquitted – in such a case, the 
insured was nonetheless bound to disclose the charge but he is 
entitled to submit to the insurers evidence showing his innocence, 
then the insurer therefore would have embraced all aspects of the 
insured’s knowledge, including his own statement of his innocence 
and such independent evidence as he had to support that by the time 
of placing;510 
(b) in the case of an insured who, prior to a placing, had been both 
charged and acquitted of an offence, but was in reality guilty of it, the 
fact of guilt was a material fact;511 
(c) if, at the time of the proposal, the insured had been charged with and 
convicted of a criminal offence, but he was in fact innocent, it 
nevertheless remained necessary for him to disclose the conviction 
although he could attempt to prove his innocence to the insurers. 
Thus, the insured must disclose to the underwriter any relative information, in 
his possession, as to allegation of criminal convictions of himself, his business 
or his employee, including both the known fact of guilt in case of an acquittal, 
and the known fact of conviction in case of innocence, given that this may 
increase the risk to be underwritten, although “idle rumours” need not be 
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disclosed; but in circumstances (a) and (c), the insured can disclose not only 
the allegation, but also evidences supporting his statement that he was wrongly 
convicted.512 Further, Lord Mance drew a clear distinction between material 
“intelligence” that might ultimately be proved as unfounded, but which should 
nevertheless be disclosed, and the immaterial “loose or idle rumours” which 
need not be disclosed by an insured or his agent.513 The applicant does not 
have to disclose “mere speculations, vague rumours or unreasoned fears”.514 
The burden is rest with the underwriter to demonstrate that there were facts or 
circumstances known to the insured, and that it was not disclosed. But the 
rumour with “some real substance” that later turns out to have been untrue must 
be disclosed.515  
 
Subsequently, the decision was followed in North Star Shipping Ltd v Sphere 
Drake Insurance plc.516 Colman J was confronted with the insurer’s defence that 
the insured failed to disclose that they were alleged to have committed fraud 
and were facing both criminal and civil proceedings, arguing that this 
information would have influenced the judgment of a prudent underwriter. The 
facts were plainly material. However, the assured’s counsel argued “allegations 
that related to the risk itself were one thing but allegations of dishonesty, which 
had nothing to do with the risk and nothing to do with either the particular 
                                                            
512 O. Gurses, Marine Insurance Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2016) 69. 
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514 Decorum Investments Ltd v Atkin (The Elena G) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 378 [27] (David Steel J), with 
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insurance or with insurance at all, were another”, to which Lord Waller found 
himself tempted to follow.517 Moreover, because the law in this area is indeed 
capable of producing serious injustice,518 given the duty requiring the insured to 
disclose every false allegation of dishonesty might create unfairness and 
become onerous. The issue was considered in Norwich Union Insurance Ltd v 
Meisels. 519  The High Court held that an allegation of criminality was not 
necessarily itself material and that materiality depended upon a combination of 
dishonesty, age and importance.520 Tugendhat J expressly indicated that as 
follow: 
“The test of materiality is by reference to what would influence the 
judgment of a prudent insurer. This is an objective test, and the 
characteristics to be imputed to a prudent insurer are in substance a 
matter for the courts to decide. There is room for a test of proportionality, 
having regard to the nature of the risk and the moral hazard under 
consideration. There may be things which are too old, or insufficiently 
serious to require disclosure, whether or not there is exculpatory 
material. And in cases where the information would be material and 
disclosable if there were no exculpatory material, the degree of 
conviction that the exculpatory material must carry, must depend on all 
the circumstances known to the insurer.”521 
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(c) Insurance claims history and prior refusals of cover 
One area so far as moral hazard is concerned generating a clear disparity 
between marine and non-marine insurance is in respect of refusals of cover by 
previous underwriters. Traditionally, in marine insurance a previous refusal is 
not material and need not to be disclosed,522 whereas previous refusals in 
connection with general contract of insurance, whether life, property, liability or 
reinsurance, have generally been held to be material.523 Questions need to be 
taken into account at this point is what amount to a refusal. It was held that the 
lapse of a policy by non-payment of a premium did not amount to a refusal by 
the insurers to renew the policy.524 It is also clear that the fact that the insured 
was in arrears with his premiums on another policy was held not to be a 
material fact.525 In Holts Motors Ltd v South East Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd526 
the Court of Appeal decided that a statement by insurers that they would 
choose not to invite renewal by reason of the insured’s record amounted to a 
refusal to renew. Questions may not be confined to policies of the same type. In 
Locker & Woolf Ltd v Western Australian Insurance Association,527 a previous 
refusal of motor insurance on the ground of misrepresentation and non-
                                                            
522 Glasgow Assurance Corporation v Symondson 16 Com Cas 109, 119; Glicksman v Lancashire & 
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disclosure had affected the avoidance of the fire policy in question. However, in 
Ewer v National Employers’ Mutual & General Insurance Association, 528 
MacKinnon J held that past refusals by insurer in respect of any other policies 
were not material. 
 
With respect to claim history, claims made by the insured may be considered as 
a material fact for the proposed insurance,529 as this is indicative of the attitude 
which the insured placed on his insurance and the subject matter insured. 
Compared to other moral hazards, claim history and past experience of losses, 
made either in respect of the subject matter insured by the same insurer or any 
other properties by different underwriters, are the most direct and convenient 
way in which the underwriter could contemplate his potential risk brought by 
characteristics of the insured, although previous claims or losses on policies 
relating to a different subject matter may not be material.530 It is noteworthy that 
“in relation to claims history, the fact that the business of the insured may have 
substantially changed since the previous claims because, for example, the 
management has been replaced, or its place of business has been relocated 
and the workforce is different, will not necessarily excuse the insured’s non-
disclosure”.531 
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4.2.5.3 Matters which need not be disclosed 
The Insurance Act 2015 s. 3(5) lists the matters which the assured is not 
required to disclose in the absence of enquiry. In other words, the assured must 
provide answers accordingly so as to comply with the duty to avoid 
misrepresentation, if the underwriter has made a specific request for 
information. The assured does not need to disclose a circumstance if: 
(a) it diminish the risk, 
(b) the insurer knows it, 
(c) the insurer ought to know it, 
(d) the insurer presumed to know it, or 
(e) it is something as to which the insurer waivers information 
Sections (a) and (e) replicate ss. 18(3)(a) and 18(3)(c) of MIA 1906. S. 18(3)(d) 
of the MIA 1906 concerning disclosure of warranted matter has been omitted 
because the changes to the law of warranties by the Insurance Act 2015 have 
made it “superfluous”.532  
 
(a) Diminution of risk 
Any material circumstance which diminishes the risk does not need to be 
disclosed. In Carter v Boehm,533 Lord Mansfield illustrated this principle as 
follow: 
“The underwriter need not to be told what lessens the risqué agreed and 
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understood to be run by the express terms of the policy…if he insures for 
three years, then he need not be told of any circumstance to show that it 
may be over in two.” 
The principle was once applied in Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin,534 in which the House 
of Lords held that the fact that the lorry was to be garaged in Glasgow rather 
than kept on a farm on the outskirts of Glasgow was not material. In Inversiones 
Manria SA v Sphere Drake Insurance Co Plc (The Dora)535 Phillips J noted that 
the fact that a yacht had been in the builder’s yard at the inception of the policy 
was a fact that reduced, rather than increased, the risk. More recently, David 
Steel J, applying the same principle in the case of Decorum investments Ltd v 
Atkin (The Elena G),536 decided that there was no obligation on the assured to 
disclose that a yacht was kept in a secure and guarded mooring. 
 
(b) Knowledge of the insurer for disclosure purposes – Insurance Act 
2015 s. 3(5)(b)(c)(d)  
IA 2015 s. 3(5) outlines three types of knowledge of the insurer. These types of 
knowledge constitute an “expended and clarified” re-enactment of MIA1906, s. 
18(3)(b).537 Each of these types has been defined by s. 5 of the IA 2015. 
 
• Actual knowledge 
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First, circumstances which the insurer knows. For this purpose, s. 5(1) 
illustrates that “an insurer knows something only if it is known to one or more of 
the individual who participate on behalf of the insurer in the decision whether to 
take the risk, and if so on what terms (whether the individual does so as the 
insurer’s employee or agent, as an employee of the insurer’s agent or in any 
other capacity)”, whereby the person who actually involved in underwriting 
decision making process is captured.538 More importantly, “only the knowledge 
of the underwriter(s), including underwriting agent,539 involved in decisions about 
the policy in question” rather than the insurer’s senior management team or 
board should be directly attributed to the insurer, only if the risks insured is to be 
“very large” thereby were reported to the board.540  
 
The term “knowledge” is subject to IA 2015 s. 6, in which it provides general 
rules as to attributing knowledge applicable not only to insurers but also to 
insured and the intermediaries. The meaning of “knowledge” extends to the so-
called “blind eye knowledge”, 541  namely, as expressed by subsection (1), 
“matters which the individual suspected, and of which the individual would have 
had knowledge but for deliberately refraining confirming them or enquiring about 
them”. The knowledge attributed to the insurer is limited by IA 2015 s. 6(2)(b), 
which was intended to codify the common law rule in Re Hampshire Land 
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Company542. If an agent defrauds the principal, then the principal is not treated 
as knowing of the fraud for the obvious reason that the agent cannot be 
expected to tell the principal about it. The main problem, discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3, appears to be the scope of Hampshire Land principle. The section 
now equally applies to insurers, whereas all of the binding precedents on the 
point relate to fraud by the insured’s agent.543 
 
• Constructive knowledge 
Circumstances which the insurer ought to know. For this purpose, IA 2015 s. 
5(2) provides that an insurer ought to know something only if:  
(a) an employee or agent of the insurer knows it, and ought reasonably 
to have passed on the relevant information to an individual who 
participate on behalf of the insurer in the decision whether to take the 
risk, and if so on what terms (whether the individual does so as the 
insurer’s employee or agent, as an employee of the insurer’s agent or 
in any other capacity); or  
(b) the relevant information is held by the insurer and is readily available 
to an individual who participate on behalf of the insurer in the decision 
whether to take the risk, and if so on what terms (whether the 
individual does so as the insurer’s employee or agent, as an 
employee of the insurer’s agent or in any other capacity).  
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The common law rule as to exactly which individuals, within the insurer’s 
organisation, have knowledge that is treated to be known to the underwriters 
has been expressed by Gallen J in the judgment of Green v State Insurance 
General Manager544 in the following terms: 
“Knowledge must be in the possession or deemed to be in the 
possession of the person whose responsibility it is to make the decision 
in relation to the proposal … Knowledge can be imputed from the 
knowledge of an agent, who may include obviously a servant of the 
company, but only when that agent was acting in the capacity of the 
insurer’s agent in the transaction affected and it was his duty in that 
capacity to place at the insurer’s disposal the knowledge which he had.” 
Notably, subsection (a) has been codified in substantially similar terms, which 
clarifies particularly circumstances “where the information has been gathered 
specifically for the purpose of assisting the underwriter in his assessment of the 
risk” such as “a doctor commissioned by an insurer to examine a prospective 
policyholder” or “a surveyor who is asked to make a report of a prospective 
insured site”.545 Further, English courts546 have ruled that insurers who appointed 
auditors to examine the physical security and the control systems of a bank was 
not deemed to know material facts as to fraud of officers of the bank for the 
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reason that the auditors were simply not engaged to audit such matters, 
therefore made them unrelated to the appointment.547 Then it cannot be said 
that the agent “ought reasonably to have passed on the relevant information” to 
the underwriter in question.  
 
With the advent of computerised records systems, modern communication 
offers new ways in which modern professional insurers are being able to access 
much more information quicker and easier than they could ever imagine in 
times when communications were far slower without internet. As IT systems 
improve, underwriters are expected to know information, such as previous 
dealings including rejections, loss and claims,548 “held” in their records, almost 
certainly electronically,549 but only if it is “readily available” to the particular 
underwriter within his/her organisation.550 Problems can be raised where the 
underwriter deliberately deletes its record so that the information is no longer 
“held”.551 As of August 2016, information gathered in the course of investigation 
of a claim under a different policy might be treated to be known to the insurer if 
it is included in a report that is available to the underwriter in his/her record to 
which he/she has access, electronically or not,552 although the Court of Appeal 
had concluded by a majority that the knowledge from the claims department 
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was not imputed to the underwriting department of the same insurer because 
the two departments were in different locations.553 English courts were reluctant 
to find that an insurer has constructive knowledge of the policyholder’s 
circumstances.554 IA 2015 s. 5(2)(b) has rendered such a precedent futile.555 The 
Law Commission is of the view that “an insurer would be expected to check its 
computer systems, but would not be expected to carry out elaborate or 
impractical enquiries, or to match information across the organisation”.556  
 
If insurers are imposed an implied duty, by subsection (b), to search electronic 
files within their organisation for the purpose of revealing relative information, it 
is but a small step to suggest that every information elsewhere revealed by a 
simple search could be treated as ought to be known by the underwriter. 
Judiciaries may find attempting to do so, given that such a search is likely to 
take no more than a few seconds,557  particularly in the context of marine 
insurance, for example, where insurers can subscribe to databases that contain 
extensive information on vessel and their owners.558 Although cases under the 
1906 Act have not recognised any duty on insurers to search the internet to 
check information related to the subject matter insured,559 the ability of insurers 
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to search for and retrieve information seems necessary to be taken into account 
in the modern era in which “specialist information is increasingly made available 
through dedicated electronic produces”.560  Furthermore, it is also worthy of 
consideration whether there would be imputed knowledge that would have been 
revealed where a simple search would have put an insurer on notice that it 
needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing relevant 
circumstances. The Law Commission was seemingly reluctant to take the small 
step. The statutory test has nevertheless been so confined within the scope 
which is no wider than information that is available within the insurer’s 
organisation. One issue will be at the discretion of judges is whether 
interpretation of the phrase “readily available” is to be construed objectively 
(prudent insurer) or subjectively (the actual insurer).561 
 
• Presumed knowledge 
Circumstances which the insurer presumed to know. For this purpose, s. 5(3) 
states that an insurer presumed to know: (a) things which are common 
knowledge, and (b) things which an insurer offering insurance of the class in 
question to insureds in the field of activity in question would reasonably be 
expected to know in the ordinary course of business. 
This provision is to be read as a modernised and clarified restatement of MIA 
1906 s. 18(3)(b). The term “notoriety” has been replaced because of its 
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changed meaning since 1906.562 No change in law was intended by the Law 
Commission in terms of common knowledge and matters of commercial 
nature.563  
 
Generally, the fact that information published in a newspaper does not make it 
of common knowledge. The courts have concluded that an insurer was not 
presumed to have knowledge or particular facts of particular ships on the 
ground that such facts had reported in newspaper.564 The same principle was 
applied in HongKong in Hua Tyan Development Ltd v Zurich insurance Co Ltd 
(The Ho Feng 7).565 In this case, Mr Lam Sek Kong, the plaintiff’s handling 
solicitor, had located the gross tonnage and its deadweight of Ho Feng 7 on the 
internet Lloyd’s List Intelligence which is based on Lloyd’s List, the leading 
newspaper for the maritime industry, and two other websites. The Court held 
that insurers are not presumed to be fixed with constructive knowledge of the 
deadweight capacity merely because the information had reported in Lloyd’s 
List or similar industry sources. Thus, information that is available on internet is 
not necessarily considered to be common knowledge of insurer,566 particularly 
where the insurer had no access to the database,567 even when they are marine 
insurers and the information is published in a specialist media forum targeted at 
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the maritime community. 568  An insurer was not to be presumed to have 
knowledge of matters simply because he had the means of ascertaining them 
by appropriate enquiry.569 By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has kept 
abreast of the times. In Canadian Indemnity Co v Canadian Johns-Manville 
Co,570 Gonthier J concluded that “an insurer was expected to know facts which 
went beyond political and natural perils and generally matters known to all and 
included a certain amount of information regarding the activity which was being 
insured”.571 Mr Justice who emphasised that articles as to the health hazards of 
asbestos and the scientific papers were “at hand and available to anyone who 
was interested in the details”, and the seriousness of the risk of asbestosis from 
inhalation of asbestos fibres was a matter of “public character” and “notoriety”, 
and therefore “an insurance underwriter ought to have known of their existence 
and their seriousness”.572 
 
An insurer is also presumed to know the practices of the trade, in other words, 
the market in which he/she is writing business. This proposition has become the 
common law rule, emphasised by Lord Mansfield in Noble v Kennaway,573 in 
which he stated that “Every underwriter is presumed to be acquainted with the 
practice of the trade he insures, and whether it is established or not if he does 
                                                            
568 H. Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance (2nd ed, OUP 2006) para 4.96 
569 Hua Tyan Development Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd (The “Ho Feng 7”) [2013] HKCA 414; [2014] 
Lloyd’s Rep IR 2 [16.12]. 
570M. Clarke, Law of Insurance Contracts (6th edn, Informa 2016) 23-9B1A, citing Canadian Indemnity Co v 
Canadian Johns-Manvilles Co (1988) 54 DLR (4th) 468 (CA Quebec); (1990) 2 SCR 549, (1990) 72 DLR 
(4th) 478. 
571 ibid 500. 
572 ibid 478 – 480. 
573 (1780) 2 Doug KB 510, 512. 
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not know it, he ought to inform himself.” Underwriters will be expected to have a 
better knowledge which affects the business that they writes than the layman, 
even if the range of circumstances that the prudent underwriter can be expected 
to have is inevitably very broad in the context of open cover for worldwide oil 
trade, i.e. the scope of the proposed insurance cover is broad.574 The Court held 
in Glencore International v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd575 that an oil trader did not 
have to disclose that there were no real methods for verifying the quantities of 
oil held in storage for the assured, which exposed the insurer to greater risk 
than necessary, given that the practice does not fall outside the range of 
possibilities that the underwriter ought to have in mind in the normal 
procedures, thereby the insured’s duty of disclosure is correspondingly limited 
to matters which are unusual in the sense that they fall outside the 
contemplation of the reasonable underwriter familiar with the business of oil 
trading”.576   
 
(c) Waiver  
The waiver exception set out in s. 18(3)(c) of MIA 1906 has been retained in IA 
2015 s. 3(5)(e), yet in slightly different form, which stated that, in the absence of 
enquiry, the assured is not required to disclose a circumstance “if it is 
something as to which the insurer waives information”. The English court held 
that the insurer’s failure to ask further questions in the situation where the 
                                                            
574 Glencore International v Alpina Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2792 (Comm). 
575 [2003] EWHC 2792 (Comm). 
576 ibid [41]. 
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information provided by an insured in answering the insurer’s question was 
insufficient for a reasonably prudent insurer to be alerted would amount to a 
waiver of the obligation.577 This only happens when a policyholder made a fair 
presentation of the risk. 578  The codification of IA 2015 s. 3(4)(b) however 
renders this conclusion less important.579  
 
• Implied waiver 
A waiver can be explicit or implicit. An insurer who asks limited questions on a 
proposal form may be taken to have waived information which falls outside the 
scope of the limited question.580  In Laing v Union Marine Insurance Co,581 
Mathew J stated that an assured “is not bound to give information which the 
underwriter waives or as to which the assured may reasonably infer that the 
underwriter is indifferent”.582 The courts have further clarified that, in terms of 
limited questions, waiver can only be implied in cases involving limited yet 
specific information. No waiver can be found where an express question 
seeking information about the claims history was formulated in a way in which it 
was “too general and gave rise to a great deal of uncertainty as to what was 
                                                            
577 Container Transport international Inc v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1984] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 476; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 496 
(CA); [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 (HL) [10.15] & [10.29]; WISE (Underwriting Agency) Ltd v Grupo Nacional 
Provincial SA [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 764 (CA); Garnat Trading & Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Baominh 
Insurande Corporation [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 589 [135] (Christopher Clarke J); Sea Glory Maritime Co & 
Another v Al Sagr National Insurance Co (The “M/V Nancy”) [2013] EWHC 2116 (Comm); [2014] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 112 [56]. 
578 New Hampshire Insurance Co v Oil Refineries Ltd [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 462 QB (Comm) 
579 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 10.70 
580 ibid para 10.71. 
581 (1895) 1 Com Cas 11. 
582 ibid [15]. 
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and was not waived”.583  
 
In Noblebright Ltd v Sirius International Corp,584 the insurer asked whether there 
had been any claims in respect of his business premises in excess of £10,000 
at any time, or any smaller claims in the previous five year. The assured had not 
made any claims, but had experienced three incidents that had taken place at 
his premises, which consisted of a violent attack on the managing director and 
two armed robberies. The assured, given no claims had been made previously, 
answered these questions in the negative, and contended that the insurer had 
waived disclosure of the incidents by reason of the limited nature of the 
information that it had chosen to seek by way of the claims declaration 
contained in the proposal form. The Court held that there had been no waiver 
by the insurer of any obligation to disclose an incident that might have given rise 
to an insurance claim but did not do so and three incidents had fallen into that 
category. Clearly, in circumstances of a similar kind, it is not open to the insured 
to argue that the insurer had waived the information that has been misstated if 
the insured have tried to avoid touching the important points and dwell on the 
trivial. Moreover, it is, however, important to note that while it is the case that 
limited questions may give raise to a waiver of disclosure, an absence of 
express questions does not normally lead to the same result as the assured is 
required to make full disclosure of material facts even where no question is 
asked. 
                                                            
583 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-164 
584 [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 584 
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• Express waiver 
An express waiver requires a statement of waiver. The question arising here is 
the effectiveness of such a clause in policy wording. The House of Lords held 
that the wording of a “truth of statement” clause585 in an insurance contract 
excluding liability to make statement did not prevent the assured from 
consequence of deliberate and dishonest or reckless non-disclosure by 
broker.586 It is therefore worthy of consideration whether the wording, on the 
true construction of the contract for insurance, can operate sufficiently to 
achieve the drafting objective. Clear wording of restricting the duty to disclose 
specific types of information and/or limiting authority of an agent to make any 
disclosure on behalf of the assured is necessary for an expressed waiver clause 
to be effectively construed.587 
 
4.2.5.4 Chinese approaches 
4.2.5.4.1 Non-marine insurance contract 
In respect to general insurance law, art. 16 par. 6 of the Insurance Act of PRC 
provides that the insurer is not entitled to rescind the contract where the insurer 
has known the misrepresentation at the time of contract; in the event of an 
insured loss, the insurer shall be liable for compensation or payment of the 
                                                            
585 In HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 230, the 
clause stated that “[the assured] will not have any duty or obligation to make any representation, warranty 
or disclosure of any nature, express or implied (such duty and obligation being expressly waived by the 
inusurers) …” 
586 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 230 
587 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-159 
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insurance premium. That is to say that the insurer cannot rescind the contract of 
insurance on the ground of non-disclosure of misrepresentation, if he/she 
before the contract is concluded knew the fact that the applicant has failed to 
disclose material circumstance or answer questions contained in the proposal 
form, and he/she nevertheless entered into the contract. The same principle, 
namely, the doctrine of implied waiver, has long been established in the 
common law system. This point is considered in detail in Section 4.2.5.3(c) of 
this chapter, in the context of waiver by the insurer. Clearly, if the underwriter 
chooses not to ask further questions in the situation that there might be other 
material facts relating to the subject matter insured, judging from information 
provided by the assured, it will then lead to the same result. The law on this 
point is blurry where the applicant clearly refuses to answer a question, and the 
insurer nevertheless accepts their proposal. It is not clear if art.16 par.6 is 
applicable in such circumstances. It is likely to be the case, given that such an 
omission would undoubtedly put a prudent underwriter on notice that it needs to 
make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing other material facts. 
 
Notably, this formulation indicates that, at the time of proposal, the insurer must 
be in possession of the actual knowledge of the misstatement by the insured. 
Constructive knowledge of such information does not give rise to exclusion of 
the pre-contractual duty of representation. Additionally, art. 7 of the 
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Some Issues on 
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Application of the Insurance Law of the PRC (II) (The ‘Interpretation II’)588 
provides that, after the contract of insurance is concluded, if the insurer knows 
or ought to know that the insured failed to comply with the obligation of making 
truthful representations, and he/she nevertheless collects the premium, the 
people’s court shall not uphold the requisition of terminating the contract in 
accordance with art. 16 par. 2 of the Insurance Law of PRC. In the context that 
the loss occurs in the period between conclusion of the contract and collection 
of premium, an insurer who is actually aware of the fact as to the non-fulfillment 
of such a duty by the insured cannot terminate the contract regardless whether 
or not premium is paid; on the other hand, the insurer, after the contract is 
concluded, without sufficient evidence of actual knowledge, is entitled to evade 
his/her liability by rescinding the insurance contract so long as no premium is to 
be collected, even if constructive knowledge of non-fulfillment of the duty can be 
proven. 
 
The insured is to be urged, as a common practice, to do a medical examination 
by a physician designated by the insurer before applying for life insurance, so 
that health conditions inconsistent with insured’s disclosure may be discovered. 
The Supreme People’s Court has further clarified, in the Interpretation of the 
Supreme People’s Court Concerning Some Issues on Application of the 
Insurance Law of the PRC (III) (The Interpretation III)589 legal effect of a health 
check in terms of life insurance. Such a medical examination does not 
                                                            
588 Fa Shi [2013] No. 14 
589 Fa Shi [2015] No. 21 
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constitute a waiver unless the insurer is in possession of the actual information 
in relation to the result of the health examination.590 In other words, medical 
history and other health conditions excluded from the medical report may still 
enable the insurer to reach a conclusion as to termination of the contract. 
Further, other exceptions of duty of disclosure have appeared in the Guidance 
Notes and Guidelines of some of the Higher People’s Courts at the provincial 
and municipal level, i.e. Beijing, Jiangxi and Zhejiang. The ‘Guidance Notes 
concerning Adjudication of Insurance Contract Disputes’ published by the 
Higher People’s Court of Beijing Municipality, art. 14, listed the following matters 
which the assured is not required to disclose: 
(1) facts undisclosed by the assured diminish the risk; 
(2) facts which is known or ought to be known to the insurer; 
(3) a waiver of relative information as to which is to be clearly 
declared by the insurer. 
The provision has been formulated in a similar wording as the s. 3(5) of the 
English Insurance Act 2015, which is provided in Section 4.2.5.3 above. Jiangxi 
and Zhejiang Higher Courts have provided a similar provision in different terms. 
Art. 6 of the ‘Guidance Notes concerning Adjudication of Insurance Contract 
Disputes’ of Jiangxi Higher Court and art. 9 of the ‘Guidance Notes concerning 
Adjudication of Insurance Contract Disputes’ of Zhejiang Higher Court 
formulated such exceptions in the following phrase. 
                                                            
590 ibid, art. 5; also see explanations of this provision made by Zhumei LIU, deputy chief judge of the 
second civil tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court of China, on the press conference concerning the 
Interpretation III on 26th Nov 2015, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-16101.html  
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The assured’s non-compliance with enquires of an insurer does not amount to a 
breach of the duty of honest disclosure if: 
(1) the circumstance is known to the insurer; 
(2) the circumstance, as a matter of common sense, ought to be known 
to the insurer; 
(3) the insurer clearly declares that the circumstance is not necessary to 
be disclosed. 
 
4.2.5.4.2 Marine Insurance 
Instead of fully inheriting MIA 1906 s. 18(3), art. 222 par. 2 of MC 1993, 
borrowed from MIA 1906 s. 18(3)(b), states the limits to the duty of disclosure in 
the context of marine insurance, in the following terms: 
“The assured need not inform the insurer of the facts which the insurer 
has known of or the insurer ought to have knowledge of in its ordinary 
business practice and about which the insurer made no inquiry.” 
Actual and constructive knowledge of the insurer for the purpose of disclosure 
in terms of English law approach is discussed at length in Section 4.2.5.3(b) 
above. It is worth noting, again, that the effect of the wording “about which the 
insurer made no inquiry” is that the insured is obliged to comply with the duty of 
representation, if the underwriter have made a specific request for information. 
 
Unlike the common rule, namely, the insurer is under a duty to require further 
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information if the insured makes a limited disclosure which puts the underwriter 
on notice that there may be concealed material circumstances,591 now codified 
by IA 2015 s. 3(4)(b), Shandong Higher People’s Court held that insurer is 
under no legal obligation to make such enquiries. In Nisitani Co (Japan) Ltd v 
People’s Insurance Company of China, Qingdao Branch (The “Hang Tuo 
2001”),592 the insurer, PICC Qingdao office, entered into a contract of insurance 
with the assured, North Sea Shipyard, against all risks, war risk and strike risk. 
All policies were later transferred to Nisitani by endorsement of North Sea 
Shipyard. The L/C and the commercial invoice have stated following 
information: “ONE SET OF SHIP-LOADER CONVEYOR”, Carrying vessel: 
“HANG TUO 2001”, Net Weight: “534.805 ton”. Nisitani asserted that the insurer 
had waived the duty of disclosure as he failed to perceive, from the L/C and the 
commercial invoice, that there might be further material information which may 
otherwise be discovered, given that information stated on the L/C and the 
commercial invoice was sufficient to put a prudent underwriter on notice. The 
court was of the view that “HANG TUO 2001” did not indicate “航拖(Air drag) 
2001”. “An ordinary person including an insurer”, as a matter of common sense, 
cannot be expected to carry an “unreasonably heavy burden” to discover further 
information which may otherwise be material if it was disclosed by reference to 
“fragmentary statements” expressed on the L/C and the commercial invoice. 
Thus, the insurer ought not to be known in the ordinary course of his/her 
business. Accordingly, the suggestion of waiver and constructive knowledge 
                                                            
591 This point is considered in section 4.1.5.3(c) in the context of waiver. 
592 (2002) Lu(Shangdong) Min(Civil) Si(the Fourth Tribunal) Zhong(Final) Zi No. 45 
220 
 
was rejected. Shangdong Higher People’s Court also held that information 
published in a local newspaper or reported on local TV program does not 
necessarily make it a “public affair” which comes to light. The same principle 
has also been adopted in common law jurisdiction. A detailed discussion is 
provided in section 4.2.5.3(b), in the context of presumed knowledge. 
 
4.3 Inducement 
Given that the test of materiality held by the House of Lords is regarded as 
being too lenient, and therefore generous to the insurer, in July 1994, the House 
of Lords in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd 593 
conclusively adopted the concept of inducement as the second limb of the test 
of materiality for the purpose of preventing potential abuse of the remedy of 
avoidance by the insurer, with the benefit of hindsight, for a breach of the duty 
of disclosure. Inducement is presented at this context as a prevention 
mechanism. It was held that the insurer should only have a remedy of 
avoidance for non-disclosure or misrepresentation if it can show that the actual 
underwriter in question must have been induced by the circumstances withheld 
or misstated to enter into the contract on the same term.594 Since then the test of 
inducement became the dominant issue in the vast majority of cases.595 
 
                                                            
593 [1995] 1 A.C. 501 
594 Earlier authorities rejecting the subjective test ceased to be effective. See, in particular, Zurich General 
Accidcent and Liability Insurance Co v Morrison [1942] 2 KB 53; Container Transport International v 
Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 476 
595 Sea Glory Maritime Co & Another v AL Sagr National Insurance Co [2013] EWHC 2116 (Comm); Lewis 
v Norwich Union Healthcare Ltd [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 198; Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc 
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 268 
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4.3.1 Effect of IA 2015 
The subjective inducement requirement has now entered on a statutory footing, 
as a separate concept, by the Insurance Act 2015, s. 8(1). It is phrased in the 
following terms:   
(1) The insurer has a remedy against the insured for a breach of the duty 
of fair presentation only if the insurer shows that, but for the breach, the 
insurer –  
(a) would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, 
or 
(b) would have done so only on different terms. 
Accordingly, there is no remedy until the insurer can prove that something 
different would actually have happened in underwriting terms had the duty of 
fair presentation not been broken. The remedy will be based upon that assumed 
outcome, albeit there is an automatic right of avoidance in cases of fraud or 
recklessness on the part of the assured.596 The notion of requiring proof of 
inducement, as a prerequisite to a remedy of avoidance, rather than as the 
second limb of the test of materiality, was borrowed from the Australian 
approach, i.e. the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, s. 29.597  
 
4.3.2 Test of inducement 
This is to be contrasted with the test of materiality: so far as the requirement of 
                                                            
596 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-087 
597 R. Mekin & O. Gurses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured 
(2015) 78(6) Mod. L. Rev. 1004, footnote 28 
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inducement is concerned, a causal connection between non-disclosure and the 
conclusion of the policy must be shown. This is to be understood in the same 
sense in which it was used in the general law of contract.598 It was held that, to 
prove inducement, the insurer must show that the circumstance withheld or 
misstated had a decisive influence, in that it was a contributory cause, although 
not necessarily the only cause, in the making of the contract of insurance.599 
Further, a detailed consideration to this issue was revealed by the Court of 
Appeal in Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc,600 in which it was 
clarified that it is necessary for the insurer to show that he was actually induced 
by the non-disclosure to accept the risk on terms that it would not otherwise 
have agreed to. In other words,  
“it is not, however, sufficient for the insurer to show that the fact in question 
affected underwriting judgment, it is necessary for the insurer to go on to show 
that something different would actually have happened.”601  
Rix and Clarke LJJ thus took the view that, in determining whether the non-
disclosure had induced the actual insurer to enter the contract, it is necessary to 
examine what would have happened, had the facts in question been disclosed 
or not misrepresented.602 Pill LJ, in his dissenting judgment, expressed his 
deprecation to speculation of the court on these matters, and held that the 
burden is on the shoulder of the assured to demonstrate to the court that the 
                                                            
598 [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 549 (Lord Mustill). 
599 Assicurazioni Generali v Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 1642. 
600 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 277; see also Toomey v Banco Vitalicio de Espana SA de Seguros y 
Reasseguros [2004] EWCA Civ 685. 
601 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-64. 
602 Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 277 (Rix and Clarke LJJ). 
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course events have taken the suggested turn.603 The principle of inducement 
was recently highlighted in the view of Christopher Clarke J:  
“To justify avoidance, the non-disclosure must be a real and substantial 
cause affecting the decision of the insurer to enter into the contract, or to 
do so on the terms agreed, the insurer bearing the onus of proving 
inducement on the balance of probabilities. No presumption of fact 
applies where the underwriter is called to give evidence.”604  
 
It is important to note here that, in order to demonstrate inducement, it is not 
necessary to prove that the representee believed the representation to be 
true.605 Further, in Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Ltd,606 Leggatt J 
pointed out that the legal test of inducement is not the same for 
misrepresentation as it is for non-disclosure.607 He then explained that in order 
to determine whether the making of a misrepresentation induced the 
representee to enter into a contract, the critical counterfactual question to ask 
must in principle be whether the representee would still have contracted on the 
same terms if the representation had not been made;608 while, in the case of 
non-disclosure, the question arises is what the insurer would have done if he 
had been told the truth.609 Therefore, the consequences of misrepresentation 
                                                            
603 ibid [179]-[181] (Pill LJ). 
604 Garnat Trading & Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Baominh Insurance Corp [2010] EWHC 2578 
(Comm); [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 589, at [135(i)] 
605 Zurich Insurance Co plc v Hayward [2016] UKSC 48; [2016] 3 WLR 637; [2016] AII ER (D) 138 (Jul) 
606 [2015] EWHC 2225 (Comm) 
607 ibid [211] 
608 ibid [212] 
609 ibid [213] 
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and non-disclosure may differ. Moreover, the distinction is not merely theoretical. 
Leggatt J stressed in particular that, when a misrepresentation is made to 
insurer, the facts which insurer would have been told if told the truth do not 
necessarily coincide with facts which the insured had a duty of disclosure.610 
 
It is worth noting that, by proving materiality, the burden of proof is shifted on to 
the insurer. In practice, it is generally difficult to prove that the insured did not 
disclose a material fact, in particular where there is only a standard proposal 
form. In Greenhill v Federal Ins Co,611 neither party obtained a clear recollection 
of correspondence as to the negotiation of the contract. The insurer argued that 
the fact was so material that he, as a prudent underwriter, would never have 
written the policy had he known the undisclosed fact, while the agent of the 
insured contradicted that the fact was so material that he, as an honest broker, 
must have disclosed it. In this situation, Scrutton LJ found that “it is 
inconceivable to me that the ordinary rate of premium should be charged for a 
cargo as to which an underwriter knew” the relative facts.612 Therefore, it seems 
that the insurer may be helped by the judge who, having listened to the 
evidence, may be persuaded that, had the facts been disclosed at the time of 
proposal, the particular insurer would have acted differently.613 In this case, the 
broker was unable to find any reference to the fact in his documents relating to 
the transaction. However, it is not the broker, agent of the insured, but the 
                                                            
610 ibid [215] 
611 [1927] 1 KB 65 
612 ibid, 79 
613 M. Clarke, Law of Insurance Contract (6th edn, Informa 2016), para 23-2.  
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insurer himself who must establish what has or has not happened.  
 
It is clear from the decision of Pan Atlantic that an insurer must prove both 
materiality and inducement, although the adoption of the inducement test has 
rendered materiality more or less redundant. Materiality operated as a filter, 
taking out obvious cases where facts are plainly immaterial. Virtually every case 
since Pan Atlantic has turned on inducement. However, the House of Lords in 
that case left the question open on how materiality and inducement are to 
operate together. The issue here is whether proof of materiality in some way 
affects the degree – or even the burden – of proof required of the insurer for 
inducement.614 IA 2015 does not take the matter any further. One possibility is 
the “presumption of inducement” propounded by Lord Mustill. Details are 
provided in next section. Clarke LJ has provided some guidelines on the 
relationship between materiality and inducement in Assicurazioni Generali SpA 
v Arab Insurance Group (BSC)615 in the following phrase: 
(i) In order to be entitled to avoid a contract of insurance or 
reinsurance, an insurer or reinsurer must prove on the balance of 
probabilities that he was induced to enter into the contract by a 
material non-disclosure or by a material misrepresentation. 
                                                            
614 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-088. 
615 [2002] EWCA Civ 1642. 
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(ii) There is no presumption of law that an insurer or reinsurer is 
induced to enter in the contract by a material non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. 
(iii) The facts may, however, be such that it is to be inferred that the 
particular insurer or reinsurer was to induced even in the absence 
from evidence from him 
(iv) In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer must show 
that the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was an effective 
cause of his entering into the contract on the terms on which he 
did. He must therefore show at least that, but for the relevant non-
disclosure or misrepresentation, he would not have entered into 
the contract on those terms. On the other hand, he does not have 
to show that it was the sole effective cause of his doing so.616 
 
4.3.3 Presumption of inducement 
Lord Mustill, vigorously opposed by Lord Lloyd, held that in Pan Atlantic, if the 
matter undisclosed was objectively material, there was a “presumption of 
inducement”, i.e. if a non-disclosure or misrepresentation would influence a 
prudent insurer, then it is likely to be the case that it in fact influenced the actual 
underwriter, and that the assured faces an “uphill task” in demonstrating to the 
court that the material facts have made no difference to the actual insurer in 
making the contract, “even where the underwriter is shown to have been 
                                                            
616 ibid [62] (Clarke LJ). 
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careless in other respects”.617 Subsequently, the presumption of inducement 
have received some consideration and succeeded in St Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co (UK) Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd.618 In brief, one 
would, in practice, expect a finding of inducement to follow freely from a finding 
of materiality as a convenient excuse entitling the insurer in the event of a trial, 
not to be cross-examined on the assertion of inducement but instead permitting 
the insurer to rely on the presumption, then much of the benefit of the 
requirement of inducement from the point of view of the insured will be lost. It 
was for that reason that, in the marine case of Marc Rich & Co AG v Portman,619 
the Rt Hon Lord Justice Longmore suggested that, unless there was a good 
reason for the insurer who wrote the risk not to be called to give evidence,620 the 
presumption would be unlikely to apply, since the court would decide the point 
on the evidence that was before it rather than on the basis of any presumption.  
 
It is now clear that the presumption of inducement is an exception rather than 
the rule.621 Inducement cannot be inferred from proved materiality, as a matter 
of law.622 Thus, there is no link between materiality and inducement.623 The 
insurer must prove inducement on the balance of probabilities, though there 
may be cases which may sometimes be possible to infer inducement from the 
                                                            
617 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 551 (Mustill LJ) 
618 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 116 
619 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 430 QB, 442 
620 e.g. that the insurer was dead or unable to attend for inevitable reasons 
621 R. Merkin, ‘Current Issues in Marine Insurance and Reinsurance Law’ Seminer paper of Yeditepe 
University. 
622 St Paul Fire and Marine Ins Co (UK) Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
116, 127, citing Lord Hailsham of Marylebone (ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 31 (4th edn, 
Butterworth 1998) para 1067. 
623 Assicurazioni Generali v Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 1642. 
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facts in the absence of direct evidence.624  Nevertheless, there is room for 
presumption of inducement where, “as it is not uncommon, the passage of time 
mean that the actual underwrite cannot be identified, or cannot be recall the 
particular transaction,” but it should only arise where materiality is clearly 
established.625  In AXA Versicherung AG v Arab Insurance Group (BSC)626 , 
Males J commented that the presumption of inducement was not as a matter of 
law limited to cases where the insurer could not give evidence, but that this 
would generally be true as a matter of fact.627 
 
4.3.4 Necessity of introducing test of inducement into Chinese insurance 
law 
Whilst the principle of inducement is coming of age in English insurance law, 
Chinese insurance law has not commenced in paving its way on the test. 
Notably, judging from their guidelines concerning insurance disputes, some 
provincial higher courts in China have recognised the need for a causal 
connection when considering the reckless non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
by the assureds. Clearly, Chinese courts do not require demonstration of 
causation if the insured deliberately breach the duty of disclosure. The onus of 
proof is upon the insurer. 
 
The Higher People’s Court of Shandong Province provides, in art. 7 of its 
                                                            
624 Assicurazioni Generali v Arab Insurance Group [2002] EWCA Civ 1642 [62(i)]; Laker Engineering Ltd v 
Templeton Insurance Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 62. 
625 Francis Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice (2nd ed, Informa 2012) para 5.82. 
626 [2015] EWHC 1939 (Comm). 
627 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-089. 
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Guidance Notes as to Adjudication of Insurance Contracts Disputes (Trial),628 
that the obligation of insurer shall not be discharged because of the assured’s 
non-fulfillment of the duty of disclosure and that of the duty not to misrepresent, 
if there is no causal connection can be shown between the recklessly withheld 
or misstated facts and the occurrence of the loss. Meanwhile, the Higher 
People’s Court of Zhejiang Province adopted a different approach. It is stated, 
in art. 7 of its Guidance Notes concerning Adjudication of Insurance Contract 
Disputes, that the obligation of insurer shall not be discharged because of the 
assured’s non-fulfillment of the duty of disclosure and that of the duty not to 
misrepresent, if the facts undisclosed or misrepresented due to the insured’s 
recklessness are not the main cause to the occurrence of the loss, therefore no 
decisive causal link between the facts and the insurers’ obligation. By contrast, 
art. 6 of the Guideline published by the Higher People’s Court of Guangdong 
Province indicates that insurer is not obliged to insurance indemnity, even if 
there is no causal connection is shown between the relevant facts recklessly 
concealed or distort by the proposer or the insured. Obviously, Guangdong 
Higher Court takes a stricter measurement than Shandong and Zhejiang 
provincial courts as to the enquiry of causal connection. The remarkable 
inconsistence between provisions of provincial guidelines constantly causes 
problems, in particular, contrarious decisions in different regions in China. 
 
                                                            
628 Published on Mar 17, 2011, passed on Mar 2nd, 2011 on 12th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the 
Higher Court of Shangdong Province. In order to correctly handle cases concerning insurance contracts, 
the Guidelines are formulated in accordance with the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 
Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China and the relevant laws, regulations and judicial 
interpretations and with the legal practice of insurance disputes in Shangdong province.  
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Although some have suggested that the definition of materiality stated in the 
MIA 1906 impliedly carries within it the essential concept of a causal link 
between the misrepresented or undisclosed facts and the insurer’s right to avoid 
because of loss,629 it is not necessary to show, in common law, in order to avoid 
the policy on the ground of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, that the loss 
should have arisen from a cause connected with the circumstance concealed or 
misstated.630 Further, the Law Commissions have taken a special consideration 
on the idea, concerning negligent misrepresentation,631 that the insurer would be 
required to show a link between a non-disclosure and any loss that had 
occurred. This idea was nevertheless rejected for the reason that “the test of 
causal connection would prove very difficult to apply in practice”, particularly in 
circumstances of moral hazard.632 It would be irrational for the insurer to have no 
remedy in the cases where he, with a negligent misrepresentation, accepted a 
proposal with a record of criminal conviction. “It would be wrong to hold an 
insurer to such a contract.”633 The test of inducement is, as Lord Mustill noted in 
Pan Atlantic, a “question which concerns the need or otherwise, for a causal 
connection between the misrepresentation or non-disclosure and the making of 
the contract of insurance.”634 The “causal link” considered by Chinese provincial 
courts is not the kind that referred in the test of inducement. Therefore, it might 
                                                            
629 Norma J Hird, ‘Pan Atlantic – Yet More to Disclose’ [1995] JBL 608 
630 Pan Atlantic v Pine Top [1995] 1 A.C. 501, 528. 
631 The Law Commission has made clear that this approach does not apply to cases of deliberate or 
reckless misrepresentation, nor to “innocent” misrepresentation. See Law Commission, Insurance Contract 
Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 
2007) footnote 85. 
632 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 2007) paras 4.174-4.175. 
633 ibid para A. 33. 
634 [1995] 1 A.C. 501. 
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be the time for legislatures in China to think a step further from materiality. And 
one thing that is necessary for Chinese judiciaries bear in mind when making 
judgments is the objective nature of the test. 
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Chapter 5 Insurer’s Pre-Contractual Duty of Utmost good faith 
 
5.1 Origin of the insurer’s pre-contractual duty 
It is accredited that the original formulation of the duty of utmost good faith, 
despite the missing term “utmost”, in Carter v Boehm635 indicating that the 
principle is bilateral. It was recorded in the classic statement of Lord Mansfield, 
“Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to 
draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of the fact, and his 
believing the contrary.”  
Marine Insurance Act 1906 embodied the bilateralism in s. 17 but, intentionally 
or unintentionally, failed to expand the duty mutually and omitted the 
corresponding test for determining materiality in terms of the insurer’s duty of 
disclosure. Other sections of the legislation expanding on the s. 17, i.e. ss. 18 
and 20, defined the test of materiality only as a duty imposed on the assured.636 
While the 1906 Act was silent about the operation of insurer’s pre-contractual 
duty of utmost good faith, Lord Mansfield may have left prophetic traces of 
instruction in certain passages of the judgment in Carter v Boehm637 which 
indicate that “the definition of materiality in respect of the insurer’s duty is the 
mirror image of that operating for the assured’s duty”.638  
 
                                                            
635 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905 
636 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-035 
637 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 
638 ibid. 
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In China, the traditional view as to the origin of insurer’s pre-contractual duty 
rests upon the proposition that this duty is a demonstration of the mutuality of 
utmost good faith, which has however been challenged in recent years since 
the second reform of the Insurance Act of PRC, namely, the 2009 Amendment. 
It is worth mentioning at this point that, unlike the common law position, a 
Chinese insurer is not required to disclose material facts to an assured but does 
own a statutory duty to explain to the insured the contents of an insurance 
policy, particularly clauses exempting insurer’s liabilities and obligations, 
meanwhile an insurer must leave sufficient marks on those clauses so that the 
insured is not ignorant of and unable to discover them - the so-called “insurer’s 
duty of prompt and explanation”. It is suggested that this duty is based on the 
contract law concept of autonomy of the will639  and the civil law notion of 
honesty and good faith, which is conceptually distinctive from the common law 
principle of utmost good faith.640 Although the principle of honesty and good faith 
also requires conscience, integrity and goodwill, and resist concealment and 
fraudulent, the intension and extension of the concept are rather different.641 
Utmost good faith is not simply the maximization of honesty and good faith.642 It 
is, therefore, doubtful to say that the insurer’s pre-contractual duty of prompt 
                                                            
639 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, 103 & 114.  
640 Xinli HE & Chaowei FU, ‘A Study of Explanation of Obligation of the Insurer’ (2007) 17 Annual China 
Maritime Law 217; Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance 
System of Insurer’s Explanation Obligation: Comments on Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 
40(3) Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 88, 91. 
641 Xinli HE & Chaowei FU, ‘A Study of Explanation of Obligation of the Insurer’ (2007) 17 Annual China 
Maritime Law 217. 
642 Tian YIN, Peng SUN & Linqing JIA, ‘Legal Regulation and Control on Chinese Insurance Market’ 
(2000) Social Science Academic Press 115. 
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and explanation is theoretically originated from the two-way stretch of utmost 
good faith.  
 
The duty of explanation owed by the contract drafter, in the realm of contract 
law, is one of the general pre-contractual duties of contracting parties generated 
by the notion of good faith,643 its legal objective and operational measure of 
which is highly consistent with that of the insurer’s duty of prompt and 
explanation. Thus, it is clear that, unlike the common law position, the insurer’s 
duty of prompt and explanation under Chinese law, with its own peculiar 
characteristics, is not a corresponding duty of but independent to insured’s duty 
of misrepresentation. Details as to the insurer’s pre-contractual duties under 
Chinese law are provided in the next section. The common approach of the 
insurer’s duty of disclosure is discussed in detail thereafter. 
 
5.2 Insurer’s duty of explanation – the Chinese law innovation 
The terms of contract, in particular insurance contract - a paradigm of standard 
form of contract which is unilaterally drafted by the insurer - are notoriously 
complex documents riddled with insurance jargon, and their layout is often 
muddled to the untrained eye.644 It has been reported that 74.8 per cent of 
consumer life insurance policyholders did not understand the precise meanings 
                                                            
643 Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance System of Insurer’s 
Explanation Obligation: Comments on Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 40(3) Journal of 
Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 88, 91. 
644 Zhen JING, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017) 288. 
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of insurance clauses.645 The information asymmetry resulted from the insured’s 
deprivation of specialised knowledge as to standard terms and the 
misapprehension of contract terms that are above the insured’s comprehension 
may lead to a false representation of the true intention of the insured on 
whether to enter into a contract of insurance. This issue was dealt with by an 
innovative legal method, namely, the insurer’s duty of explanation, originated by 
Chinese legislatures,646 although the originality of the duty might be somewhat 
arguable.647 It is suggested that the mandatory requirement resting upon the 
insurer to produce detailed explanations of certain type of clauses in the policy 
nevertheless exists only in Chinese legal system.648  
 
When the duty first appeared in the Insurance Act 1995, it reads: “If there are 
exclusion clauses provided by the insurer in the insurance contract, then the 
insurer shall make clear explanation in respect thereof to the proposer at the 
time of concluding the contract. Where such clauses are not clearly explained, 
they shall not be effective”.649 It can be seen from this formulation that the duty 
of explanation owned by insurers relates to exclusion clauses in the policy. This 
provision had been redrafted in the second insurance law reform in 2009. There 
were two main developments: first, the scope of the exclusion clauses was 
broadened to all causes which exempt or limit obligation of an insurer; second, 
                                                            
645 Ibid. 
646 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, 102; Qirong FAN, Baoxian Qiyue Gaozhi Yiwu Zhidu 
Lun [The Regime as to the Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract] (CUPL Press 2004), 309. 
647 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, footnote [1]. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Zhen JING, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017) 293. 
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a new duty was added against the insurer in respect of standard form of 
clauses.650 In 2015, the Insurance Act was revised again for the third time by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.651 This time article 17 
remained unchanged.  
 
5.2.1 “Article 17” 
Art.17 of the Insurance Act of PRC 2015 places concrete obligations on the 
shoulder of an insurer to explain policy terms when standard terms are 
deployed in an insurance policy; and to produce well-defined explanation of 
exclusion clauses to the applicant. The provision is phrased as follow:  
Article 17 In the formation of contract, the insurer must provide insurance 
policy with the standard terms attached to the proposer where such 
clauses are deployed, and explain to the proposer the contents of the 
contract. 
The insurer must give sufficient prompt, on the insurance application 
form, the insurance policy or any other insurance certificate, to bring 
clauses exempting insurer’s obligations to the proposer’s attention before 
the contract is entered into; and produce a clear explanation of the 
exemption clauses embodied in the policy in either a written or oral form; 
failure of compliance renders the provision null and void.652 
                                                            
650 Insurance Act of PRC 2009, art.17. 
651 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No.26. 
652 Author translation. 
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The legislative purpose of art. 17 is to balance information asymmetry between 
contractual parties so as to protect the insured, mainly consumers, against a 
misuse of insurer’s superiority in drafting terms of an insurance policy.653 There 
are four duties of insurer that are listed in the provision:  
• a duty to present the standard terms attached to the insurance policy;  
• a duty to explain the content of the contract;  
• a duty to give sufficient prompt to draw clauses exempting insurer’s 
liabilities and obligations embodied in the policy to the proposer’s 
attention; and  
• a duty to provide an unambiguous and definite illustration, oral or 
written, of clauses exempting insurer’s liabilities and obligations. 
While the insurer is, under English law, required to disclose to the insured all 
material known to him facts relating to the risks insured in the policy, the scope 
of insurer’s statutory pre-contractual duties formulated in art. 17 have been 
confined to explanation of certain types of policy terms. Disclosure sounds a far 
narrower concept than explanation, insofar as art. 17 is silent about the 
definition of explanation, the wide conceptual term “explanation” only leads to a 
great uncertainty. Its interpretation is unclear. There are two levels of 
obligations indicated in art. 17 in respect of different types of clauses: the first 
two duties are aiming at the contents of standard form attached in insurance 
policy, the purpose of which is to allow the insured to gain a better 
                                                            
653 Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance System of Insurer’s 
Explanation Obligation: Comments on Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 40(3) Journal of 
Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 88, 89. 
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understanding of contract terms, mainly clauses as to the scope of risks sought 
to be covered in the policy; and the further two higher-level duties are in allusion 
to exclusion clauses, the purpose of those duties is more obvious, that is to 
protect the insured against the insurer’s abuse of exemption.  
 
5.2.2 Practical issues 
The enforceability of the duties at both levels are problematic, especially the 
latter. Insofar as no implementing rules are given under the Act, art. 17, as the 
most controversial provision both theoretically and practically, have become one 
of the most commonly disputed matters amongst all kinds of insurance 
disputes.654 From 2009 to 2013, i.e. before publication of the Second Judicial 
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Insurance Law of the PRC in May 2013 (the “Interpretation 
II”)655, 96.2 per cent of insurers among 482 insurance cases have lost in their 
lawsuit on the ground of failure to comply with art. 17: in 385 of which, insurer 
failed to provide evidence in support of fulfillment of their pre-contractual duties; 
and in the residual 97 cases, the Chinese courts have again rejected insurers’ 
allegation on the ground that implementing measures taken by the insurer were 
insufficient even where there was supportive evidence.656  
 
                                                            
654 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, 102. 
655 Interpretation No. 14 [2013], adopted at the 1577th meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme 
People’s Court on May 6, 2013. 
656 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, 104. 
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Market practice in the past decade shows that some insurers, in accordance 
with requirements under art. 17, have managed to insert into an insurance 
policy: (a) an insurer’s obligation section and a functional provision to remind 
the insured of the standard terms and exemption clauses contained in the 
contract;657 and (b) an “Insured’s Declaration” sector requiring the insured to 
read the exemptions and ask questions if there is any.658 Meanwhile, insurers 
also made the exemptions in bold and bigger typefaces for heavier emphasis to 
grab the reader’s attention. 659  However, the above methods are not quite 
satisfactory to the courts. One of the interesting grounds given by the courts for 
a refusal was that, the insured claimed that he himself did not understand the 
meaning of the exemption clauses, even the inured had been informed and 
explained the exemption clauses and he had indeed signed in the “insured’s 
Declaration” sector. 660  Hence the art. 17 has to some extent become the 
assureds’ shield and buckler, which therefore placed insurance firms in an 
adverse position in trial.  
 
                                                            
657 Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance System of Insurer’s 
Explanation Obligation: Comments on Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 40(3) Journal of 
Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 88, 89. 
658 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, Table 1 at 104; Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection 
on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance System of Insurer’s Explanation Obligation: Comments on 
Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 40(3) Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social 
Sciences) 88, 89. 
659 Yongmin WU & Bin HU, ‘A Reflection on and Reconstruction of China’s Insurance System of Insurer’s 
Explanation Obligation: Comments on Article 17 of the New Insurance Law’  (2010) 40(3) Journal of 
Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 88, 92. 
660 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
Explanation] (2015) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 102, Table 1 at 105. 
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5.3 The common law position 
Although the concept that the duty of utmost good faith is reciprocal has been 
made patently clear and put on an explicit statutory footing in England, there 
were barely any cases to hold in terms that the insurer owns a duty of utmost 
good faith to the assured until Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) 
Insurance Co Ltd, 661  in which this point was first addressed and heavily 
discussed by Steyn J.  
 
5.3.1 The “La Banque Financière” 
In this case, syndicates of banks, including La Banque Financière (LBF) 
(formerly Banque Keyser Ullman SA) entered into separate loan agreements 
totalling 80 million Swiss francs with four companies owned or controlled by B, 
secured by the deposit of gemstones with certified valued at 95 million Swiss 
francs and by a credit insurance policy for 37 million Swiss francs. N, a 
reputable firm of Lloyd’s brokers who was appointed to act as the banks’ agent, 
were instructed by the banks to arrange the credit insurance. The banks were 
named as co-insured or assignees under those policies. L, an employee of the 
brokers, found it impossible to place the required insurance as one risk, and 
therefore sought to arrange insurance in layers. In January 1980 cover notes 
certifying that total insurance of the initial loan had been effected were issued 
by L who was subsequently found to have acted fraudulently, in that the primary 
layer insurance which was to be underwritten by Westgate Insurance (WI) 
                                                            
661 [1987] 2 All E.R. 923. 
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(formerly Hodge General & Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd) had not been 
arranged when cover note were issued; by June 1980, the full amount of 
insurance had nevertheless been obtained by L. Further advances were made. 
By May 1980, D, an employee of WI, became aware of L’s fraud, but he failed 
to disclose this to LBF. In the event, that fraud proved to be of no significance 
as matters were rectified by L. By March 1981, LBF and five other banks made 
a total amount loaned, i.e. 80 million Swiss francs, to B. Subsequently, a further 
insurance to cover the advances was needed and further false cover notes 
were again issued by L. Upon the default of repayments, the gemstones were 
found to be virtually worthless and the additional insurance did not exist. In 
1983 LBF and other banks brought actions against N and L for negligence and 
fraud respectively. LBF also sought to recover under such insurance as did 
exist, but was rejected as the result of a fraud exclusion clauses in the policies, 
which stated that the insurers were not liable “for any claim or claims arising 
directly or indirectly out of or caused directly or indirectly by fraud attempted 
fraud misdescription or deception by any person firm organisation or company”. 
LBF however raised an alternative argument in the proceeding s against the 
insurer, and alleged that the insurers, being aware through D of L’s fraud, owed 
a pre-contractual duty of disclosure to the banks.  
 
At first instance, Steyn J reaffirmed the mutuality of the duty of disclosure, which 
was later approved in principle on appeal by the Courts of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in La Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance 
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Co Ltd.662 It was held, by the Court of Appeal, that the insurer’s failure, during 
the negotiations leading to the contract of insurance in respect of the second 
loan, to inform the banks of L’s deceit had indeed been a breach of the insurer’s 
duty of utmost good faith. However, Slade LJ was opposed to the scope of the 
duty and the test of materiality in determining such a duty. 
 
5.3.2 Scope of the insurer’s duty of the disclosure 
In Carter v Boehm,663 Lord Mansfield had provided an example of what an 
insurer has to disclose:  
 “The policy would be equally void, against the underwriter, if he 
concealed; as, if he insured a ship on her voyage, which he privately 
knew to be arrived, and an action would lie to recover the premium.” 
It might be able to infer from “the arrival of a ship” that, as a matter of principle, 
those circumstances which are material and which are to be disclosed by an 
insurer are circumstances which decrease rather than increase the risk to the 
assured.664 However, this approach was not quite fit the circumstances of La 
Banque Financière, because the fact alleged to be material were that the 
leading underwriter had failed to disclose to the banks the earlier fraud of their 
broker, which in fact related not the insured risk but to the circumstances 
                                                            
662 [1989] 2 All E.R. 952; [1990] 2 All E.R. 947. 
663 (1766) 3 Burr. 1905. 
664 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-035. 
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relating to the setting up of the policy itself; and that did not involve material 
facts as defined in Carter v Boehm.665  
 
In considering the ambit of the duty, Steyn J at first instance was of the view 
that the duty of disclosure of insurers will cover matters peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the insurers, which the insurers know that the insured is ignorant 
of and unable to discover but which are material in the sense of being 
“calculated to influence the decision of the insured to conclude the contract of 
insurance”.666 However, the “good faith and fair dealing” test, which are not the 
tests embodied in Section 18 of the Act of 1906, was rejected by the Court of 
Appeal as being far too broad and vague, therefore uncertain for determining 
the existence of a duty which might arise “even in the absence of any dishonest 
or unfair intent”, for example, the fact that other insurers offered similar cover 
but at a lower premium.667 By contrast with the “mirror image” concept raised by 
Lord Mansfield, Slade LJ thought that: 
“in adapting the well established principles relating to the duty of 
disclosure falling upon the insured to the obverse case of the insurer 
himself, due account must be taken of the rather different reasons for 
which the insured and the insurer require the protection of full 
disclosure”, 
  
                                                            
665 ibid, at 6-036. 
666 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia UK [1990] 1 QB 665, 703. 
667 ibid 772. 
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Upon which his Lordship provided a general statement of principle:  
“the duty falling upon the insurer must at least extend to disclosing all 
facts known to him which are material either to the nature of the risk or to 
the recoverability of a claim under the contract, which a prudent insured 
would take into account in deciding whether to place the risk with the 
insurer.”668  
Applying that test, the Court of Appeal held that the leading underwriter was in 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith because the insured would have 
recognised a possible danger that the policy might prove to be unenforceable 
because of the fraud exclusion clause, or voidable.669 The House of Lords, 
opposing the conclusion, argued that a fraud exclusion clause in a policy does 
not extend to fraud by the assured’s broker in setting up the policy.670 L’s fraud 
thus did not affect the recoverability of a claim within the Court of Appeal 
formulation of the test of materiality. The question then arose at this point is 
whether the fact in question would have been material, had the fraud exception 
applied to L’s fraud. The answer is no. The loss suffered by the assured is the 
inability to recover under the policy,671 but this were not the consequences of the 
failure of the insurer to disclose the misconduct of L.672 No authority was cited 
for the proposition that a negotiating party owed a duty to disclose to the 
opposing party information that the broker of the opposite party committed a 
                                                            
668 ibid 772. 
669 ibid 773. 
670 La Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 Lloyd’s rep 377, 380. 
671 ibid 389 (Jauncey of Tullichettle LJ). 
672 ibid 380, 384, 385, 388 and 389. 
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breach of the duty he owed to his principal in an earlier transaction.673 The 
House of Lords followed closely the narrow Cater v Boehm test, and confined 
the insurer’s duty of disclosure to insured perils, however, it does not extend to 
the legal meaning of contract terms.674 This was confirmed in Norwich Union Life 
Insurance Society v Qureshi.675 Mummery LJ held in the leading judgment that 
the duty of good faith applied only to matters material to the risk covered by the 
life policy, i.e. to the recoverability of a claim in respect of the assured’s life 
under the policy. 
 
5.4 The duty to explain policy terms 
Compared to the duty of explanation, the insurer’s duty of presentment, 
applying only to the standard terms attached to the insurance policy not to the 
entire contract, is nicely set out by art. 17 par. 1. No issues at all have ever 
arisen out of it.676 The duty to explain to the assured the content of contract was 
codified in such a broad and general terms and it seems unreasonably 
ambiguous: for example, (a) no legal consequence was identified; (b) no 
definition of “content of contract” was clarified; (c) no operational measures 
were indicated; (d) the silence on the issue of to what extent an insurer should 
explain; and (e) the omission in respect to the matter on whether an insurer 
must volunteer a full illustration of policy terms. However, surprisingly, there is 
an absence of disputes involving insurer’s failure of explanation. The only 
                                                            
673 ibid 384 (Templeman LJ). 
674 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-038. 
675 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 263. 
676 Ning MA, ‘Boxianren Mingqueshuoming Yiwu de Pipan’ [Criticism of the Insurer’s Duty of Clear 
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possibility to expound this phenomenon is that the duty is the inability to perform. 
Leaving the matters (a), (b), (c) and (d), so long as (e) is considered: if the 
answer was yes, the insurer will undertake unbearable costs in acting out this 
duty;677 even if the duty were entirely passive, the difficulty in gathering evidence 
might again turn the light off. In fact, the real question that is of a quiet 
contemplation here is whether it is necessary to exert such a troublesome duty 
on the insurer in the era of market economics. At this point it is useful to 
consider the English approaches along with the Australian experience to see 
what might be improved in the near future. 
 
5.4.1 The English approaches 
Generally, there is no obligation on the insurer to disclose policy terms under 
English law, any duty of disclosure owed by insurers relates to recoverability of 
a claim in the policy. There might be an exception offered by s. 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, where the insurers are aware of assured’s wrongful 
belief as to the coverage provided by the policy but have not corrected it, 
particularly where that mistake has been induced by a positive misstatement by 
the insurers as to the scope of cover.678 In such circumstances, assureds are 
granted a statutory permission to claim damages. Further, estoppel can be an 
alternative if insurers knew that assureds rely upon a misapprehension of a 
contract term; but the common law is not “promising” on this point; one thing 
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678 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-044. 
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almost certain is that the insurer’s passive action would not amount to an 
estoppel, so a positive statement might be needed.679  
 
Insurers might in some circumstances, be under an obligation to disclose 
inadequacy of cover to the assured. This issue has been given some concern 
by the Court of Appeal in the case of La Banque Financière de la Cité SA v 
Westgate Insurance Co Ltd. 680 The Court held that there was no duty of care on 
the insurers to ensure that material facts as to the fraud of the assured’s broker 
were disclosed to the banks. This finding did not receive much consideration as 
it should be when it was appealed to the House of Lords, but Lord Jauncey 
stated that any duty of care could not go beyond what was required by the 
insurer’s duty of disclosure. The duty of care can arise if “the usual 
requirements for the imposition of that duty are satisfied”, i.e. the insurers 
undertake additional responsibility towards the assured.681  So far:  
“The courts have not been readily persuaded that insurers have gone 
beyond their ordinary responsibilities under a contract of insurance and 
have not undertaken any additional duty to warn the assured of the risky 
nature of the policy”.682  
This finding coincides with New Zealand approach confirmed in Lovett v Crown 
Worldwide (NZ) Ltd,683 that the principle of utmost good faith can never exert an 
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extra contractually duty on an insurer to disclose or ensure that an insured party 
understands terms and conditions already settled between them by 
agreement.684 It is arguable that the gate is opened in Australia where cases are 
decided under the implied terms for utmost good faith. Details are provided 
below.  
 
5.4.2 The Australian position 
Insurers are under a statutory duty to notify the assured of matters relating to 
the policy.685 This duty, explicitly stated in s. 13 of the Insurance Contract Act 
1984, is contractual; hence it is by its words unlikely to impose a pre-contractual 
duty of utmost good faith.686 Nevertheless, the generous formulation of the 
words “in respect of any matter arising under or in relation to” an insurance 
policy may possibly be construed to be wide enough to deal with pre-contractual 
matter. 687  The insurer’s pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith under 
Australian law is conferred by a legislative framework composing by various 
provisions of ICA 1984, namely, s. 22, s. 23, ss. 33A-D and ss. 34 to 37E.688 
Some detailed analysis as to the potential scope of the duty is provided below. 
 
Before that, it is worth mentioning that mere silence of the insurer does not 
amount to a breach of utmost good faith. In Speno Rail Maintenance Australia 
                                                            
684 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-042. 
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687 W I B Enright & R. Merkin, Sutton on Insurance Law, vol 1 (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 2015) at 6-110. 
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Pty Ltd v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd,689 as a result of the negligence of employees 
of Hamersley, two employees of Speno were injured while they were performing 
certain rail grinding work under a contract between Speno and Hamersley. It 
was a term of the contract that Speno would indemnify Hamersley against all 
liability to the injured workers. Speno obtained a general liability policy and an 
umbrella policy with Zurich pursuant to its contract with Hamersley. There was 
no express representation by Zurich that the cover would be provided. Zurich 
remained silent and simply issued policies which did not meet the required 
specification. The question was whether Zurich, as the insurer, was under a 
positive duty to disclose that it had not covered the liability. Wheeler J, having 
stated that by analogy to the counter-offer concept an insurer is under no 
obligation to specifically draw to the attention of the insured every way in which 
the policy proposed may differ from that sought by the insured, continued that in 
the absence of any express representation by Zurich that the proposed terms 
would respond in the way requested by Speno, and in the context of an insurer 
negotiating with a party who would appear to have some experience in 
commercial and insurance matter, there was no breach of utmost good faith in 
the course taken by Zurich.690 The insured’s commercial knowledge and the 
legal advise received have also been taken into consideration in the judgment 
of Small Business Consortium Lloyd’s Consortium No 9056 v Angas Securities 
Ltd,691 in which it was held that there was no breach of the duty of utmost good 
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faith in failure by the insurers to explain the terms of the release.692 By this 
token, the outcome might be reversible in respect of consumer matters. 
 
5.4.2.1 Key Facts Sheet 
For the purpose of giving greater clarity to consumers about their insurance 
cover, part IV Division IV of the ICA 1984 concerns “Key Facts Sheet” (KFS) for 
home building and home content (combined and individual) insurance policy 
imposing a duty upon the insurer to provide a single-page disclosure document 
in the prescribed format to consumers for them to obtain a quick and easy 
access of key information, including the nature of cover and any key 
exclusions.693 The content of the KFS is set out in the Regulation.694 A KFS, 
subject to the exceptions, must be provided as soon as reasonably practicable, 
but no later than 14 days, after the consumer first requests information about 
the contract, and enters (including renewals, but any extension, variation or 
reinstatement are excluded) into the contract or potential contract with the 
insurer.695 The requirement to provide a KFS rests with the insurer.696 There is 
no direct obligation on an insurance broker to provide a client with a KFS. This 
document, however with the limited nature of the information provided, does not 
cover everything and it does not take into account any specific circumstances of 
individuals. It is of significant importance to note that, pursuant to s. 33(D), “the 
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<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/2322/PDF/KFS_homebuilding.pdf> accessed 29 Nov 2017. 
694 Insurance Contract Act 1984 s. 33(B), 
695 Insurance Contracts Regulations 1985, part 4 division 4 regulation 4C(2). 
696 Insurance Contract Act 1984 s.33(C). 
251 
 
provision by an insurer of a KFS to a person does not constitute clearly 
informing the person of the matter contained in the KFS”. Thus providing a KFS 
will not discharge an insurer’s duty to notify an assured certain terms of an 
insurance policy. 
 
5.4.2.2 Notification of non-standard and unusual terms 
S. 14(3) of the ICA 1984 provides that: 
In deciding whether reliance by an insurer on a provision of the contract 
of insurance would be to fail to act with the utmost good faith, the court 
shall have regard to any notification of a kind mentioned in s. 37 or 
otherwise. 
S. 37 of the ICA 1984 requires an insurer to “clearly inform” an insured in 
writing, prior to the making of the contract, of the effect of any unusual terms of 
a kind not usually included in contract of insurance (not being a prescribed 
contract) 697 . Unless the insurer does so, the unusual terms become void. 
Meanwhile, by virtue of s. 35 of the 1984 Act, insurers are also under a statutory 
duty to notify the insured, before the contract was entered into, any non-
standard policy terms of a prescribed contract, regardless the utmost good faith. 
By contrast, the requirements of presentment and explanation of standard 
clauses stipulated in art. 17 par. 1 of the IAC 2015 looks rather unnecessary at 
this point. In fact, non-standard and unusual terms are more challenging in 
                                                            
697 Definition of “prescribed contract” and “prescribed event” are stipulated by s. 34 of Insurance Contract 
Act 1984, namely, motor vehicle insurance, home building insurance, home contents insurance, sickness 
and accident insurance, consumer credit insurance and travel insurance (see Part II of the Insurance 
Contracts Regulations 1985 (as amended)). 
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practice as standard insurance contracts or standard clauses of an insurance 
policy are generally written and/or approved and recorded by CIRC for the 
purpose of protecting public interest.698  
 
The proper construction of the phrase “clearly informed the insured in writing”, 
appearing in ICA 1984 s. 35(2), was considered by the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in Hams v CGU Insurance Ltd.699 Prior to this case, however, 
the words in that section have not been considered in any reported case, 
despite only the phrase received much discussion in Suncorp General 
Insurance v Cheihk700, for the purpose of ICA 1984 s. 22(1). The affinity of s. 
35(2) with s. 22(1) was, for the first time, referred to in Hams v CGU Insurance 
Ltd.701 S. 22(1) of the ICA 1984 imposes on insurers a statutory duty to inform 
the assured of the nature and effect of the duty of disclosure, failure to do so 
preventing the insurer from relying upon that duty. 
  
In Suncorp, Stein JA, citing Lumley General Insurance Limited v Delphin,702 
accepted that “inform” means to “make known”. He continued stating that “the 
adverb ‘clearly’ is a plain English word and its ordinary meaning would convey 
the need for some precision in the making known of the relevant duty”.703 In 
addition to that, the Court held that, without appropriate cross-referencing or 
                                                            
698 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 135. 
699 [2002] NSWSC 273. 
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highlighting, the mere supply to the insured by the insurer of a statement of the 
duty of disclosure on the reverse side of a certificate of insurance failed to 
“clearly inform” the insured of his duty of disclosure.704 Einstein J in Hams v 
CGU, adopting the Suncorp approach, held that, in the ordinary course, the 
insurer’s obligation to “clearly inform” of unusual policy terms could be met by 
simply providing the insured with a copy of the policy wording which in plain 
English language.705 Thus, the insurer is in most circumstances not obliged to 
provide extra documentation identifying and explaining the construction of 
particular provision of the insurance policy. In addition, the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales has also recognised that there may be special circumstances 
in which the complexity of, or confusions within, the policy wording prevent this 
from being so.706 Therefore in each case the content of the document and all of 
the circumstances of its provision would need to be considered in order to 
determine if the insurer had effectively informed the insured of the limitation.707 
This approach was followed recently by the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Marsh v CGU Insurance Ltd t/as Commercial Union Insurance.708 In 
this case, the court found that an insured had been “clearly informed” that there 
was no cover for flood under the policy because the insured had been provided 
with a copy of the policy wording and the policy wording contained a flood 
exclusion in clear and unambiguous language and was in a manner which a 
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person of average intelligence and education was likely to have little difficulty in 
finding and understanding.  
 
5.4.3 Treatment for exclusion clauses 
Art. 17 par. 2 of the IAC 2015 imposes on insurers some higher-level 
obligations to volunteer an unambiguous and well-defined explanation of 
exclusion clauses in the policy, which is named the duty of “clear illustration”. 
The duty is not dependent on any prior request by the insured. Unlike the 
insurer’s general duty to explain the contents of contract to which no operation 
measure has ever been indicated in either the Act or any of the judicial 
interpretations, the “Interpretation II” has set up trial criteria for the performance 
of art. 17 par. 2.  
 
5.4.3.1 Scope of exclusion clauses 
The original wording set out in the IAC1995 was as follow: 
If there are exclusion clauses provided in an insurance contract, the 
insurer shall make clear explanation in respect thereof to the proposer 
before the contract is entered into. Where such clauses are not clearly 
explained, they shall not be effective.709 
In 2009, during the second insurance law reform, the words “exclusion clauses” 
was superseded by the phrase “clauses exempting insurer’s liabilities and 
obligations” so as to broaden the so limited definition of “exclusion clauses” and 
                                                            
709 Author translation. 
255 
 
so cover clauses which are indeed limits or exempts insurer’s liability but are 
not labeled as an “exclusion clause”.710 There are strong divergences of views 
on determination of the scope of “clauses exempting insurer’s liabilities and 
obligations”.711 This issue has now been clarified by the Interpretation II art. 9, in 
which it states that the “insurance liability exemption” indicated in the Insurance 
Act of PRC 2015 art. 17 par. 2 shall include any deductible and franchise 
clause, pro rata liability clause and any other clauses excluding or limiting the 
obligations of insurer contained in the standard form of insurance contract. A 
clause conferring upon an insurer the right to terminate the contract where an 
insured breaches statutory or contractual obligations is nevertheless beyond the 
definition of “insurance liability exemption.”712 Further, insurance exclusions that 
consist of statutory and/or administrative rules/regulations on actions expressly 
prohibited by law have also been eliminated from the scope of the insurer’s duty 
of clear explanation. Art.10 of the Interpretation II provides that where an insurer 
incorporates rules/regulations on actions expressly are prohibited by laws or 
regulations, as exemption clauses, into an insurance contract and prompts for 
the insured, a proposer, an insured or a beneficiary claims that such a clause is 
ineffective on the ground that the insurer has not fulfilled the obligation of clear 
explanation, the People’s Courts shall not uphold such claims. It means that, for 
this type of insurance exclusions, an insurer is only obliged to draw those to an 
insured’s attention. No explanation is needed at this point. It should be noted 
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that here the laws and administrative regulations refer to those enacted by the 
National People’s Congress and the State Council.713 
 
5.4.3.2 General operation rules  
The Supreme People’s Court founded, in the Interpretation II, art. 11 requisite 
criteria for Chinese courts to determine whether an insurer has fulfilled its 
obligations set forth in art. 17 par. 2 of the IAC 2015. Art.11 has also confirmed 
that the duty of prompt is an obligation that is independent of duty of clear 
explanation; it is not a subsidiary of the latter duty. Art. 11 par. 1 provides that, 
in the making of an insurance contract, where the insurer has given prompt, on 
the insurance application form, the insurance policy or any other insurance 
certificate, by using certain words, font, symbol or any other conspicuous marks 
that are sufficient to bring insured’s attention to the clauses excluding 
obligations of an insurer, the court shall hold that the insurer shall be discharged 
from its duty of prompt. As to the duty of clear explanation, the Interpretation II 
art. 11 par. 2 states that the illustration of concepts, contents and legal 
consequence of the relevant insurance exemption clauses made by the insurer, 
in either a written or oral form, must be comprehensible to ordinary minds. If so, 
the courts shall affirm the fulfillment of the duty of clear explanation stipulated in 
art. 17 par. 2 of the IAC 2015. The test is objective.714 Satisfaction of the test 
offers judicial guarantees to the insurers. The Supreme People’s Court was 
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silent on the definition of “ordinary minds”, which will be left to individual court to 
decide. Discretion of judges will almost certainly lead to multiple, therefore 
uncertain, standards in different regions of China. It is suggested that “ordinary 
mind” refers to one who is middle school or junior high school graduates.715  
 
Further, even if a written form of explanation is produced, the insurer is still 
required to answer the insured’s questions about exclusion clauses, until the 
insured fully understands them.716 In regard to the method, an analogy is the 
transparency requirements imposed by s. 17(2) of the IA 2015, under which “the 
insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the 
insured’s attention” prior to the making of the contract. There is no need for the 
insurer to ensure that the insured has actual and full knowledge of the terms 
being contracted out. What exactly amounts to sufficient steps will depend on 
the characteristics and sophistication of the insured and the circumstances of 
the transaction.717 The issue as to contracting out is considered in Chapter 3. 
 
The Interpretation II further clarifies the method for performing the duty of clear 
explanation for online or telephone sales of insurance contracts. Art. 12 
indicates that for contracts that are formed via internet or by telephone, the 
people’s courts shall recognise the fulfillment of insurer’s obligation of prompt 
and that of clear explanation where the insurer performs its duties by providing 
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webpage, audio, video or other forms of materials to the insured. The oral or 
written form of explanation can be provided via email or online communication 
tools.718 Moreover, the Interpretation II art. 13 par. 2 has made it clear that the 
insurer’s obligation is deemed to have been fully complied pursuant to 
Interpretation II art. 11 par. 2, where the proposer signed or stamped the 
relevant documents, or has confirmed in any other forms, in the absence of 
sufficient evidence to the contrary. The burden of proof rests upon insurer.719 
The common law authority for the proposition that an insurer must disclose to 
the assured limitation or exclusions in the policy is not coherence. The Supreme 
Court of Western Australia held in Kelly v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 720 
under a house and contents insurance policy that there was no breach of 
utmost good faith where the insurer renewed the policy with limitation on cover 
unless items in the house specified and accepted increased premiums with full 
knowledge that the itemised valuation of the household contents had not been 
provided. Porter v GIO Australia Ltd was however concluded on the contrary. It 
was suggested that the failure of an insurer to draw the assured’s attention to 
an exclusion clause contravened the duty of utmost good faith.721 
 
5.5 Effect of the Insurance Act 2015 
Under Chinese law, the insurer’s failure to perform its duties of prompt and clear 
explanation will lead to the exclusion clauses in question to be of no effect, 
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meaning, the insurer is not able to rely on such exemptions.722 No remedy of 
damages is available to the insured if further losses are occurred as a result of 
insurer’s non-compliance, notwithstanding the insured might still be paid for the 
claim. Steyn J was of the view that, having found a breach of the duty of 
disclosure, the remedy for the breach should be damages rather than 
avoidance of the policy723 as it has been described as “worse than useless” 
where the insurer’s breach is to be found after the risk has occurred.724 
 
Although there is not yet any authority in England supporting the award of 
damages, the amendment of s. 17 of the MIA 1906 by s. 14 of the IA 2015, and 
the removal of the sole remedy of avoidance, might be seen as a turning point. 
It is interesting to see how English courts will react in the near future to this 
change on this point. 
 
5.6 The Insurance Act of PRC 2015, Art. 116 par. 3 
Chapter IV of the Insurance Act of PRC 2015, among all Chapters of the Act, 
formulates administrative rules for insurance business operation. The last article 
of that Chapter, i.e. art. 116, explicitly indicates thirteen actions from which 
insurers and their employees are prohibited doing; under which, its third 
paragraph enjoins insurance companies and their employees, in the course of 
insurance business operation, from obstructing insurance applicants to perform, 
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or inducing the proposers not to perform, the duty of presentation as prescribed 
in this Act. As to the interpretation of this provision, there are two conflicting 
views: one is that it is only a statutory administrative provision supervising 
operation and management of insurance entities;725 the other is that art. 116 par. 
3 imposes on insurers a duty not to mislead the insureds in negotiating the 
contract, meaning, “the insurers must not mislead the insureds by concealing or 
misrepresenting material information relevant to the insurance contract”.726  
 
Therefore, two questions arise at this point: 1) whether this provision reflects the 
civil law notion of good faith and fair dealing; 2) whether this provision should be 
treated as one of the insurer’s duties analogous to the duty of clear explanation 
discussed above. It is clear as to the first question that this article itself, as it 
appears under Chapter IV, has nothing to do with the principle of good faith.727 
The second issue merits a full exploration in this section. It might be worthy of 
giving an example herein so as to reify the abstract subsection: C, an insurance 
applicant, has been visited by B, an insurance sales representative armed with 
proposal forms and other information supplied by A, an insurer. B has then 
solicited an insurance agreement and has thereafter further assisted the 
proposer - most of the time filled in the application form - in completing of a 
proposal. There has arisen some material information that discouraged C from 
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purchasing the policy. B, paid by commission, cut corners in order to sell 
insurance and C then signed the form. A has subsequently sought to rescind 
the contract for misrepresentation.  
 
The remedy for this class of cases is stipulated by the IAC 2015 art. 161. Where 
an insurance company commits any of the conducts prescribed in art. 116 of 
this Act, the competent insurance regulatory body shall order it to make a 
correction and impose a fine between 50,000 and 300,000 Yuan; and, for a 
worse case, the regulatory body may restrict its line of business, pursue a 
banning order for the new business or revoke its Business Operation Permit. 
One may therefore assert that art. 116 par. 3 cannot be regarded as an 
insurer’s duty if breach of which generates administrative remedies. This 
allegation has nevertheless been negated in Australia by the introduction of a 
special enforcement provision in the ICA 1984 s. 14A.728 ASIC may exercise its 
powers under the Corporations Act 2001 to vary, suspend or cancel a licence to 
provide financial services, and to ban persons form providing financial services 
pursuant to s. 14A(2)-(3),729 “if an insurer under a contract of insurance has 
failed to comply with the duty of the utmost good faith in the handling or 
settlement of a claim or potential claim under the contract”. 730  Thus, an 
administrative remedy is not inconsistent with a breach of an insurer’s civil duty. 
Even so, it would be too slapdash to determine that art. 116 par. 3 can be 
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recognised as an obligation of insurers upon the discussion above. It might be 
possible theoretically only if the non-compliance of art. 116 par. 3 would 
constitute a breach of liability for Culpa in contrahendo expressed by the 
Contract Law of PRC 1999 art. 42. The provision applies if the contracting party 
negotiates in bad faith; or deliberately conceals material facts relating to the 
conclusion of the contract or provide false information to the other party; or 
performs any other actions in violation of the principle of good faith and fair 
dealing. Breach of art. 42 gives rise to damages. The issue is worthy of an 
article in its own right, and therefore will not be covered here. Up until now the 
attitude of Chinese courts towards this matter is unclear, yet art. 116 par. 3 is 
unlikely to be amplified to this extent.731 It is only a manifestation of a public law 
prohibitory rule in private law.732 
 
What is left undetermined is the legal effect of the policy. Doubtlessly, the 
insurer should not be bound by a contract where both the insured and the agent 
have committed a fraud together. Reading between the lines of the provision, 
mere silence of B is probably less convincing to give rise to a breach of art. 116 
par. 3. What is questionable is where B stands in the way of an honest insured. 
In Newsholme Brothers v Road Transport and General Insurance Co Ltd,733 the 
plaintiffs had insured a motor omnibus through a man named Willey, appointed 
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by the defendant to canvass and procure proposals form for them, who had 
been given the true facts and nevertheless managed to fill in the erroneous 
answer, negligently or intentionally committed a fraud on his own initiative, e.g. 
to obtain the commission, in answering express questions on the proposal and 
concealed important facts. The insurer then avoided the policy. The Court of 
Appeal held that the insurer was entitled to repudiate liability since in completing 
the proposal form Willey had been acting as the agent of Newsholme Brothers. 
Further, by signing the proposal, the insured is bound by their signature. Thus, it 
is the duty of the proposer for insurance to see and make sure that the 
information contained in the proposal form is accurate, it being no argument that 
he did not read it properly or was not fully appraised of its contents. The 
Newsholme rule is in many ways unsatisfactory, despite in Newsholme Willey 
was indeed not authorised by the insurance company to fill in proposal forms.  
 
In the usual course of events, B would have been considered the insurer’s 
agent; and the ultimate concept involved in the matter of the completion of 
proposal forms by intermediaries is known as “transferred agency”, which will 
be considered in detail in chapter 6 where the role of brokers and their duty of 
disclosure is analysed. Even though the Newsholme rule represents English law 
where information has actually been communicated to B, 734  the Law 
Commission has recognised that “if a sales representative is employed by the 
insurer as the insurer’s agent, it might be thought that the insurer should carry 
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greater responsibility for the fraud than the insured”.735 Therefore, the insurer 
must not rely on misrepresentation of the insured, and ought to pay the sum 
insured as if it were a valid claim.  
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No 3, 2007) para 3.13 
265 
 
Chapter 6 The Role of Brokers in Respect of Information Disclosure and 
Presentation 
 
6.1 Definition  
Insurance brokers are defined by the Insurance Act of PRC 2015 art. 118 in the 
following statement:  
Insurance brokers is an entity that, in the interests of the applicant, 
provides intermediary services between proposers and insurers for the 
conclusion of an insurance contract and receives a commission in 
accordance with law. 
A broker is required to observe the Administrative Rules on Supervision of 
Insurance Brokers (Revised in 2015, hereinafter the 2015 Rules)736 and to obey 
the principles of free will, good faith and fair competition.737 In accordance with 
art. 2 par. 1 of the Rules, insurance brokers include brokerage companies and 
its subsidiaries. The statutory definition has deliberately confined the role of 
intermediaries between proposers and insurers in pre-contractual services, 
although in practice brokers in China execute various functions including post-
placement assistance and claims handling service, which are identical to which 
brokers in England carry out738. A licensed insurance broker is, in accordance to 
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art. 27 of the 2015 Rules, permitted to carry out the following activities:  
(1) drafting the insurance plan, choosing insurance company and 
application process handling;  
(2) assisting the assured or beneficiary in claiming; 
(3) reinsurance broking; 
(4) risk assessment and risk management consultancy work; and  
(5) other activities permitted by the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission. 
 
In common law jurisdictions, it was suggested as being axiomatic 739  that 
insurance brokers, appointed by the assured, act as “independent agents” for 
the assured to effect an insurance contract between the assured and the 
insurer 740  – “errors made by the broker within the scope of his actual or 
ostensible authority bind the assured” 741  – although they were defined by 
Hobhouse J in The Zephyr742 as “servants of the market” who in fact in practice 
act in a dual capacity as agent for both said.743 Thus, any information disclosed 
to the broker is not deemed to have been received by the insurers.744 On the 
contrary, there has been no mention of the role of brokers in respect of 
presentation and disclosure of information in the placement process under IAC 
                                                            
739 Velos Group Ltd v Harbour Insurance Services Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461, 462. 
740 Anglo-African Merchants v Bayley [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 268; General Accident Fire & Life Assurance 
Corp Ltd v Tanter, The Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58; Staatssecretaris van Financien v Arthur Andersen 
& Co (C-472/03) [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 484. 
741 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 16-031. 
742 General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter, The Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58, 66. 
743 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v JLT Risk Solutions Ltd [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 278 [60]. 
744 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 16-032. 
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2015. What is worse, the legal status of brokers in China is left undefined. If the 
legal status of brokers can be identified under Chinese legal system, it might be 
possible to have a discussion as to the duty of disclosure by intermediaries by 
applying civil law and general contract law concepts. There have been three 
possibilities accepted by academic research, each of which is considered in the 
next section below. In accordance with the IAC 2015 art.16, the insured is under 
no obligation to volunteer information to the insurer without request, from which 
a question arises at this point is, as brokers are insurance professionals armed 
with specialised knowledge and even legal advice, whether art.16 is to be the 
legal basis unleashing brokers from the duty of disclosure, providing one of the 
legal purposes of art.16 is to protect the vulnerable group.  
 
6.2 Brokers in China 
While, in England, the use of insurance brokers is as old as the London marine 
insurance market itself, this emerging profession is still under-development in 
China because, for a long time, brokers were technically unnecessary where 
the Chinese insurance market had been monopolised by the one and only 
insurance company, namely, the PICC. In 1995, the first Insurance Act of 
People’s Republic of China officially placed brokers on a statutory footing, which 
opened up a whole new era for the future development of Chinese insurance 
market, but the first generation of insurance brokers did not receive their 
approval from the CIRC until 1999.745 Until the most recent times the new-born 
                                                            
745 Hui LIN (ed), Bao Xian Zhongjie Lilun yu Shiwu [Insurance Intermediaries: concepts and practice] 
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baby is still hypo-genesis in three main aspects: lack of qualified brokers, 
indeterminate lines of business, and ineffective oversight.746 In recent years, 
vast majority of commercial risks, particularly marine insurance such as hull & 
machinery and cargo insurance, are being conducted through brokers.747 Before 
the role of brokers was introduced, in China, insurers used commission agents 
– often being employees of an insurer – to solicit insurance agreements. This 
form is still in common use for consumer insurance sales today, and there are 
yet any signs of use of brokers in the consumer sector. Problems caused by the 
commission agents are discussed in the following section. 
 
6.2.1 The canvassing agents 
The direct sales model, being the crudest, yet most efficient technique of 
promoting products, has been widely using by insurers since modern insurance 
established in China. The process that an employee of an insurance company – 
appointed by the insurer – known as the insurer’s agent, demonstrating and 
selling insurance policies directly to the end consumers probably in their homes, 
often involves a circumstance that proposal forms are being completed by the 
insurer’s agent. That practice leaves great uncertainty on whether information 
disclosed to the insurer’s agent had been validly communicated to the insurer 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(Tsinghua University Press 2006) 85. 
746 Liming ZHANG, ‘Baoxian Jingjiren Tanjiu’ [Analysis of Insurance Brokers] <http://pl.sinoins.com/2015-
06/16/content_159167.htm> assessed 9 Dec 2017; Fei CHEN & Fei GAO, ‘Woguo Baoxian Jingji Ye 
Cunzai de Wenti ji Duice’ [Problems of Insurance Brokers and the Countermeasures in China] (2006) 3 
Finance and Accounting Monthly; Xiuhui LIANG & Fangfang WANG, ‘Woguo Baoxian Jingjiren Fazhan 
Fangxiang Tanjiu’ [A Research as to Development Orientation of Insurance Brokers] (2015) 37 Business 
42; Lin YUAN, ‘Qiantan Woguo Baoxian Jingjiren Zhidu de Xiangzhuang ji Wenti’ [Recent Development 
and Problems of Insurance Brokers in China] <http://www.chinarm.cn/Insurance/2009/0121/20565.html> 
assessed 9 Dec 2017. 
747 Zhiyong ZHANG & Fei XU, ‘Guanyu Haishang Baoxian Hetong Fa Xiuding de Sikao’ [Some Thoughts 
on Revision of the Law of Marine Insurance Contract] (2014) 3 Chinese Journal of Maritime Law 72, 72. 
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itself because the action of completing the form for the assured may have 
successfully metamorphosed the agent of the insurer into “the amanuensis of 
the assured for that limited purpose”.748 Given that during the period of this 
research there have been no findings of any regulations or rules, nor any cases 
regarding the nature of the canvassing agents, it is assumed that such a matter 
has not been dealt with by Chinese insurance law which makes it sensible to 
consider the common law approaches.  
 
6.2.1.1 The English methods of dealing with canvassing agents  
Courts in all common law jurisdictions supported the concept that the insurer’s 
appointee may become the assured’s agent simply by taking the administrative 
role in filling in the proposal form, despite that, under general agency principles, 
any description of the role of the insurer’s appointee in completing the proposal 
falls outside the technical legal sense of the word “agent”. 749  English law 
permitted insurers to avoid the policy for non-disclosure or misrepresentation in 
this circumstance, unless agents have actual or ostensible authorised to receive 
the relevant information on behalf of insurers.750 Although the ruling is less 
significant in English these days because: first, technical innovation in the digital 
age, agents of that type have generally disappeared from the consumer market 
which has been substituted by online placement directly with insurers; second, 
under the CI(DR)A 2012, insurers’ agent are treated as representatives of the 
                                                            
748 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
749 R. Merkin, ‘Transferred Agency in the Law of Insurance’ (1984) 13 Anglo-Am L Rev 33, 35-36. 
750 Biggar v Rock Life Assurance Co [1902] 1 KB 516; Newsholme Brother v Road Transport and General 
Insurance Co Ltd [1929] 2 KB 356. 
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insurers so that information received by them are deemed to be communicated 
to the underwriting department directly; and finally, consumers are no longer 
requested to volunteer material facts to the insurer, the duty of disclosure in 
consumer insurance contract is abolished by the 2012 Act751 – the problem will 
arise only where the broker receives a material fact but misstates it;752 it is 
worthwhile to trace its development in England as direct insurance sales are 
largely utilised in mainland China. 
 
At one time, cases used to be decided solely on the question of whether the 
agent’s authority to receive information, reconciling with ordinary principle of 
agency.753 Thus it was held in Wing v Harvey754 that information conveyed to an 
agent of the insurer was deemed to have been received by the insurer on the 
basis that the agents had ostensible authority to receive such information. Over 
the same period the U. S. Supreme Court stressed the responsibility that need 
to be taken by the insurer to its agent within the scope of his employment, and 
pointed out that the danger that the agent, to whom was paid large 
commissions, might seek to cut corners in order to sell insurance should be 
borne by the person appointing him rather than the person upon whom he is 
imposed.755 Before the twentieth century, English courts generally accepted the 
insureds favourable approach that the fact known to the agent could be imputed 
                                                            
751 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018) 
752 R. Merkin, ‘Consumers and Agency’ (2009) 21 ILM 4, 4. 
753 R. Merkin, ‘Transferred Agency in the Law of Insurance’ (1984) 13 Anglo-Am L Rev 33, 36 
754 Wing v Harvey (1854) 5 De GM & G 265, see J. Lowry & P. Rawlings, Insurance Law: Cases and 
Materials (Hart Publishing 2004) case no. 309. 
755 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Maine v Wilkinson 80 US (13 Wall.) 222 (1871), 234-235 
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to the insurer756 on the ground that insurance companies should not be allowed 
to take advantage of its own appointee’s mistake757 and to transfer the burden of 
its agents’ breaches of duty onto insureds,758 although the decision might be 
reversed by an express notice stating that information communicated to the 
agent but not passed on to the insurer contained in the proposal.759 
 
No notion of agency was mentioned until the ruling of the case Biggar v Rock 
Life Assurance Co,760 in which the insured, was, for the first time, held liable for 
misrepresentations incorporated into the proposal by the insurer’s appointee, on 
the ground that by signing the proposal the insured had adopted all statements 
contained therein, and that as the appointee had no express authority to 
complete the proposal he could only have done so as agent of the insured. 
However, the case which received extensive consideration was Newsholme 
Brothers v Road Transport and General Insurance Co Ltd.761 The Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal on three grounds: the insured’s negligence, the 
parol evidence rule, and transferred agency. None of them can hold water. The 
insured’s duty to check before signing the form may not be practical in real life 
as: on a practical level, the agent might himself start filling in the form in 
absence of any requests from the insured; the assured may not be given an 
opportunity to do so, especially where deals are to be concluded via 
                                                            
756 Brewster v National Life Ins. Society (1892) 8 T.L.R. 648; Bawden v London, Edinburgh and Glasgow 
Ass. Co (1892) 2 Q.B. 534. 
757 Brewster v National Life Ins. Society (1892) 8 T.L.R. 648. 
758 Bawden v London, Edinburgh and Glasgow Ass. Co (1892) 2 Q.B. 534, at 540, per Lindley LJ. 
759 Levy v Scottish Employees’ Ins. Co. (1901) 17 TLR 229.  
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telemarketing; or even if the proposal is read, errors may be missed or regarded 
as trivial or within the agent’s discretion; and ultimately insurers should in no 
circumstance be equipped any mechanism for denying liability for the errors of 
their own appointee.762 The parol evidence rule was clearly an unfitted norm 
applying to the Newsholme situation.763 The transferred agency argument was 
based on a misunderstanding of the American authority N.Y. Life Insurance Co 
v Fletcher,764 where the proposal form stated that no statement made to the 
appointee would be binding on the insurer unless it appeared in the proposal 
form. Signing the form by the insurer had thus been taken to taken to have had 
notice of the limitation of the agent’s authority. This case, concerning only with 
the effect of a clause denying authority of the agent to receive information, 
however, cannot be treated as authority in the absence of any express limitation 
of authority.765 Moreover, comparing to the first wrong made by Wright J in 
Biggar in generating the transferred agent rule, the narrower approach adopted 
by Scrutton LJ made the concept worse than unjustifiable. In Biggar, the 
fundamental defect in Wright J’s reasoning is that he stopped at the 
consideration of authority to complete the proposal form and ignored the further 
question of authority to receive information arising by estoppel, on the basis of 
which previous cases were decided.766 Scrutton LJ’s formulation of the rule - 
even actual or apparent authority to complete the proposal would not prevent B 
from becoming C’s agent for the purpose of errors in the proposal – is 
                                                            
762 R. Merkin, ‘Transferred Agency in the Law of Insurance’ (1984) 13 Anglo-Am L Rev 33, 38 
763 ibid 39. 
764 117 US 519 (1886). 
765 R. Merkin, ‘Transferred Agency in the Law of Insurance’ (1984) 13 Anglo-Am L Rev 33, 39-40. 
766 ibid 37-38. 
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suggested as being “repugnant to common sense” and “legally 
unsupportable”.767 Later, the judgment of Newsholme was distinguished by the 
Court of Appeal in Stone v Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Ltd,768 in which 
the judgment of Lord Denning was based upon the actual authority of the agent. 
Although the Court of Appeal considered Stone upon its own special facts, the 
crucial point is the confrontation with the judgment of Scrutton LJ.769 It was held 
that the insurer cannot avoid the policy for non-disclosure, because the 
inspector - agent of the insurer - who failed to warn the insured’s wife of the 
duty of disclosure and the earlier claim was not mentioned in the proposal, had 
actual authority to complete the proposal.  
 
6.2.1.2 Reform  
The problem was addressed by the Law Commission in its Issue Paper 3.770 
The original test was set out in the 2007 Consultation Paper, in which it was 
suggested that, in accordance with FSA requirements, an intermediary should 
be regarded as acting for the insurers unless he is clearly an independent 
intermediary conducting “a fair analysis of the market” on the insured’s behalf.771 
In this way, the narrow approach of Newsholme would be abolished. 772 
Meanwhile, the Law Commission further proposed that the policyholder’s 
                                                            
767 ibid 40. 
768 [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 469. 
769 R. Merkin, ‘Transferred Agency in the Law of Insurance’ (1984) 13 Anglo-Am L Rev 33, 40 
770 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Intermediaries and Pre-contract Information (Law Com IP 
No 3, 2007). 
771 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 2007) paras 9.110, 10.17, 10.32-10.33. 
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signature should no longer be taken to be conclusive evidence that the insured 
knew of or adopted the statements on the proposal completed by the agent.773 
Criticism as to the 2007 Consultation Paper in respect to status of intermediary 
was the failure for the Law Commission to provide a clear definition of exactly 
when an intermediary was and was not independent.774 The Law Commission, 
in responding to that matter, published the 2009 Policy Statement,775 indicating 
the underlying principle as to this issue - “insurers should bear responsibility for 
those intermediaries within their control, and have appropriate incentives to 
exercise that control in a way that prevents problems form occurring. Insurers 
should not, however, be liable for the actions of genuinely independent 
agents.”776  
 
The Law Commission have provided three circumstances, in which an 
intermediary is always considered to act for the insurer: 1) the intermediary has 
authority to bind the insurer to cover; 2) the intermediary is the appointed 
representative of the insurer; 3) the intermediary has actual express authority 
form the insurer to collect pre-contract information on its behalf; thereby, in any 
of these cases, the Newsholme reasoning is reversed and information 
communicated to the intermediary is imputed to the insurer.777 In other cases, 
the intermediary will be treated as acting for the assured “unless there is a close 
                                                            
773 ibid paras 10.39-10.44. 
774 R. Merkin, ‘Consumers and Agency’ (2009) 21 ILM 4, 4. 
775 Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – for whom does an intermediary act in 
transmitting pre-contract information from consumer to insurer? (Policy Statement: The Status of 
Intermediaries, 2009). 
776 ibid para 1.8. 
777 R. Merkin, ‘Consumers and Agency’ (2009) 21 ILM 4, 4. 
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relationship between the intermediary and the insurer, so as to indicate that the 
insurer has granted the intermediary implied or apparent authority to act on the 
insurer’s behalf.”778 A list of factors indicating a close relationship between the 
intermediary and the insurer include the following: (a) the intermediary only 
places insurance with a limited number of insurers. (The smaller the number of 
insurers, the greater the indication that the intermediary acts for the insurer); (b) 
the insurer sells that particular policy through only a limited number of 
intermediaries; (c) the insurer permits the intermediary to brand its services with 
the insurer’s name, thereby giving the intermediary apparent authority to act on 
its behalf; (d) the insurer permits its policies to be branded with the 
intermediary’s name, thereby representing that the consumer is dealing with an 
insurer rather than an intermediary; (e) the insurer requests the intermediary to 
approach the consumer to market the insurer’s particular product; (f) the insurer 
exerts substantial control over the way that the intermediary conducts its 
business. 779  Factors appointing the other way include: (a) the intermediary 
undertakes to act in the consumer’s interest by, for example, giving impartial 
advice or providing a fair analysis of the market; (b) the consumer pays the 
intermediary a fee; (c) the intermediary provides full disclosure to the consumer 
of the commission it has received from the insurer.780 Both lists are indicative 
and non-exhaustive.781 The determination of the status of the intermediary will 
                                                            
778 Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law – for whom does an intermediary act in 
transmitting pre-contract information from consumer to insurer? (Policy Statement: The Status of 
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779 ibid para 1.12(1). 
780 ibid para 1.12(2). 
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ultimately depend on “all the circumstances, weighing the various factors in the 
case”,782 which reconciles with general agency principles.783 Last but not the 
least, the Law Commission placed special emphasis on that the intermediary 
will be taken to act for the consumer under this test if no factors were shown 
either that the intermediary acts for the consumer or for the insurer.784  
 
The 2012 Act has implemented the Law Commission proposals and abolished 
the rule in Newsholme for consumer insurances by elaborating, in the Schedule 
2, examples of factors which may tend to show the status of an agent and 
clarifying any statements made to an agent of the insurer as made to the insurer 
itself. Thus where consumer insurance policies offered by suppliers of goods or 
services along with the supply contracts, such supplier – who was held 
previously to be the agent of the assured – are likely to be treated as the agent 
of the insurer so that misrepresentation made by the agent would not be 
imputable to the assured under CI(DR)A 2012.785 In the commercial cases, first 
of all, the point is most unlikely to arise concerning the custom of the market, 
where the present practice is for the assured to use an independent placing 
broker rather than apply through an agent of the insurers.786 Thus that matter is 
not dealt with in particular in the Insurance Act 2015, nevertheless, it should still 
resolve the problem “by treading knowledge of an agent as the knowledge of 
the insurer itself and thus not required to be disclosed”, should it by any chance 
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arise.787 
 
The rapid development of Chinese insurance industry, with the rise of insurance 
intermediaries, is bound to provoke China into legislative activity. The vexed 
question of canvassing agent of the insurer should come into legislature’s notice 
and be written into law as a matter of urgency. In codifying that, section 10 of 
the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977,788 as, it is submitted,789 a quintessence 
definition of the agents of insurer, removing Newsholme from its jurisprudence, 
might be a good lesson to draw from New Zealand. The Section is as follows: 
(1) A representative of the insurer who acts for the insurer during 
negotiation of any contract of insurance, and so acts within the scope of 
his actual or apparent authority, shall be deemed, as between the 
insured and the insurer and at all times during the negotiations until the 
contract comes into being, to be the agent of the insurer. 
(2) An insurer shall be deemed to have notice of all matters material to a 
contract of insurance known to a representative of the insurer concerned 
in the negotiation of the contract before the proposal of the insured is 
accepted by the insurer. 
(3) In this section the term representative of the insurer includes any 
servant or employee of the insurer and any person entitled to receive 
                                                            
787 Ibid. 
788 Reprinted on 24 May 2016 
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0014/latest/whole.html#DLM442556> accessed 29 Nov 
2017.  
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from the insurer commission or other valuable consideration in 
consideration for such person’s arranging, negotiating, soliciting, or 
procuring the contract of insurance between a person other than himself 
and such insurer. 
 
6.2.2 The legal status of insurance brokers in China 
The nature of the brokers is another puzzle of insurance law. Neither civil law 
nor common law jurisdictions reject the proposition that insurance brokers are 
independent intermediaries who carry out various functions in building up 
contractual relationships between insurers and assureds in order to receive 
remuneration. London, home of insurance, is a “broker market”,790 and brokers 
here are paid by the insurers based on the custom of the market.791  The 
Chinese insurance market has adopted the same practice. What has not been 
preserved in China is that insurance brokers are not recognised as agents of 
the insureds because that operation, i.e. acting in their own name not the name 
of insureds and being paid by the underwriters,792 are theoretically discrepant 
with general rules of agency under Chinese law, whilst the brokers with the 
same practice is accepted in English law as being the insureds’ agents. Thus it 
might deserve mentioning at this point the theoretical differences as to the law 
of agency between civil law and common law system, albeit they are inherently 
                                                            
790 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
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792 Kewu LI & Qi ZHOU, ‘An Analysis on the Legal Status of Insurance Brokers in China’ (2006) 2 Journal 
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logical. 793  The theoretical foundation of the modern concept of agency in 
common law system is the doctrine of identity of the principal and agent794 which 
has further generated some broader concept of agency which avoided the 
complexities of fragmentation typical of the civil law situation – this general 
concept could be used as the theoretical basis of all forms of agency 
encountered in practice,795 whereas the doctrine of agency in civil law system 
was founded in the theory of separation which has contributed to the strict 
conceptual separation of the mandate from the authority: mandate points to the 
internal relations between the mandator (the principal) and the mandatory (the 
agent); authority on the other hand, refers to the external aspects of the 
transaction – the relation of principal and agent towards third parties, i.e. the 
limitation of the authority of the agent by the mandate is, on principle, ineffective 
with respect to the third party.796 In respect of the power of the agent to contract 
for the principal with the third party, the emergence of the doctrine of separation 
in the civil law system has contributed a considerable degree in discriminating 
the distinctions between direct and indirect representation, depending upon 
whether the intermediary acts in a representative or a personal capacity (the 
name test): the intermediaries, acting in his representative capacity, normally on 
behalf of his principal, bind the principal in the legal rights and obligations 
created by them under the contract vis-à-vis the third party in the case of direct 
                                                            
793 C.M. Schmitthoff, ‘Agency in International Trade: A Study in Comparative Law’ in C.J. CHENG (ed), 
Clive M. Schmitthoff’s Select Essays on International Trade Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1988) 307. 
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representation; the indirect agents act in their own name but for the account of 
the principal,797 while no difference on terminology is expressed in the broad 
sense of common law principle of agency, the nomenclature for both types of 
representatives is “agent”.798  
 
Inheriting the civil law concept, the term “agency” is confined, under Chinese 
law, in the strictly narrow definition referring only to direct representation.799 
According to the permitted activities of insurance brokers listed at the beginning 
of this chapter, there are two mainstream views as to the legal status of 
insurance brokers: a) the agent of the assured, 800  or b) an independent 
intermediate mechanism – a middleman (居间⼈人)– between the insurer and the 
assured.801 The latter for the time being is in a leading position.802 In accordance 
with art.424 of the Contract Act of PRC 1999, a brokerage contract (居间合同) is 
“a contract whereby the broker presents to the client an opportunity for entering 
into a contract or provides the client with intermediary services in connection 
with the conclusion thereof, and the client pays the remuneration”. Therefore, 
considering the statutory definition of “insurance brokers” stated under art.118 
of the IAC 2015, strictly speaking, perhaps the legal status of an insurance 
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broker is a brokerage – the “brokerage” here is a term used to denote a 
middleman who performs a matchmaking function between the insurer and 
assured in the placing the risk, whereas in practice a broker does act, beyond 
the statutory function, as an agent of the assured in providing post-contractual 
assistance and claims handling services. 803  As above, the legal status of 
insurance brokers is intangible, and the IAC 2015 on this point lies in a serious 
lag situation. A better view for now, it is submitted, is to treat the matter in a 
sectional form, i.e. an insurance broker is, to be an brokerage in advising and 
placing insurance proposal, and to be an agent of the assured in assisting 
claims handling process and other post-placement dealings.  
 
6.2.3 Obligations of insurance brokers 
In respect to information disclosure, art. 131 of the Insurance Act of PRC 2015 
states in the following terms, 
“Article 131, No insurance agent, broker or their practitioners may in any 
insurance transactions commit any of the following acts: 
2 Conceal material information with respect to the insurance 
contract; 
… 
10 Disclose any commercially confidential information of an 
insurer, a policyholder or an insured obtained during business 
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activities.” 
Three problems are to be noted from this article: first, reading between the lines, 
these two provisions, it is submitted, cannot be treated as the legal basis of the 
brokers’ duty as to disclosing information, in its own or the assured’s capacity, 
to the insurer in placing the risk. At least the wording of those provisions 
themselves failed to do so after all. In particular, art. 131 par. 10 seems only 
indicated a general obligation of brokers not to disclose relevant confidential 
information to any third parties. Thus, it leaves open the question whether 
confidential information acquired by the broker through a business relationship 
with a third party is disclosable to the insurer. Moreover, the phraseology of art. 
131 par. 2 is vague and ambiguity in terms of identifying exactly to whom – the 
insurer or the assured – a broker must not conceal material information in 
relation to the insurance contract, and if to the insured, what information is 
considered material with respect to the insurance contract, for example, is the 
rate of commission disclosable under art. 131 par. 2. Finally, the remedy for 
breaching those duties is omitted in the article, although the answer might be 
found in art. 128, namely an insurance broker shall be liable for losses or 
damages caused to the policyholder or the insured due to his or her 
faults/negligence. Answers to questions arose previously are considered in the 
following Section where the duty of brokers under English law is analysed, 
especially the changes and new adoptions for the brokers in the IA 2015. 
 
Notably, the IAC 2015 has no mention to the duty of brokers in information 
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transmission to the insurer in the placement process. However, it is to be noted 
that, where the broker is acting as the assured’s agent, it is apparently 
unreasonable and contrary to the purpose of protecting underprivileged groups 
to surmise from art. 16 of the IAC 2015 that the obligation of brokers is limited to 
provide correct answers in accordance with questions arose from the 
underwriter, provided that insurance brokers are groups professionals armed 
with specified knowledge and possibly legal teams, and the concept should also 
apply to consumers – the view has been taken by the English Law 
Commission804 that the level of care expected from consumers will depend on 
the way that the insurance was sold – a higher level of care would be 
reasonable if the consumer was helped by an agent; where the broker is acting 
as a brokerage, art. 425 of Contract Act 1999 imposes upon this type of 
intermediary a duty to disclose honestly to their mandatory matters relating to 
the conclusion of a contract; and the brokerage who deliberately conceals 
material facts relating to the conclusion of a contract or makes false state of 
affairs which vitiates the interest of the mandatory is not entitle of any 
remuneration and is liable for damages caused by breach of the duty. Therefore 
any breach of duty of disclosure or any misstatement made by the broker will 
lead the insurance contract to be rescinded. No matter what legal status a 
broker is, the assured in any event has a statutory right of action to bring a 
claim against the negligent or fraudulent broker. No exceptions were indicated 
in IAC 2015. 
                                                            
804 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law Com 
No 319, 2009) para 4.17. 
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6.3 Brokers in the UK 
Having located an appropriate insurer, as a matter of normal practice, the role 
of a broker in placement process is to present the risk to the insurers.805 In the 
commercial market, the assured, under IA 2015, owes a duty of fair 
presentation including a duty of disclosure. English courts generally hold 
producing brokers to a high standard of care to warn the assured of the duty of 
fair presentation. In particular the crucial issue of an insured’s duty of 
disclosure.806 Among all pre-contract functions, insurance brokers in placing the 
risk must: adequately advise insureds of their duty to disclose all material 
circumstances, indicating the sort of matters that ought to be disclosed as being 
material or arguably material; explain the consequences of failure to disclose; 
take reasonable care to elicit matters which clients ought to disclose but might 
consider unnecessary to mention, bearing in mind that the client may not realise 
without assistance that a particular matter is or is arguably material. 807  In 
addition to the common law rule, brokers are likely, by reason of the Insurance 
Act 2015, to be required to advise insureds as to the requirement to carry out a 
reasonable search and that a reasonable search might entail.808  Failure of 
proper advice will enable insureds to bring claims against brokers for breach of 
duty. The producing broker, in Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Ltd and 
                                                            
805 Insurance Broking Practice and the Law, para 4-1 (issue 20). 
806 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 16-058. 
807 Jones v Environcom Ltd (No.2) [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 676; Synergy Health (UK) Ltd v CGU Insurance 
Plc [2010] EWHC 2583 (Comm); Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Ltd and Others [2015] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR Plus 23. 
808 Insurance Broking Practice and the Law, para 4-3.30 (issue 20). 
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Other,809 was held by Leggatt LJ to be in breach of duty of care in failing to take 
care to ensure that the proposal form stated the opinion of the market value of 
the super yacht. That failure had cost the Greek broker two million Euros. 
Moreover, the necessary chain of causation must be established between the 
broker’s breach of duty and the loss.810 In Jones v Environcom Ltd and MS plc 
t/a Miles Smith Insurance Brokers,811 David Steel J at first instance concluded 
that, although the broker had negligently failed to advise the insured properly on 
its disclosure obligations, he was not liable to the loss suffered by the assured 
because the nature of its business operation made it uninsurable and thus the 
prospect that the insurer would have accepted the substantial risk 
improvements required and the premium charged were too remote. 
 
As to performing the obligation of fair presentation, other than serving 
appropriate advice to the insured, one of the essential functions of a broker is to 
acquire all material facts from the assured and correctly transmit them to the 
insurer. Insofar as the duty of disclosure was abolished by the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, the duty of a consumer 
assured is limited to exercising reasonable care in giving answers to express 
questions listed by the insurer. CI(DR)A 2012 s. 12(5) expressly preserves the 
common law rule that “a principal is liable for the misdeeds of an agent”.812 In 
non-consumer cases, the IA 2015 “leaves untouched the ordinary common law 
                                                            
809 [2015] Lloyd’s Rep IR Plus 23. 
810 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 16-089. 
811 [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 676. 
812 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 16-054 & 16-056. 
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rules on agency in this regard”,813 albeit knowledge known only to the broker 
might be treated as the knowledge of the insurer where the assured uses an 
independent placing broker rather than apply through an agent of the 
insurers.814 Thus there is no doubt that the insured is without recourse where a 
consumer assured who fails to act with reasonable care in providing answers to 
the broker, and in commercial cases an assured conceal material facts fro the 
broker. The problem arises where information that has been properly given to 
the broker does not successfully convey to the insurer by virtue of the broker’s 
fraud, negligence or mere accidental error.815 The broker’s state of mind, as an 
omission of the 2015 Act, may well be a considerably influential element on the 
right of the insurers.816  
 
It is notable that the European Commission the Insurance Distribution Directive 
(IDD)817 – a recast of the Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD)818 which was 
introduced by the FSA in 2005. It came into force in February 2018, introducing 
enhanced information and conduct of business requirements819 including:  
• additional knowledge and competency requirements for distributors  
• product oversight and governance requirements 
• an insurance product information document for non-life products 
                                                            
813 ibid at 16-054. 
814 ibid at 16-021. 
815 ibid at 16-056. 
816 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
817 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance 
distribution (recast). 
818 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance 
mediation. 
819 Directive 2016/97, chapter V. 
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• disclosure of cross-selling and product bundling 
• Additional disclosure requirements in relation to insurance based on 
investment products 
• remuneration disclosures requirements 
The Directive is also aiming to enhance consumer protection. UK is expected to 
implement the IDD into national laws and regulations before February 2018 on 
which date it will repeal the IMD. It remains to be seen any reforms will actually 
materialise in the near future. 
 
6.3.1 Separate duty of disclosure owed by broker – MIA 1906 s. 19 
Brokers, as agent of the insured, were previously imposed, courtesy of s. 19 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906, an independent and separate duty to disclose 
to the insurer all material circumstances known to him, breach of which gave 
the insurers the right to avoid the policy as against the assured, although it has 
been suggested that this practice was perhaps a ramification of a 
misinterpretation of s. 19 – the true imposition of the duty suggested by this 
section might well be that the insurer still has to pay the claim but has a right of 
recourse against the broker as failure of disclosure is a breach by the broker – 
after all the section itself did not spell out the avoidance remedy of the insurer.820 
In the UK, such a duty was appealed and abolished in its entirety: in consumer 
cases the CI(DR)A 2012 has removed disclosure and so it is no longer an issue; 
in the commercial market, IA 2015 has logically drawn in the concept of general 
                                                            
820 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
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agency law - “the law may impute to a principal knowledge relating to the 
subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires whilst acting within the 
scope of his authority”821 – and so the law for business insurance is unchanged 
in nature: the abolished s. 19(b) has been literally replaced with a duty of 
disclosure imposed upon the assured by IA 2015 s. 3.822 Knowledge held by 
brokers is included within the scope of what an insured either knows or ought to 
know, meaning, the insured is now deemed to know what the broker knows.823 
Thus the assured losses its defence if the broker has obtained the knowledge 
and nevertheless failed to pass it on to the insurer. 
 
Moreover, s. 19(a) of the 1906 Act was substantially abolished by the new 
business insurance regime. It provides that: “Where an insurance is effected for 
the assured by an agent, the agent must disclose to the insurer … every 
material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is 
deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary course of business 
ought to be known by, or to have been communicated to, him.” The basis of 
s.19(a) – “a distinct duty of disclosure on the part of the broker” – was formed, 
inter alia, by decisions of two nineteenth century authorities, namely, Blackburn 
Low & Co v Vigors824 and Blackburn Low & Co v Haslam825: it was held in the 
former that information unknown to the assured but known to the producing 
broker was not imputed to the assured; the latter was ruled only on the ground 
                                                            
821 P. Watts (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (20th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para 8-207. 
822 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
823 Insurance Act 2015, s 4(2)(b), 4(3)(b) and 4(8)(b). 
824 (1887) 12 App Cas 531. 
825 (1888) 21 QBD 14. 
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that the duty of brokers to reinsure and thus to disclose material facts to the 
reinsurer, disregarded the issue that the default of the producing broker was 
deemed to be the default of the assured - attribution of knowledge - as the non-
disclosure of the non-arrival of the vessel had been the direct responsibility of 
the producing broker who had been instructed to insure.826 The producing broker 
is therefore unleashed, since the assured will take the blame for him under s. 
18. 827  S. 19(a) was problematic in several ways: first, the well-established 
consequence of breach pointed towards the innocent insured not the broker 
who was at fault; second, the phrase “agent to insure” is undefined, despite 
English courts were arguably in favour of placing brokers828 – the approach itself 
was controversial; 829  finally, whether confidential information that brokers 
received in a different capacity falls within s. 19(a). All of these problems have 
been dealt with in IA 2015: both first and second issues are on their deathbed 
when s. 19(a) marked the end of it service; confidential information has been 
specialised in s. 4(4) of the 2015 Act. Details are considered in the following 
section. 
 
                                                            
826 R. Merkin, ‘Placement of Insurance and the Role of Brokers’ (Forthcoming in 2018). 
827 It was held in Simner v New India Assurance [1995] LRLR 240 that the agent’s knowledge would be 
imputed to the assured only where: (1) the assured was reliant upon the agent for information; or (2) the 
agent was in a predominant position. 
828 Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 App Cas 531; Blackburn Low & Co v Haslam (1888) 21 QBD 
14; PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurers [1996] 1 WLR 1136; Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd 
[1996] 1 WLR 1152. 
829 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Intermediaries and Pre-contract Information (Law Com IP 
No 3, 2007) para 4.18. 
290 
 
6.3.2 Exceptions to the imputation of knowledge – IA 2015 ss. 4(4) & 6(2) 
6.3.2.1 Confidential information 
Under s.19 of MIA 1906, an agent is required to disclose material facts known 
to him, whereas the knowledge of an “agent to insure” must include “every 
circumstance which in the ordinary course of business ought to be known by, or 
to have been communicated to, him.” In 1993, Hoffman LJ (as he then was) has 
first expressed his comments in obiter as to the scope of the duty laid down in s. 
19(a) in the case of EI Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc830 that “an insurance 
policy may be avoided on account of the broker’s failure to disclose material 
facts within his knowledge, even though he did not obtain that knowledge in his 
capacity as agent for the insured”. This approach was followed by him in 
Société Anonyme d’Intermediaires Luxembourgeois (SAIL) v Farex Gie.831 In 
the view of Hoffman LJ, the only restriction on the duty of disclosure of an agent 
to insure is materiality. Although in PCW Syndicates v PCW Reinsurer832 that 
suggestion was challenged by Staughton LJ and the duty was confined to 
information received as agent to insure, it left the door open to the possibility 
that confidential information obtained through a business relationship 
unconnected to the relevant contract of insurance falls within s. 19(a). The 
matter has now specified by s. 4(4) of the 2015 Act, in which it explicitly states 
that an assured “is not … taken to know confidential information known to an 
individual if – (a) the individual is, or is an employee of, the insured’s agent; and 
                                                            
830 [1994] BCC 143, 156. 
831 [1994] CLC 1094. 
832 [1996] 1 WLR 1136. 
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(b) the information was acquired by the insured’s agent (or by an employee of 
that agent) through a business relationship with a person who is not connected 
with the contract of insurance.” The Insurance Act 2015 is silence on how such 
information is to be assessed as confidential.  
 
6.3.2.2 Fraud by an agent  
The other important scenario to prevent the knowledge of a broker from being 
attributed to the assured is where the broker has been defrauding the insured in 
a manner that may be material to the insurers, known as principle of Re 
Hampshire Land,833 because a principal cannot be expected to be aware of the 
fraud committed by his agent, given that in real life the agent is highly unlikely to 
disclose to his principal, or anyone else, as to his own fraud on his principal. 
The question is how this rule applies to MIA 1906 s. 19(a). In PCW Syndicates v 
PCW Reinsurers,834 the Court of Appeal has reached the same decision that an 
insurer could not avoid a contract of insurance on the grounds of non-disclosure 
by an agent of the insured of the fact he had been defrauding his principal 
through different routes. Saville LJ dismissed the claim for avoidance on the 
ground that an underwriting agent was not the agent to insure within s. 19(a), 
and held that “agent to insurer” in s. 19 only encompassed those who actually 
dealt with the insurers concerned and made the contract in question. Staughton 
LJ by contrast rested his decision on the wording of s. 18, and, in consistent 
with the approach of ss. 18 and 19, adopted a “freestanding concept of deemed 
                                                            
833 [1896] 2 Ch. 743. 
834 [1996] 1 WLR 1136. 
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knowledge in defined circumstances”,835 namely, the insurer did not have a 
defence under s. 19 where the assured’s agent failed to disclose material facts 
obtained in his own capacity other than in his capacity as agent for the assured, 
and in any event an broker perpetrating a fraud against the assured in 
accordance with Re Hampshire Land is not to be treated as being the assured’s 
agent. Rose LJ agreed with both judgments. Saville LJ later in Group Josi v 
Walbrook Insurance836 arguably agreed the approach adopted by Staughton LJ, 
then the fraud exception gained a firm foothold in English jurisdiction. 837 
Originally, the Re Hampshire Land rule in an insurance realm applies to fraud 
engaged by the agent to insurer against his own client. The exception was 
nevertheless extended by Rix J in Arab Bank Plc v Zurich Insurance Co838 to a 
senior manager of the assured whose fraud was against both the assured and 
the insurers in the placement process. This common law rule is now preserved 
by s. 6(2) of the 2015 Act, details of which are provided in Chapter 3 and so 
repetitious discussion here is a tautology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
835 Alison Pardfield, Insurance Claims, at 11.11 
836 [1996] 1 All ER 791 
837 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 7-057 
838 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262 
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Chapter 7 Post-contractual Duties and Effects of Utmost Good Faith 
 
7.1 The existence of the continuing duty of utmost good faith 
Insofar as the Marine Insurance Act 1906 s. 17 had failed to confine the 
principle of utmost good faith to pre-contractual matters, it was settled, in a 
series of cases from the 1970s onwards,839 that the duty applies not only in the 
making of the contract but also in the course of it performance.840 However, the 
post-contract operation of utmost good faith has proved problematic, one of 
which has been that the “wholly one-sided” remedy of avoidance, left little or no 
assistance to the helpless policyholder,841 would not achieve the desired result 
for the assured. The scope of the duty continues to be the subject of debate 
amongst judges and others. There was one thing clear that a continuing duty of 
utmost good faith, imposed on both the insured and the insurer, came to an end 
on the commencement of proceedings.842  
 
Relevant questions have now been partially clarified in the Insurance Act 2015 
and its new insertion of section 13A by the Enterprise Act 2016. Two of the 
most-discussed potential post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, i.e. 
fraudulent claims and late payment, are considered in details from a 
comparative perspective in this chapter. In addition, issues as to notification of 
increase of risk are thought to be noteworthy here as it is one of the insured’s 
                                                            
839 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-004. 
840 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469. 
841 ibid [57]. 
842 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 10-060, citing Agapitos v 
Agnew (The Aegeon) [2003] QB 556. 
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continuing duties of good faith in China. By contrast, although notification of 
increase of risk is indeed a post-contractual duty under English law, it does not 
related to the principle of utmost good faith. Further, such a duty is not to be 
recognised by English courts, despite alteration of risk has been dealt with as 
quite another matter. Details are provided in Section 7.2. The Versloot is 
discussed in some length in this chapter for two reasons: firstly, the case is of 
significant importance to the definition of fraudulent claims; secondly, the 
judgment is the “final nail in the coffin” of the concept of utmost good faith in 
insurance contract.  
 
7.2 The post-contractual duty to notify the increase of risk  
Art. 52 par. 3, written under Chapter 2 of the IAC 2015, that applies only to 
property insurance contracts843, formulates the principle of increase of risk in the 
following phrase: 
“The assured shall by agreement, without undue delay, notify the insurer 
in any event where the danger of loss of the subject-matter insured has 
significantly increased during the currency of the policy, the insurer is 
subject to contract terms entitled to raise the premium accordingly or to 
rescind the contract. Where the insurer opts for termination of contract, 
the residual insurance premium shall be retuned to the assured after 
recouping the amount attributable to the operational period of the policy 
                                                            
843 IAC 2015 art. 95 states that property insurance includes property damage insurance, liability insurance, 
credit insurance and bond insurance. 
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from the date of contract to the date of termination. 
If the assured fails to perform the obligation of notification prescribed in 
the previous paragraph, the insurer shall not be liable for claims caused 
by the significantly increased danger of loss of the subject-matter insured. 
Art. 52 concerns in particular the assured’s obligation to give notice to the 
insurer in the event where the danger of loss significantly increases during the 
course of the policy. An insured who fails to perform the obligation, stated in the 
second part of the provision, will risk failure of the claim. The provision however 
is somewhat ambiguous. A number of issues may arise from it: a) what is an 
increase of risk; b) to what degree should the significance be to provide grounds 
for insurers to discharge the policy; c) consequences for the insured’s failure to 
perform the duty of notification. Detailed analysis of each question is provided 
below.  
 
The relationship between increase of risk and good faith is not clear. In China, 
suggestions were that art. 52, operating as a continuing duty of good faith, 
imposes a post-contractual duty on the assured to inform the insurer any 
significant change of risk.844 On the contrary, the common law rule does not 
seem to treat the issue as one of good faith but deals with it on the basis of 
contract. Notably, under both Chinese and English insurance law, the insurers 
remain liable where the risk has merely increased. In England, the insurer 
                                                            
844 Baoshi WANG & Fan YANG, Property Insurance Law: Legal Interpretation and Case Studies, 86. 
Although the IAC 2002 art.37 has now been replaced by IAC 2015 art.52, the proposition as the principle 
is being a continuing duty remain unchanged. 
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should bear the downside of an increase of risk845 unless there is a complete 
change in the nature of the risk (alteration of risk). English courts does not 
tolerate hindsight underwriting, whereby the insurer seeks to re-write the risk on 
the basis that they may have got the original assessment wrong.846 The increase 
of risk clause has very little value.847 It was therefore clear that, in absence of an 
“abundantly clear” notification clause, the insured should not be under onerous 
continuing obligation of notifying the insurer.848 It was held in Kausar v Eagle 
Star Insurance Co Ltd,849 in the case of a clause which required notification to 
the insurers in the event of an increase of risk, that the clause was to be 
construed as doing no more than codifying the common law distinction between 
increase of risk (which has no adverse effects on the policy) and change of risk 
(which operates automatically to discharge the insurer on the basis that what 
was agreed between parties has ceased to exist), and that the clause applied 
only to the latter situation.850 Here a clear distinction has been drawn between 
an increase of risk and a change of risk. There is an alteration of the risk if there 
is a change in the circumstances which are to form the basis of the insurance, 
and the risk is thereby altered contrary to the implied conditions of the contract. 
In other words, material alteration of the nature of the risk will discharge 
                                                            
845 M.Smith, ‘The Effect of Subsequent Increases of risk on Contracts of Insurance’ [2009] LMCLQ 368. 
Smith comments: “It might be said that allowing an insurer to escape his obligations by relying upon 
subsequent changes in circumstances rather undermines the very purpose of insurance, by bringing the 
protection purchases by the insured to an end in circumstances that the insured may not have anticipated.” 
846 Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] CLC 129, 131. 
847 In Baxendale v Harvey (1859) 4 Hurl. & N. 445, Sir Frederick Pollock CB observed: “The insurer, when 
it has had notice of the risk, is not entitled to any notice by reason of the increase in danger. A person who 
insurers may light as many candles as he pleases in his house, though each additional candle increases 
the danger of setting the house on fire.” 
848 Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] CLC 129,133. 
849 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 154. 
850 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 5-023 - 5-027. 
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insurers from liability. Considering the “significant increase” requirement set out 
in IAC 2015 art. 52 par. 1, it is necessary to drawn a clear distinction between 
the term “significant increase” and the phrase “material alteration”. A detailed 
discussion is provided in the following paragraphs.  
 
7.2.1 The meaning of increase of risk 
In China, the definition of increase of risk, omitted in IAC 2015, has however 
been strictly limited by the courts.851 It was held that a change in the use of a 
car from private to business purpose falls outside the scope.852 The essence as 
to the issue on whether the risk had increased, considered by Beijing Railway 
Transport Court in Li CHEN v Yingda Taihe Property Insurance Co Ltd,853 was 
whether the nature of use of the insured vehicle has changed at the time of 
loss. The insurer asserted that renting out the “family-occupied” vehicle by its 
owner Li CHEN had changed the motor’s “nature” of use, i.e. the insured 
“family-occupied” vehicle was used for business purposes at the time of lose, 
and that had significantly increased the danger of loss. The Court’s view was 
that, although at the time of loss the insured vehicle was driven by Jian Zhang 
who hired it from Li CHEN, its nature of use remain the same because the 
vehicle was still used as a private car, therefore fell short of affecting the risk. 
The allegation was nevertheless rejected by the court. In this case, it is an 
unfathomable enigma for the Court to conclude that the nature of use of the 
                                                            
851 Hongtao Sun, ‘A Study as to the Development of the Duty to Notify Increase of the Risk in the 
Insurance Act of People’s Republic of China – Acticle 52 of the Insurance Act of PRC’ (2016) 6 Journal of  
Political and Law 107. 
852 Li CHEN v Yingda Taihe Property Insurance Co Ltd [2014] Jing Tie Min Chuzi No. 18. 
853 ibid. 
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insured vehicle had not changed, given that the automobile lease service is in 
fact a business activity, even the motorcar was hired out for the purpose of 
family use. 
 
Under Chinese insurance law, first, the increase of risk must be enduring. 
Ephemerality automatically renders a change futile. It is essential to distinguish 
between temporary increases of risk and changes of use. For example, an 
increase of risk is not attributable to a car accident caused by an occasional 
brake failure. Under English law, it is subject to the actual wording of contract 
terms. “An endorsement prohibiting an increase in risk ‘unless expressly 
provided for by endorsement’ is an indication that a temporary or isolated 
increase of risk is not within the scope of the exception.”854 The leading authority 
is Dawson v Monarch Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd.855 The Court held that 
an inflatable fairground rabbit was lost by fire after the assured had used a 
welding torch to repair the trailer on which it rested was amounted to a change 
of risk. It is noteworthy that where the contractual provisions against increase of 
risk are expressed as a warranty in a policy, insurers can no longer evade their 
obligations by relying upon a temporary increase of risk since the common law 
principle that the contract of insurance terminates automatically as from the 
date of the breach has been abrogated by s. 10 of the Insurance Act 2015.856 
The warranty may nevertheless be relied upon if there is non-compliance at the 
                                                            
854 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 5-027. 
855 [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 372 SC. 
856 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 5-031. 
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time of the loss,857 but it is only subject to clear wordings. Second, the increase 
of risk must not be contemplated by the insurer from the outset. In China, if in 
practice the insurance premium is to be arranged upon anticipated conduct of 
assured which leads to an increase in risk during the operational period of the 
cover, the assured cannot be said to have increased the risk.858 For example, 
ascertaining premium or rate-making process for hull insurance is influenced by 
various factors, one of which is the vessel’s operation zone. General, the 
increase of risk is deemed to be significant if the insured vessel enters into any 
unanticipated operation zone, e.g. a war zone in particular. The same approach 
has also been adopted by the common law.859 There is no doubt that “conduct 
anticipated by the policy clearly cannot be said to have increased the risk as 
defined by the policy”.860 For example, an insurer was expected to have had in 
mind the possibility that the sprinkler system would be turned off temporarily, for 
example, for maintenance or repairs, or for other reasons.861 Thirdly and most 
importantly, the increase of risk has to be significant. A mere increase in the risk 
is not sufficient. The problem arises on this point is that the statutory expression 
is far from clear for establishing a test of significance. It is therefore essential to 
determine what exactly the term “significant” refers to in this provision. 
 
                                                            
857 Ibid. 
858 Hongtao Sun, ‘A Study as to the Development of the Duty to Notify Increase of the Risk in the 
Insurance Act of People’s Republic of China – Acticle 52 of the Insurance Act of PRC’ (2016) 6 Journal of 
Political and Law 107.  
859 see Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] C.L.C. 129; Qayyum Ansari v New India Assurance 
Ltd [2008] EWHC 243 (Ch). 
860 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 5-027. 
861 Qayyum Ansari v New India Assurance Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 93 [46]. 
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7.2.2 Significance of the changes 
What is sufficiently central to the consequences of the increase of risk is, 
ultimately, a matter of degree. It should be noted that, although the IAC 2015 
articulates that the effective increase of risk should be “significant”, the Act 
however fails to establish statutory criteria of significance, nor does it give any 
examples of things which may, from the insurer’s point of view, be significant to 
the increase of risk. In respect of English interpretation of Chinese articles of 
law, it is noteworthy that one may prefer to translate the Chinese phrase “显著
增加” set out in art.52 par.1 as “material alteration” rather than “significant 
increase”. Literally, the term “material alteration”, in Chinese, presenting 
substantial changes which refers to a higher level change in risk than the word 
“significant” does, means a change to the nature of the risk. While the English 
courts, as mentioned above, have clearly expressed the important distinction 
between a material alteration and a mere change in the risk which will not entitle 
the insurer to terminate the contract,862 It is somewhat of equal importance to 
distinguish “material alteration” and “significant increase” at this point. 
Accordingly, the question that has to be considered here is whether the phrase 
“significant increase” referred in the article should not to be read literally, and 
whether it nevertheless implicates an extended meaning, i.e. a material change 
to the nature of the risk. Details are provided below. 
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7.2.2.1 English approaches 
The meaning of “material change” has once been considered in Scottish Coal 
Co Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc,863 where David Steel J adopted the 
common law principle, to which the court referred in Kausar v Eagle Star,864 and 
held that there was only a material change in the risk if there was a fundamental 
change to its nature.865 It was held that a change in working practices is not a 
material change. The leading authority on the matter now is Qayyum Ansari v 
New India Assurance Ltd,866 in which an appropriately worded policy term has 
widened the basis upon which a change in risk might provide grounds for 
insurers to discharge the policy. In this case, the policy included in General 
Condition a “Changes in Facts” clause as follow: 
“2 This insurance shall cease to be in force if there is material alteration 
to the Premises or Business or any material change in the facts stated in 
the Proposal Form or other facts supplied to the insurer unless the 
insurer agrees in writing to continue the insurance.” 
The premises, which were protected by an automatic sprinkler installation, were 
let to a friend of Mr. Ansari, who used them for the wholesaling of kitchens. 
During the period of cover, the assured’s tenant was carrying on the rather 
different business of selling motor cycles and had turned off the sprinkler 
system. As the sprinkler system had not been working at the time of the loss by 
fire, the insurer rejected the claim and cancelled the policy. It was submitted by 
                                                            
863 [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 718. 
864 [1997] CLC 129. 
865 also see Swiss Reinsurance Co v United India Insurance Co Ltd [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 341.  
866 [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 562; [2009] EWCA Civ 93. 
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the insured that the fact that the inoperability of the functioning system could not 
in fact constitute a material alteration in the subject matter so as to discharge 
the insurers from the policy, given that the common law has traditionally been 
concerned not with an increased danger of loss but in a complete change of use 
of premises.867 Moor-Bick LJ indicated that, with regard to the true construction 
of General Condition 2,868 the relevant question to ask here with regard to what 
was “material” was whether the alterations or changes have taken the risk 
outside that which was in the “reasonable contemplation of the parties at the 
time the policy was issued”. The position at common law was stated in in Law 
Guarantee Trust and Accident Society v Munich Re-insurance Company.869 The 
essence of the principle is that “… the obligation of the insurer is confined to the 
particular risk insured” by the contract into which he has entered, thus the 
insurers were discharged from liability if an alteration that takes the risk outside 
that which was within the contemplation of the parties at the time the policy was 
issued.870 The Court of Appeal therefore held that a prudent insurer would not 
regard the risks being the same for a building with a functioning sprinkler 
system and a building without one, hence, permanently disabling the sprinkler 
system did amount to a “material change” in the facts stated in the proposal 
form.  
                                                            
867 Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] C.L.C. 129, the Court of Appeal held that an insurer could 
not rely on a term requiring the insured to notify it of changes that increased the risk to avoid liability; also 
see Swiss Reinsurance Co v United India Insurance Co Ltd [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 341; Scottish Coal Co 
Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 718. 
868 The judge was of the view that the position concerning alterations to the premises and changes in the 
facts stated in the proposal form are governed not by the common law but by Condition 2 of the policy; and 
the Condition 2 should nevertheless be construed with the common law in mind. See Qayyum Ansari v 
New India Assurance Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 93 [45]. 
869 [1912] 1 Ch. 138. 
870 Ibid [154]. 
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The insurers alleged that the word “material” in the context of General Condition 
2 was to have the same well established meaning as in Pan Atlantic v Pine 
Top.871 The Court of Appeal firmly rejected the argument and held that the test 
of materiality, operating in the context of pre-contractual negotiations, is 
“relatively undemanding” and only utilised in separating circumstances that 
could merely influence a prudent underwriter in assessing the risk. 872 
Importantly, materiality now operates as a filter, taking out obvious cases where 
facts are plainly immaterial; and the consequences of adopting it are to a large 
extent controlled by establishment of inducement. It is in fact that virtually every 
case since Pan Atlantic has turned on inducement. Condition 2 in the present 
case is concerned with events occurring after the contract has been concluded, 
hence if the term “material” were to import the test of materiality for the duty of 
utmost good faith (now, fair presentation), it would lead to unacceptable 
uncertainty for insureds since virtually any circumstances arising mid-term, no 
matter it would actually lead the insurers alter contract terms in any way, would 
risk the cover being jeopardized; meanwhile, the insurers would be bestowed 
the invidious right to re-think the underwriting exercise every time there is a 
minor change.873 Moore-Bick LJ distinguished Condition 2 in the present case 
from the common law rule which requiring a fundamental change in the nature 
of the risk and acknowledged in his judgment that “a material alteration or 
                                                            
871 Qayyum Ansari v New India Assurance Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 93 [17]. 
872 Ibid [40] 
873 ibid [41]. 
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change is one which significantly affects the risk.”874 Although the Court of 
Appeal lay particular emphasis on the terms of the clause in Ansari rather than 
on the common law principle, it may be necessary for the assureds to embark 
an altogether more delicate assessment, recognising that certain features of an 
insured property are themselves descriptive of its use. The widened scope upon 
which facts and matters might amount to a “significant” alteration in the subject 
matter of the insurance resulting termination of the policy will have a 
recognisable impact on the meaning of the term “material”. 
 
7.2.2.2 Treatment in the civil law systems 
Statutory criteria as to the degree of significance can be found in many civil law 
jurisdictions. For example, in Greek Insurance Contract Act art.4 par.1,875 the 
test has explicitly stated in the following phrase: 
“Throughout the contract period … such [a significant aggravation of risk] 
had the insurer been aware, it would not have concluded the insurance 
contract, or would not have concluded it under the same terms.” 
Similar tests have also been adopted in Norway and Belgium. With reference to 
the wording of the provision, an increase of risk should be notified to the insurer 
if its degree of significance is sufficient to influence the judgment of the insurer 
on whether to underwrite the risk or in fixing the contract terms, if the insurer 
had known the particular from the outset. It is noteworthy that this set of terms is 
                                                            
874 See Qayyum Ansari v New India Assurance Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 93 [45]. 
875 No. 2496/1997. 
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strikingly similar to the wording used for the test of materiality for pre-contractual 
duty of utmost good faith.  
 
It is clear now, as seen from the last section, that the allegation that the term 
“material” should bare the same meaning as that which it was given in Pan 
Atlantic has nevertheless been dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the ground 
that the “mere influence” test adopted by the common law, if it were to be 
imported in the context of increase of risk, would jeopardise the performance of 
the policy by bringing in uncertainty and unfairness for the insureds. Unlike the 
English approach, instead of adopting the “mere influence” test, art. 16 par. 2 of 
the IAC 2015 – concerning the duty of presentation - has employed the 
“decisive influence” test, whereby requiring that a changed circumstance must 
have a decisive effect on the acceptance of the cover by the underwriter so as 
to constitute a material fact, and hence, in that context has prevented resulting 
to the same problem that might be caused by the “mere influence” test, i.e. 
policy will automatically lapse on the occurrence of any minor changes arising 
mid-term in which a prudent underwriter would be interested. Meanwhile, the 
consistency with the test in art. 16 par. 2 of the IAC 2015 is propitious to unify 
application of Chinese insurance law and its legal interpretations. In market 
practice, this measure has in fact long been embraced by Chinese underwriters 
for the purpose of saving transaction costs, namely, the assured is not required 
to give notice to the insurer if the degree of significance is not sufficient to 
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influence the insurer’s decision in accepting the risk.876  
 
It is evident that, in the provision, the adjunct word confining the phrase 
“aggravation [alteration] of risk” is “significant” and not “material”. Generally, it is 
submitted that “material” is more likely to be referred to in this context as a 
complete change of use of subject matter insured or a fundamental alteration to 
the nature of the risk.877 Accordingly, where the nature of the risk is materially 
altered, the promise upon the insurance agreed is negated. The changed 
circumstance would constitute a new risk which substitute the original cover, 
and should be dealt with in a new policy under a pre-contractual duty of fair 
presentation. It is incumbent upon the insurer to prove that there has been a 
change or alteration in the risk such that it is no longer the same risk. It is 
therefore reasonable to presume that the underwriters are entitled to discharge 
liability by reason of the increase in risk in situations where the alteration to the 
subject matter insured has a significant bearing on the risk but not yet being 
sufficient to alter the basis of the contact. Speaking of the meaning of 
“significance”, it has been suggested by Chinese scholars that there is a 
significant increase of risk if the change made on the insurance subject 
seriously count against the insurer.878 
 
                                                            
876 ‘A Discussion as to the Duty of Notification of the Significant Increase of Risk’, written by China 
Property & Casualty Reinsurance Co Ltd for the 2013 Insurance Law joint conference, 111. 
877 See Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] CLC 129. 
878 Zhaoguo JIANG, Basic Principles of Insurance Law, 240. 
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7.2.3 Consequences for breach of the duty of notification 
In the Chinese legal system, right to rescind a contract can be promissory or 
statutory.879   The right of termination by reason of breach of the duty of 
notification, set out by art. 52 of the IAC 2015, is the latter. Article 52 serves to 
offer the insurer statutory force for exercising termination right. To determine 
whether or not there has been a significant change in the subject-matter, it is 
subject to the construction of the policy to determine exactly what subject-
matter falls within its coverage.  Clear wording is necessary.  
 
Where the insured fails to perform his duty of notification in the event of a 
significant increase in risk, the Chinese law discharges the insurer from all 
liability for loss to the subject-matter.880 The insurer is to be conferred an 
optional right choosing from termination of the contract or rise of the 
premium.881 Whether or not the insurer opts to terminate the contract or charge 
additional premium is subject to express terms of the contract.882 The burden of 
proof is on the insurer, who must show evidence that the loss is in fact caused 
by the significant increase in risk.883 A causal connection between the loss and 
the increase of risk is required. This issue is not considered in any detail here in 
this thesis, as it is not so related to the matter of utmost good faith.  
 
                                                            
879 Contract Law of People’s Republic of China, art. 94.  
880 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 52 par. 2. 
881 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 52 par. 1. 
882 Ibid. 
883 Jing ZHEN, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa Law 2017) 354. 
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7.3 Fraudulent Claims  
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimated that, in 2014, insurers 
uncovered 130,000 fraudulent claims worth £1.32 billion across all insurance 
produces and this adds an extra £50 to the annual insurance bill for every UK 
policyholder,884 hence this is a key issue both for insurers and insureds. The 
common law rule of fraudulent claims originated in Britton v Royal Insurance 
Co,885 and is now restated in s.12 of the IA 2015. The fraudulent claims rule 
operates to forfeit a claim made by the insured in its entirety when that claim is 
fabricated or fraudulently exaggerated, including any genuine parts 886 , 
irrespective of whether the insurer was deceived.887 The deceitful insureds not 
only do they risk failure of the claim but also run the risk of their entire policy 
being terminated from the time of the fraudulent act with no ability to seek the 
return of premiums, despite the insurer will still be liable for genuine claims 
made prior to the avoidance of the policy. Whether or not the policy comes to an 
end is at the insurer’s option; it is not automatic. Insurers are also conferred a 
right to recover from the insured sums paid in respect of the claim.  
 
Likewise, in China, insurers are not liable for fraudulent claims. However, the 
scope of fraudulent claims rule under Chinese insurance law is much 
constrained, comparing to the rules in England. Article 27 of the Insurance Act 
                                                            
884 ‘The Association of British Insurers Report: Key Facts 2015’ 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/globalassets/sitecore/files/documents/publications/public/2015/statistics/key-facts-
2015.pdf> accessed 25 Nov 2017. 
885 (1866) 4 F & F 905. 
886 This principle, endorsed by the House of Lord in the Star Sea [2003] 1 AC 469, has now confirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC 
Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45. 
887 Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2003] QB 556, 564. 
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of PRC 2015 provides an exhaustive list of fraud and the effect for each type of 
fraudulent claims. Insurers are bestowed a right to terminate the contract in the 
event of fabrication of and/or deliberately giving occasion to the occurrence of 
an insured event,888 however, exaggerated loss and fraudulent means/devices 
are both excluded.889 Issues concerning valid claims supported by fabricated 
documents, false information and/or other fraudulent devices are considered in 
detail below. The assured is nevertheless entitled to recover for his actual loss 
despite exaggeration, 890  whilst English courts held that, “even where the 
exaggerated part is eminently severable in fact”, it is not possible to sever the 
fraud from the rest of the claim,891 based on rules that which applies in the law of 
illegality, namely, an illegal contract will not be severed.892 What had been 
squarely rejected by English courts has nevertheless gained a firm foothold in 
China. A fraudulent claim can be apportionable under Chinese law. Despite the 
unknown basis of this provision, it seems clear that art.27 par.3 is not deployed 
to deter policyholders from acting fraudulently. Insofar as the problem as to 
exaggeration of loss nowadays is heavily corroding the entire insurance industry 
worldwide, this issue seems to be wrongly conceptualised in China. It was 
stated by Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea, indeed, that, “the fraudulent insured 
must not be allowed to think: if the fraud is successful, then I will gain; if it is 
                                                            
888 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 27 pars. 1&2. 
889 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 27 par. 3. 
890 Ibid. 
891 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone). [2016] UKSC 
45, [25] (Lord Sumption JSC) and  [93] (Lord Hughes). 
892 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017), para 10-051 and footnote 
171. 
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unsuccessful, I will lose nothing”. 893  The premiums paid are generally not 
refundable, subject to the exception for life insurance policyholders stated in 
art.43 par.1 of Insurance Act of PRC 2015. That is, where the proposer 
deliberately causes death, injury, disability or illness to the insured, the insurer 
is required to return the cash value of the insurance policy in accordance with 
contract terms to other obligees under the policy, if a life insurance proposer 
has paid premiums in full for two years or more.  
 
It is noteworthy that, in addition to IAC 2015 art.27, the Chinese Insurance Act 
imposes administrative sanctions on deceitful proposers, insureds and 
beneficiaries in cases that fall short of a criminal offence.894 Article 8 of the Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Penalty (The 
“Administrative Penalty Act”) lists six types of administrative sanctions and a 
miscellaneous provisions: (1) disciplinary warning; (2) fine; (3) confiscation of 
illegal gains or confiscation of unlawful property or things of value; (4) ordering 
of suspension of production or business; (5) temporary suspension or rescission 
of permit or that of license; (6) administrative detention; and (7) other 
administrative penalties prescribed by laws and administrative rules and 
regulations. This punitive measure also applies to appraisers, accessors and 
testifiers who in fact provide forged documents or other related means in 
support of the fraudulent claims.895 The problem is that neither the Insurance Act 
                                                            
893 [2003] 1 AC 469 [62].  
894 Jing ZHEN, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017) 478. 
895 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 174 par. 2. 
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of PRC 2015 nor the Administrative Penalty Act indicates any measure of 
sanctions in the context of fraudulent insurance claims. The absence of specific 
measure, coupled with excessive judicial discretion of judges, will highly likely 
bring more uncertainty and inconsistency into insurance law and its legal 
practice. 
 
The Supreme Court clarified, in the ruling of Versloot Dredging BV v HDI 
Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone),896 the definition of 
fraudulent claim on which the IA 2015 is deliberate silent. 897  The term 
“fraudulent means/devices” is rephrased as “collateral lies”. The extension of 
the fraudulent claims rule to collateral lies were found to be disproportionately 
harsh to the insured and contrary to public interest. The judgment consigns 
fraudulent devices to legal history and, most importantly, limits the term 
“fraudulent claim” in s.12 of the IA 2015. “A claim can only be fraudulent if the 
assured is dishonest or at the very least culpably reckless” therefrom, and mere 
negligence on the part of the assured will be no longer sufficient. 898 By contrast, 
Chinese insurance law requires deliberate intention of the insured to constitute 
a fraud. Lord Hughes JSC has intentionally given in his seminal judgment a 
comprehensive overview on the historic tangled ties between fraudulent claim 
rule and the duty of utmost good faith. Considerations of those issues are 
discussed below.  
                                                            
896 [2016] UKSC 45. 
897 R. Merkin & O. Gurses, ‘The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured’ 
(2015) 78 (6) Mod. L. Rev. 1004, footnote 86  quoting “IA 2015 s.12 was amended by the Law 
Commission I the consultation process to removing wording which appeared to codify the principle.”  
898 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 10-045. 
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7.3.1 The “Versloot” 899  
A vessel was incapacitated by a flood in the engine room. The insureds claimed 
against the defendant insurer, stating that the bilge alarm had gone off at 
around noon on the day of the incident. Popplewell J, the judge at first instance, 
found this statement to be a “reckless untruth” and took the opportunity to voice 
strong criticisms of the all-or-nothing effect of the fraudulent device rule 
originated in the dicta in Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon),900 although he upheld 
the insurer’s refusal of the claim.901 The owner brought an appeal. The Court of 
Appeal agreed with Prpplewell J’s refusal of the claim, but declined to endorse 
his criticisms of the rule and returned to the underlying public interest in 
deterring fraud as the principal justification for applying the fraudulent claim rule 
to fraudulent devices.902 In further appeal, the Supreme Court has for the first 
time drawn a sharp distinction between a fraudulently exaggerated claim and a 
justified claim supported by fraudulent devices, and ruled in the keenly 
anticipated judgment that collateral lies, considered to be irrelevant to the 
existence or amount of the insured’s entitlement and therefore immaterial to the 
claim, is not sufficient to defeat a claim. Lord Sumption noted that the insured’s 
right to an indemnity arises as soon as the loss is suffered, and amount payable 
can be objectively assessed and does not depend on how the insured puts its 
                                                            
899 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 
45. 
900 Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2003] QB 556 (Mance LJ). 
901 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2013] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 465. 
902 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2015] QB 608 
(CA). 
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claim.903 Fraudulent means or devices are no longer a basis for refusing claims, 
but might be a basis for claiming damages for breach of contract. 904  The 
decision of Supreme Court narrows the scope of a fraudulent claim, but it was 
made in a manner commensurate with provisions of the IA 2015. Although this 
was a marine insurance claim, the court was clear the decision is intended to 
apply to all consumer and commercial insurance polices. Lord Mance, in 
dissenting, argued that the majority in the Supreme Court have run counter to 
the basis of the insurance contract – utmost good faith has long been 
fundamental as a result of “general imbalance in information and control and the 
significance of moral hazard in insurance relationships” 905  - and wrongly 
considered the issue from the perspective of hindsight, thereby the judgment 
may provide an insured with the ability to lie with impunity. Some considerations 
between fraudulent claims and the principle of utmost good faith are discussed 
in the following section. 
 
7.3.2 Fraudulent claims and utmost good faith 
Given that the duty of utmost good faith is not confined to pre-contractual 
matters but also continues to operate in the course of contract performance, 
Willes J pointed out in Britton v Royal Insurance Co906 that the fraudulent claims 
rule was merely a manifestation of the duty of utmost good faith. This view, 
inherited in many cases, was adopted by Christopher Clarke LJ as the juridical 
                                                            
903 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45 
[26] 
904 ibid [98] 
905 ibid [114] 
906 (1866) 4 F & F 905. 
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basis for the fraudulent claims rule in the leading judgment of The Versloot in 
the Court of Appeal,907 although it has been clarified by Lord Hobhouse as long 
ago as in The Star Sea that fraudulent claims - the paradigm example of post-
contract bad faith – does not gives the insurer the right to avoid the policy ab 
initio.908 Further, the remove of the sanction of avoidance for breach of the duty 
of utmost good faith from s.17 of the MIA 1906 by the IA 2015, coupled with the 
implementation of ss.12 and 13 of the IA 2015 whereby the forfeiture rule is put 
on a statutory footing, has confirmed the Lord Hobhouse’s proposition that “the 
continuing duty of utmost good faith has no part to play in determining the 
remedies for the making of a fraudulent claim”.909 However, in cases where 
there was an express clause avoiding the policy in the event of fraudulent 
devices, then the general law was not in point.910 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision raises significant questions as to the relevance 
of good faith and fair information in the formation and operation of insurance 
contract. The claimant, again, alleged on their appeal to the Supreme Court that 
“to enable an insurer to escape liability when he has suffered no harm would be 
unjust and contrary to the spirit of mutual good faith.”911 Thus the Supreme 
Court took a meticulous examination on both the notion itself and the 
“attenuated” test of materiality – meant be operated distinctively to the test of 
                                                            
907 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2015] QB 608 
(CA) [76]-[77]. 
908 This view was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in K/S Merc Skandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s 
Underwriters [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 802 and in Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2003] QB 556. 
909 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 10-062. 
910 [2016] UKSC 45 [82] (Lord Hughes JSC). 
911 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 
45, [5] 
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materiality of pre-contractual misrepresentations and non-disclosures - that was 
“tentatively” proposed by Mance LJ in The Aegeon,912 while he indicated that the 
fraudulent claims rule does not require the insurer to prove inducement.913 As to 
the usability of the pre-contractual test of materiality at the claim stage, the 
Supreme Court rebuffed its application on the ground that the mind of the 
hypothetical prudent insurer is rather pointless in assessing a claim, as it is of a 
completely different character from the assessment of a risk at the formation of 
contract,914 therefore the concept of materiality is not transposable between the 
pre- and post-contract (claim) stages.915 The primary question to the present 
issue is whether the lie is material to the liability of the insurer, namely, the 
acceptance of a lie told by the insured with the aim of improving the position of 
the liar, collateral or not, provides the insured with something to which he is not 
entitled in law.916 Hereupon, the fraudulent claims rule is untied entirely from the 
notion of utmost good faith. The troublesome decision of The Litsion Pride, 
overruled in part by Lord Houbhouse in The Star Sea, 917  has been firmly 
squashed by Lord Hughes JSC in The Versloot.918 His lordship expressed in the 
judgment that “the lie told was not part of the presentation of the claim at all, but 
rather part of a dishonest antecedent attempt to avoid liability to pay the 
                                                            
912 [2003] QB 556. 
913 ibid [36]-[37]. 
914 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45 
[33]-[36] (Lord Sumption JSC). 
915 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45 
[87]-[91] (Lord Hughes JSC). 
916 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicheruing AG (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45 
[92]. 
917 [2003] 1 AC 469 [71], in which Lord Hobhouse stated: “In so far as it is based upon the principle of the 
irrecoverability of fraudulent claims, the decision is questionable upon the fact since the actual claim was 
valid claim for a loss which had occurred and had been caused by peril insured against when the vessel 
was covered by a held cover clause.” 
918 [2016] UKSC 45. 
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additional premium for taking the ship into a war zone.”919 That is to say, it is not 
a fraudulent claims case at all. In The Litsion Pride, the underwriter may 
discharge its liability if payment of the additional premium had constituted a 
condition precedent to coverage, however, Hirst J held that the premium 
clauses does not constitute a condition precedent. Either way, the insurer would 
not be able to wiggle out of its liability to pay the claim. 
 
7.4 Damages for late payment 
The common law recognised the existence of insurers’ duty of utmost good faith 
after the formation of the contract. This position was rooted by the Court of 
Appeal in Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
(The Good Luck).920 However, the underlying circumstances were unique – 
those who claimed damages for the alleged breach of the insurer’s continuing 
duty of utmost good faith were not the assured but their banks. The Court of 
Appeal ruled that the insurer indeed owned a continuing duty of utmost good 
faith, but only to the insured owner not to the bank - a non-contracting party who 
was deprived of its right to the proceeds of the policy. It was indicated, in obiter, 
in Drake Insurance plc v Provident Insurance plc921 that insurers are required to 
act in good faith in deciding whether or not to avoid a policy for the insured’s 
breach.922 The only duty that might matter to an assured is one imposed on the 
                                                            
919 Ibid [75] 
920 [1990] 1 QB 818, was on appeal on different grounds [1991] 3 All E.R. 1. 
921 [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 277. 
922 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-87. 
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insurer to pay valid claims.923 However, the insured’s door on relying on the 
principle has been closed by the remedy, being “inadequate”924 and of no 
practical value to the insured,925 spelt out at the original version of s. 17 of 
Marine Insurance Act 1906.926 An attempt was made to give rise to damages for 
a breach of duty of utmost good faith. The possibility was however denied by 
the Court of Appeal in La Banque Financière de la Cité v Westgate Insurance 
Co Ltd,927 where the insurer failed to disclose material facts to the assured 
resulting that the assured’s cover was less than he had been let to believe.928 
Though the case was related to a pre-contractual duty, the ruling has been 
entrenched in subsequent case law.929 The English courts were constrained in 
the rule of law on utmost good faith and were inadmissible to extent the duty or 
the consequences of breach of any such duty any further in insurance law, or to 
expand the meaning of a contract provision.930 A different approach has been 
taken in other jurisdictions. The Canadian courts have nevertheless recognised 
that the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith is a fiduciary duty, breach of which 
gives rise to damages.931  Given that the insured’s post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith “can derive from express or implied terms of the contract”932 - 
                                                            
923 R. Merkin, Reforming insurance law: is there a case for reverse transportation? - The report for the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions, paras 5.8 – 5.10. 
924 La Banque Financière de la Cité v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665 (CA) 775. 
925 Manifest Shipping v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] AC 469 [57]. 
926 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues (Law Com CP No 
201, 2012) para 3.1. 
927 [1990] 1 QB 665. 
928 Slade LJ advocated that “on the particular facts of some cases” such a post-contractual duty of good 
faith could be said to arise under the terms of the contract. 
929 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues (Law Com CP No 
201, 2012) para 3.7. 
930 Gan Insurance v Tai Ping Insurance (No.2) [2001] CLC 1103, 1134, 1138-1139. 
931 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-110. 
932 In Black King Shipping Corp v Massie (The Litsion Pride) [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437, 518, Mr Justice 
Hirst suggested that “the duty not to… make claims in breach of [post-contractual duty of] utmost good 
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although a pre-contractual duty is not based on an implied term as before the 
formation of the contract the duty cannot arise from the contract itself933 - the 
mutuality of the duty of utmost good faith thus opens the possibility that 
unreasonable refusal or arrearage by an insurer may result in a breach of the 
continuing duty of utmost good faith which is implied in the insurance contract. 
This was denied by English courts.934 Mance J held, in Insurance Corp of the 
Channel Islands v McHugh (No.1),935 that even if there was a continuing duty of 
utmost good faith owed by the insurer, it did not give rise to an implied term 
obliging the insurer to negotiate, settle and pay a claim in good faith and with 
reasonable speed.936  
 
English courts have also refused to imply a term in the policy to the effect that 
insurers must pay claims promptly.937 This is based on the legal fiction that an 
insurer’s primary obligation is not to pay valid claims in return for payment of the 
premium but to prevent the loss occurring in the first place.938 The operation of 
the “hold harmless” principle was clearly illustrated in Sprung v Royal Insurance 
(UK) Ltd,939 and the Sprung principle was followed even where the insurers had 
                                                                                                                                                                              
faith is an implied term of the policy”. Some support for this view can also be found in remarks by Lord 
Hobhouse in The Star Sea, in which he made his best attempt to make sense of section 17 by drawing 
distinctions between a lack of good faith in negotiation and a lack of good faith during the performance of 
the contract. This classic comment has been elaborated at paragraph 52 of the judgment. 
933 A Nandoo & D Oughton, ‘The confused post-formation duty of good faith in insurance law: from 
refinement to fragmentation to elimination?’ [2005] JBL 346. 
934 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-112. 
935 [1997] LRLR 94, 136-137. 
936 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-060. 
937 Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 111. 
938 English law regards an contract of insurance as analogous to a contract with a security firm, in which 
the security firm undertakes to prevent a break-in. See Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and 
Indemnity Association (The Fanti) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239; Secony Mobil Oil v West of England 
Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (The Padre Island) [1991] 2 AC 1, 35 (Lord Goff). 
939 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 111. 
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expressly undertaken that they would “always try to be fair and reasonable 
whenever you have need of the protection of this policy. We will also act quickly 
to provide that protection”,940 despite that explicitly well-worded terms might be 
exceptionally enforceable as a separate contractual obligation, such as clause 
46.7 of the International Hull Clauses 2003 confines the claims handling period 
for the leading underwriter in 28 days.941 Where payment is late, there can be no 
remedy for assureds as English law does not allow damages for late 
payment,942 other than interest on a sum due.943 This is because payment under 
the policy represents damages, and further damages cannot be awarded for 
non-payment.944 The law on late payment, being unfair and less protective of 
assureds, was described as a “blot on English common law jurisprudence”.945 
 
The matter, after having experienced a careful and circumspective process of 
reform, has now been dealt with by implied term under s. 13A of the Insurance 
Act 2015, added by the Enterprise Act 2016. This provision will for the first time 
allow policyholders to pursue damages against underwriters for late payment. 
The duty of good faith has now been redesignated as a general “interpretative 
principle”946 under the IA 2015 - the avoidance remedy is now abolished - 
                                                            
940 Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd [2006] EWHC 1120 (TCC), 34. 
941 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) paras 25.16 – 25.21. 
942 The President of India v Lips Maritime Corporation (The Lips) [1988] AC 395. 
943 Sempra Metals Ltd v HM Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] UKHL 34, in which the House of 
Lords recognised a restitutionary right to compound interest, where one party had wrongly received and 
held insurance money during a period when it should not have had it. 
944 The operation of the “hold harmless” principle is clearly illustrated in Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd 
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 111. 
945 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 26.4 – 26.14 & 26.51. 
946 Insurance Act 2015, s.14. 
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breach of which does not give rise to a standalone action, however, that may no 
longer be significant in the situation where late payment occurs.947 In the course 
of the insurance contract law reform, the Law Commission indeed suggested 
that 13A liability should rest upon good faith and intended to award a remedy of 
damages for a breach. The mission nevertheless failed, albeit such an 
extension to the ambit of the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith succeeded in 
Australia. The Australian High Court recognised that an insurer’s duty of good 
faith is not limited to acting honestly and extends to an obligation to determine a 
claim for indemnity in a timely manner and without due delay. 948  Specific 
considerations as to the reform of late payment of insurance claims and the role 
of utmost good faith are provided as follow.  
 
7.4.1 The reform 
In December 2011, the Law Commission of England and Wales and the 
Scottish Law Commission produced a joint consultation paper on the post 
contract duties and other issues,949 in which they proposed that insurers should 
be under a contractual obligation to pay valid claims within a “reasonable time” 
and that a failure could result in liability to pay damages for any foreseeable 
losses caused. In July 2014 the Law Commission published their report – 
Insurance contract law: business disclosure; warranties; insurer’s remedies for 
                                                            
947 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 6-051. 
948 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 36. 
949 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues (Law Com CP No 
201, 2012). 
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fraudulent claims; and late payment.950  Evidence to the Law Commissions 
shown majority support for the reform among insurance companies and 
insurance trade bodies, despite the argument that damages might be 
disproportional to the amount of claim, that the additional amount may only act 
as a substitute of business interruption cover which can be purchased 
separately from the market, that insurers always under a strong competitive 
pressure to pay claims timeously so that the measures were rendered 
superfluous, and that FOS does not apply the rule in Sprung to consumer cases 
so that damages for distress are in practice awardable. Three broad 
approaches were outlined, one of which was to enable policyholders to claim 
foreseeable or foreseen loss where bad faith can be shown. 951  The Law 
Commission had eventually moved away from this solution as a result of a fear 
to the uncertainty that might be brought by a possibility of development of US-
style substantial punitive damages.952 Further, the contractual route, thought to 
be the best, was nevertheless refused by the Government for being too 
controversial to be included in the Law Commission Bill that would attract an 
expedited Parliamentary procedure.953 The Bill eventually passed without late 
payment provisions. 
 
                                                            
950 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014). 
951 See generally at Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues 
(Law Com CP No 201, 2012) part 3, Damages for late payment: other routes to redress 
952 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) paras 26.43-26.45. 
953 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-117 & 11-118. 
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7.4.1.1 The Insurance Act 2015, s. 13A 
The matter, as promised,954 was revisited and is now dealt with under the 
Enterprise Act 2016, which received the Royal Assent on 4 May 2016. This ‘U-
turn’ in law has brought significant implications for insurers. For insurance 
contracts, the crucial points lie in Part V (ss. 28-30), which amends the IA 2015 
by incorporating s. 13A, implying a term in every contract of insurance that any 
sums due in respect of a claim will be paid “within a reasonable time” where it 
includes time to “investigate and assess” the claim,955 breach of which will give 
rise to the usual contractual remedies, including damages in addition to interest 
and the sum due under the policy.956 Reasonableness will depend on all the 
relevant circumstances. Examples of circumstances that need to be taken into 
account are listed in IA 2015 s. 13A(3), namely, the type of insurance, the size 
and complexity of the claim, compliance with any relevant statutory or 
regulatory rules or guidance and factors outside the insurer’s control. The test is 
simply what is reasonable. It is necessary to demonstrate a breach of duty was 
unreasonable, frivolous or unfounded. Notwithstanding it is apparent that s. 13A 
is not about good faith but failure to pay, the High Court of New Zealand has 
held in Young v Tower Insurance Ltd957 that utmost good faith, as a necessary 
incident of insurance contracts, is an implied term at common law, and has in 
effect incorporated s. 13A of the IA 2015 into New Zealand law. Gendall J finds 
that the duty of utmost good faith extends beyond a mere obligation on the 
                                                            
954 The government did undertake to review the matter after the election. 
955 Insurance Act 2015, s. 13A(2). 
956 Insurance Act 2015, s. 13A(5). 
957 [2016] NZHC 2965. 
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insurer and the insured of continued disclosure, and requires the insurers to “act 
reasonably, fairly and transparently, including but not limited to the initial 
formation of the contract and during and after the lodgement of a claim”; and 
“process the claim in a reasonable time”.958 
 
7.4.1.2 Contracting out - the “shield” of good faith  
IA 2015 s. 16A permits parties to a non-consumer959 contract to contract out of 
the implied term subject to the strict transparency requirements in the IA 2015, 
requiring the term to be clear and unambiguous and that the insurer to take 
sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the policyholders’ attention 
before the contract is concluded, but the insurer will lose right to rely upon 
exclusion if breach of the term implied by IA 2015 s. 13A is deliberate or 
reckless.960 It reflects the Australian approach and was described by the Law 
Commission as “a shield” of good faith,961 preventing an insurer who has acted 
in bad faith from relying upon the exclusion clause.962 If there is an exclusion 
clause in a non-consumer insurance contract, the concept of “deliberate or 
reckless” is to be put into service. The burden of proof will fall on the 
policyholder, although insurer will in any defence have to explain reasons 
behind its refusal or delay.963 This is not straightforward.964 Knowledge of the 
                                                            
958 ibid 163. 
959 No exception at all is to be allowed in consumer insurance. 
960 Insurance Act 2015, s. 16(2). 
961 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 26.63 and 28.96. 
962 ibid para 26.59. 
963 ibid para 28.99-28.101. 
964 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-123. 
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insurers’ actual awareness or of their recklessness as to the irrationality of their 
conduct is required. Examples of deliberateness or recklessness given by the 
Law Commission are: knowingly delaying or rejecting a claim knows to be valid 
in order to secure a bonus payment or with a view to any internal budgets or 
quotas; or the insurers’ approach to a claim is blameworthy to the point of 
recklessness.965 Proof will be complex and there will be issues as to whose 
knowledge or recklessness is material for this purpose.966  
 
7.4.2 Compensatory damages for late payment in China 
In China, paying valid claims timeously is and has always been, in performing of 
the principle of honesty and good faith, a primary obligation to the insurer. 
Provisions as to remedies for the insurer’s unreasonable delay or refusal are 
provided in the art. 23 par. 2 of the 2015 Act, which is stated as follow, 
An insurer who fails to fulfill the obligation as prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph shall compensate the policyholder or beneficiary for losses 
incurred therefrom, in addition to paying the insurance amount or claim. 
It is apparent from this provision that the sums awardable by way of damages 
are in addition to the sums due under the policy. Interest is not specified in the 
Act but has recognised by the courts.967 However, there is no measure of 
damages specified by the Act, thereby the ordinary contractual rule in the 
                                                            
965 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, 2014) para 28.98. 
966 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-123. 
967 Zhen JING, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017), 462, citing Shanghai 
Zhenan Company v PICC Property Co. Wenzhou Branch, Ningbo Maritime Court, Civil Judgment (2007) 
no. 25. 
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Contract Law of PRC 1999 is to be applied.968  Art. 113 par. 1 of the 1999 Act 
states that the amount of compensation shall equal damages for breach of 
contract, including any loss of profit under the contract, but must not exceed 
foreseeable or foreseen losses which was in the contemplation of both parties 
at the time the contract was made, as the probable result of the breach. 
Likewise, IA 2015 provides no measure of damages, and so the ordinary 
common law test, set out in Hadley v Baxendale,969 is likely to be deployed.970 
The rule of remoteness operates in a similar manner with the above Chinese 
provision, namely, damages are recoverable if the actual loss suffered by the 
assured was in the contemplation of the insurers from the inception. In principle 
the assured can recover: 1) losses which the parties ought to have 
contemplated in the ordinary course of events when the contract was made; 
and 2) special losses arising from circumstances actually known to the parties 
when the contract was made, although claiming special losses might be 
somewhat impractical.971 Insofar as the infant IA 2015 does not provide much 
guidance on how late payment might operate, those Australian authorities are of 
particular importance on this matter. A claim for damages arising from personal 
injuries under a Combined Home Building and Home Contents Insurance Policy 
against insurer for breach of contract including breach of duty of utmost good 
faith was held to be too remote by the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
                                                            
968 Zhen JING, Chinese Insurance Contracts: Law and Practice (Informa 2017) 456. 
969 (1854) 9 Ex 341. 
970 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-120. 
971 ibid. 
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(NSWCA) in Sudesh Sharma v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance.972 
The NSWCA upheld findings of the judge at first instance that the insurer was 
not in breach of its duty of utmost good faith by reference to the landmark 
judgment in CGU Insurance v AMP Financial Planning973, and concluded that it 
was not “in the usual course of things”974 that one may suffer personal injury as 
a result of a breach of an insurance contract covering property damages, and 
that it would be unreasonable to contemplate that the insured would undertake 
repair work and end up a fall from a ladder. As such, even if the insurer had 
breached its duty of utmost good faith, the personal injuries claimed were to be 
too remote to be compensable. The question is: would the loss be foreseeable if 
the insured is a builder, whereby repair work is expected, so is a fall from a 
ladder?  
 
One of the functions of the 1999 Act art. 113 part. 1 is to set a ceiling on the 
amount of compensation. In contrast, IA 2015 s. 13A(5) does not cap damages 
at policy limits, so that the assured can recover sums due under the policy plus 
any loss suffered, whatever the total amount.975 There will not be interest on the 
sum insured as it will be reflected in the damages awarded, although there may 
be interest on the damages.976 In the majority of cases, claims might be limited 
to simple or compound interest only to reflect the cost of borrowing money at 
                                                            
972 [2017] NSWCA 55. 
973 [2007] HCA 36. 
974 European Bank Ltd v Evans [2010] HCA 21 [13]. 
975 R. Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) at 11-120. 
976 ibid at 11-131. 
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commercial rates or the loss of use of money at commercial lending rates,977 as 
insureds are required to prove on the balance of probability that any loss for 
which it claims damages was actually caused by the insurer’s breach of the 
implied term, and many insureds will be unable to show loss. 
 
Though IA 2015 s. 13A(3) has provided examples of relevant issues, what 
constitutes a “reasonable time” is a congenitally vague standard under English 
law.978 Case law will be required for clarity. Chinese law, by contrast, tackles the 
problem by specifying timeframe for claim settlement. The Act requires the 
insurer to notify the insured, in one comprehensive list, of all the documents and 
evidence it needs to assess a claim,979 and to make a decision on liability 
promptly: if the claim is complicated, the insurer should make a decision within 
30 days from receiving notice of the claim in the absence of express terms to 
the contrary;980 by implication, the period is relatively less for simple claims. 
Payment must be made within 10 days of the insured’s agreement to the 
settlement proposed unless there is different time frame indicated to the 
contrary in the policy.981 Failure to do so will lead to damages payable to 
policyholders or beneficiaries on or over the sum owing under the policy. The 
insurer is obliged to make a payment on account of the sums that can be 
agreed, if the settlement amount cannot be determined within 60 days of 
                                                            
977 ibid at 11-120. 
978 M. Clarke & B.Soyer, The insurance Act 2015: A new regime for commercial and marine insurance law 
(Informa 2016), paras 6.3.& 6. 93. 
979 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 22. 
980 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 23 par.1. 
981 Ibid. 
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notification with full documents and evidence provided; balance must be paid 
after final determination.982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
982 Insurance Act of PRC 2015, art. 25. 
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Chapter 8 Treatment for Consumers  
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
 
8.1 The Path to Reform 
It is well acknowledged that, by 2013, the insurance law did not keep the pace 
with the change in the economic and technological environment in which 
commercial insurance is transacted and failed to meet the expectations of the 
policyholders.983 The need for reform in the field of insurance law was initiated 
as long ago as 1957. There have been several reports calling for the reform of 
the law in light of misrepresentation and non-disclosure in insurance contract 
during these years.984 The Law Reform Committee, the forerunner of the Law 
Commission, reported that the state of English insurance law with respect to 
pre-contractual misrepresentation and non-disclosure, and consumer-assureds’ 
breach of warranties was capable of leading to abuse.985 Limited suggestions 
made in the proposal eventually went down like a lead balloon but formed the 
basis of the Law Commission’s 1980 proposal for reform. From 1979 to 1980, 
for the purpose of forestalling a harmonisation of insurance contract law of the 
member states at the time under consideration by the European Commission,986 
the Law Commission produced a working paper and a report,987 advocating a 
                                                            
983 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law Com 
No 319, 2009) para 1.8. 
984 ibid para 1.5. 
985 Law Reform Committee, Conditions and Exceptions in Insurance Policies (Fifth Report, 1957) Cmnd 
62. 
986 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to insurance contracts, COM (79) 335 final, 6 July 
1979. 
987 Law Commission, Law of Contract: the Parol Evidence Rule (Law Com Working Paper No 70, 1979); 
Law Commission, Insurance Law non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty Report on a Reference Under 
Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act 1965, (Law Com No104, 1980) 
330 
 
reform on the problematic duty of disclosure and breach of warranty.  Thus it is 
doubtless that “when the risk of the latter dissipated, the incentive to implement 
the former evaporated.”988 Nevertheless, the 1980 report concluded that the law 
was “undoubtedly in need of reform”.989 Reform was also urged in a report 
published by the National Consumer Council in 1997.990 More importantly, the 
reform was, again, triggered by a report produced by the British Insurance Law 
association (BILA) in 2002.991  
 
In 2006, the Law Commissions of England and the Scottish Law Commission 
embarked on a project to review insurance contract law, and produced scope 
paper, inviting views on which areas of insurance contract law were in need of 
reform. The Law Commissions published a series of issues papers to consider 
the main areas of the current law that were thought to be problematic, including 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure, post-contractual utmost good faith, the 
status of intermediaries, warranties, insurable interest, damages for late 
payment and requirements contained in statute for formal marine policy. Since 
then, three Consultation Papers have been published. In July 2007, the Law 
Commissions produced their first Consultation Paper992 which set out in detail 
the Commissions’ provisional proposals for the reform of insurance contract law 
                                                            
988 Rob Merkin & Ozlem Gurses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and 
Assured (2015) 78 (6) Mod L Rev 1004. 
989 Law Commission, Insurance Law non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty Report on a Reference Under 
Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act 1965, (Law Com No104, 1980) para 1.21. 
990 National Consumer Council, Insurance Law Reform: the Consumer Case for Review of Insurance Law 
(May 1997). 
991 British Insurance Law Association, ‘Insurance Contracts Law Reform’ (September 2002) 
992 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 2007). 
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with particular reference to the key areas of utmost good faith, warranties and 
agency. It begins by noting that the ways in which modern insurance contract 
are concluded differ significantly from those when insurance law was last 
reviewed by the Law Commission in 1980. 993  In 2009, the joint Law 
Commission’s first report concerned key issues related to consumer insurance 
and led to the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure & Representation) Act 2012, 
which came into force in April 2013.  
 
In addition, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015),994 which applies to 
consumer insurance contracts, will reform and consolidate consumer law in 
England, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. For insurers offering consumer 
products, the main impact of the Act is likely to be seen in the new laws for 
digital content and ancillary contracts, unfair contract terms and the changes to 
the mechanisms for consumer redress. Consumers now may have the statutory 
power of challenging unduly onerous terms which appear in the small print in a 
insurance contact. The most importantly, the CRA 2015 introduces more 
strenuous remedies resulting from unfair terms, by which it allows customers to 
terminate the contract and claim compensatory payments. 
 
                                                            
993 R. Merkin and J. Lowry Reconstructing Insurance Law: The Law Commissions’ Consultation Paper 
(2008) 71(1) Mod L Rev 95. 
994 The Consumer Rights act 2015 replaces a number of laws with regards to business-to-consumer 
transactions, including the Supply of Good (Implied Terms) Act 1973; the Sale of Goods Act 1979; the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982; the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994; the Sale and Supply of 
Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997. The Unfair Terms in 
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8.2 Treatment for consumers 
Despite some modifications provided by European Union in respect of 
restrictions to the insurer on limited use of draconian policy provisions, in UK 
statutory force have been given to the Financial Ombudsman Service by the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000995 coupled with the legally-enforceable 
regulatory requirements in the Financial Services Authority’s Handbook 
promising fair handling of claims.996 However, there has been no legislative 
change until the introduction of the CI(DR)A 2012. The 2012 Act closely follows 
recommendations made by the Law Commission in a joint report published in 
December 2009, aiming to bring the law into line with consumers’ reasonable 
expectations and good practice; and targets the most problematic area, namely, 
definition of “consumer insurance contract”, duty of consumer assureds, 
qualifying misrepresentation and the insurer’s remedies for breach. Each of 
these matters is considered in the following paragraphs.   
 
8.2.1 Meaning of “Consumer Insurance Contract” 
CI(DR)A 2012 covers only consumer insurance policy; business is subject to 
the 2015 Act. “Consumer insurance contract” is defined by CI(DR)A 2012, s. 1 
as follow: 
“consumer insurance contract” means a contract of insurance between—  
(a) an individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly 
                                                            
995 Replaced by the Financial Service Act 2012 
996 R. Merkin, Australia: Still A Nation of Chalmers? [2011] 30(2) UQLJ 194. 
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for purposes unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or 
profession, and  
(b)  a person who carries on the business of insurance and who 
becomes a party to the contract by way of that business 
(whether or not in accordance with permission for the 
purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000);  
“consumer” means the individual who enters into a consumer insurance 
contract, or proposes to do so;  
“insurer” means the person who is, or would become, the other party to a 
consumer insurance contract. 
S. 1(a) states that, “the contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to the 
individual’s trade, business or profession”. A similar phrase is used in the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, defining “consumer” as “an individual acting for 
purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft 
or profession”. This was classified by the Law Commission as “mixed-use 
policies”,997 “where the insurance covers some private and some business use, 
one needs to look at the main purpose of the insurance. This is a matter of fact 
in each case. For example, insurance on a car used mainly as a taxi, with only 
occasional private trip would be considered commercial insurance.”998 It seems 
that there is no obstacle to identify that “ a self-employed window cleaner who 
uses a van primarily for window-cleaning would be taking out insurance in a 
                                                            
997 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law Com 
No 319, 2009) para 5.17, 5.18 & 5.19. 
998 ibid para 5.6 and Explanatory Notes to the Report, Clause 1, A.5. 
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business capacity. However, a self-employed contractor who used a car mainly 
for private use would insure the car as a consumer.”999  
 
The Law Commission have clarified that insurance for purposes of business 
would be business insurance1000 and accepted that “trade or profession” are 
likely to include employees.1001 However, it is probably not easy to determine 
whether the main use of a vehicle is for “trade, business or profession”, if a self-
employed freelance designer who uses his/her own motor car to drive to and 
from business meetings; and meanwhile it also used privately for their daily life, 
i.e. picking up his/her families, going to supermarket, meeting with friends and 
families etc. Furthermore, greater difficulty exists in whether a policy on a 
privately owned vehicle will fall within or outside CI(DR)A 2012, if for instance 
the motor car is used as a non-professional Uber taxi only when he/she drives 
to and from his/her work place for the purpose of saving petrol cost. The 
definition of consumer under this Act will undoubtedly be tested by the courts in 
due course. Taking into account the above scenarios, the judge might consider 
the use of a vehicle as a whole to determine whether its predominant purpose is 
for business or private use at this point. 
 
8.2.2 Duty of a consumer assured 
CI(DR)A 2012 follows the practice of the Financial Ombudsman Service, which 
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1001 ibid para 5.14. 
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abolished the consumer contract from ss. 18-20 of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906, and instead, imposes on the consumer a duty “to take reasonable care 
not to make a misrepresentation to the insurer”.1002  The consumer would no 
longer be required to volunteer information but only to take reasonable care in 
answering question posted by the insurer fully and accurately and ensure that 
the information is not misleading.1003 Attentions will be paid to the clarity and 
specificity of the questions by the court in assessing whether or not the 
consumer’s response was reasonable,1004 and yet insurers are not precluded 
from asking general or open-ended questions.1005 Such broad questions may 
have only limited effect. 
 
In order to avoid “instant ossification”1006 of the law, the term “misrepresentation” 
is deliberately not defined by CI(DR)A 20121007 because the Law Commission 
was willing to preserve “a wide and flexible approach to the issue of what 
amounts to a misrepresentation” in line with the common law concept of a 
misrepresentation interpreted by the English courts. 1008  For example, an 
omission of a declaration on the application form1009 or a failure to answer a 
question fully may constitute a misrepresentation.1010  The Law Commission 
                                                            
1002 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 2(2). 
1003 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 4.7. 
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1010 Winter v Irish Life Assurance plc [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 274. 
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goes further by explaining that: “in particular, it should cover cases where an 
answer is misleadingly incomplete. However, if the applicant clearly refuses to 
answer a question, and the insurer nevertheless accepts their proposal, then 
this would not be a misrepresentation.”1011 In other words, if a question is left 
unanswered or is ambiguous and incomplete but the insurer does not press for 
an answer or for clarification, the insurer would be assumed to have waived the 
question required. 
 
The duty set out in CI(DR)A 2012, s. 2(2) applies equally on renewal and 
variations since they both are treated simply as a fresh contract. 1012  For 
example, consumers who failed “to respond to a renewal letter asking if the 
previous particulars are correct” would be considered a misrepresentation.1013 
Failing to comply with the insurer’s request to confirm or amend particular 
information previously given by the assured is treated to be a misrepresentation 
by CI(DR)A 2012, s. 2(3). Then questions left at this point would be whether the 
consumer acted with reasonable care in responding to the request.1014 Failure to 
reply to an insurer’s letter on renewal might not constitute a misrepresentation 
on analogy with the existing case law, in which it is concerned, as stated above, 
with “a failure to answer specific questions on a form, rather than a failure to 
reply to a form altogether.”1015 The law concerning variation remains unchanged, 
                                                            
1011 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 5.50. 
1012 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-31. 
1013 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 4.9. 
1014 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-31. 
1015 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
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only information relating to the variation itself must be disclosed.1016  
 
The duty imposed by s. 17 of Marine Insurance Act 1906 is confined to the pre-
contractual statement for consumer insurance contract. Section 2(5)(a) made 
clear that CI(DR)A 2012 does not affect any duty of utmost good faith after the 
contract has been entered into. Thus no statutory obligation of this kind is 
required by assureds to notify their insurer of a change of circumstances, unless 
there is an express term in the policy.1017 Such a term is subject to review under 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015.1018 Any consumer insurance contracts which are 
also marine insurance, such as insurance on private yachts, are subject to 
CI(DR)A 2012. Accordingly, an insurer should proceed with caution when 
entering into a contract of insurance with an individual owner of a private or 
pleasure vessel/yacht unless it is clear that the main purpose of that policy is for 
trade, business or profession. 
 
8.2.3 “Reasonableness” – a reasonable consumer test 
The standard applied to decide whether the consumer has taken reasonable 
care is defined by s. 3 of CI(DR)A 2012. Whether or not a consumer has taken 
reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation will depend on all the relevant 
circumstances.1019 A list of factors as to whether reasonable care was taken are 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Com No 319, 2009) paras 5.49. 
1016 ibid para 5.58. 
1017 ibid para 5.62. 
1018 It was the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which was replaced by the 
Consumer Rights Act on 1st October 2015. 
1019 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 3(1). 
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particularly stressed by CI(DR)A 2012 s.3(2), in which it gives “examples of 
things which may need to be taken into account in making a determination”, 
namely: 
(a)  the type of consumer insurance contract in question, and its target 
market, 
(b) any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorised 
by the insurer, 
(c)  how clear, and how specific, the insurer’s questions were, 
(d) in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer’s questions in 
connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance 
contract, how clearly the insurer communicated the importance of 
answering those questions (or the possible consequences of failing 
to do so), 
(e)  whether or not an agent was acting for the consumer. 
However, this list is indicative and not exhaustive. Accordingly, a 
misrepresentation might be reasonable where the question was general 
whereas it is not understandable by a reasonable consumer; the consumer had 
reasonable grounds for believing that their statement was true; a reasonable 
consumer would not have assumed that the fact was the one which the insurer 
would want to know about; a reasonable consumer would presume that the 
insurer would obtain such information from itself or the third party.1020 
                                                            
1020 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 5.71. 
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Whether the assured has taken reasonable care to answer questions outlined 
by the insurer in a proposal form is an objective test looked at in context. The 
key question arise at this point in determining reasonableness is whether the 
reasonable assured is “a reasonable consumer” or “a reasonable consumer in 
the circumstances of the insured”. Particular characteristics of the actual 
consumer such as the consumer’s age or knowledge of English do not usually 
be considered,1021 unless these were known or ought to have known by the 
insurer. 1022  The reasonable consumer expressed by CI(DR)A 2012, s. 3(3) 
“denotes an average consumer with no special skills or knowledge taking into 
account the examples listed in subsection (2)”.1023  
 
Section 3(5), confirming that a misrepresentation made dishonestly is always to 
be taken as showing lack of reasonable care, is somewhat controversial. The 
main concern of this provision is the criteria to be taken into account in 
considering a consumer’s dishonesty, e.g. where a well-informed consumer with 
particular characteristic or knowledge acted dishonestly, an average consumer 
might have made a reasonable mistake on the same issues.1024 Consequently, 
s. 3(5) might be abused where an insurer is trying to find a way to reject a 
claim.1025  
 
                                                            
1021 ibid para 5.75 
1022 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 3(4) 
1023 Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Insurance Bill [HL Bill 68], para. 28 
1024 ibid para 30 
1025 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-33 
340 
 
8.2.4 Qualifying Misrepresentation 
Section 4 of CI(DR)A 2012 deals with the circumstances in which an insurer is 
entitled to a remedy where there is the breach of the duty by assured. An 
insurer has a remedy against a consumer for a misrepresentation made by the 
consumer before a consumer insurance contract was entered into or varied only 
if: (a) the consumer failed to comply with the duty set out by s. 2(2) of CI(DR)A; 
and (b) “the insurer shows that without the misrepresentation, that insurer would 
not have entered into the contract (or agreed to the variation) at all, or would 
have done so only on different terms.” The latter requirement codifies the 
common law approach on inducement as developed following the House of 
Lord decision which applies to business insurance in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co 
Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd,1026 that the actual underwriter would have 
declined the risk or accepted it only on different terms had the insurer known 
the fact misrepresented or non-disclosed before the contract is concluded. The 
requirement of materiality set out in s. 20 of the MIA 1906 that a 
misrepresentation is actionable only if it is material and influenced the judgment 
of a hypothetical ‘prudent insurer’, was not preserved by CI(DR)A 2012.1027 This 
is intended to be a high evidential threshold. It is not sufficient for the insurer to 
show that the hypothetical prudent underwriter would have been influenced. 
Instead, the specific underwriter must show that it relied on the 
misrepresentation and would have acted differently had they been in 
                                                            
1026 [1995] 1 AC 51 
1027 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.10. 
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possession of all necessary facts. 
 
There is a three-part classification: reasonableness; deliberate or reckless 
breach of duty; careless breach of duty. “Deliberate or reckless” is defined by 
CI(DR)A 2012, s. 5(2), whereas “careless”, being discussed in the context of 
classification below, is residual category. A misstatement is careless if a 
consumer did not act with reasonable care resulting a “qualifying 
misrepresentation”, but was not deliberate or reckless.1028 No remedy is afforded 
to the insurer for the first category, namely, where the consumer has acted 
reasonably. The only Remedies available to the insurer, as set out in CI(DR)A 
2012, schedule 1, paragraph 2, will depend on the insured’s state of mind. The 
burden of proving a misrepresentation is “deliberate or reckless” lies on the 
shoulder of the insurer unless the contrary is shown.1029 This is discussed in 
detail below in the context of deliberate and reckless misrepresentation. 
 
8.2.4.1 The Threefold Classification 
The three-part classification employed by the FOS – “reasonable”, “careless”, 
and “deliberate or reckless” misrepresentation – has been given legislative 
effect by CI(DR)A 2012. The term “deliberate or reckless” is used to differentiate 
a special treatment made for the insurer by CI(DR)A 2012 from the common law 
concepts of fraud that “require an exceptionally high standard of proof” and that 
                                                            
1028 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 5(3). 
1029 CI(DR)A 2012, ss. 5(4) & (5). 
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was considered, by the Law Commission, to be too difficult to proof. 1030 
Definitions are set out by s. 5(2) of the Act, which is stated as follows:  
A qualifying misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if the consumer— 
(a) knew that it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether 
or not it was untrue or misleading, and 
(b) knew that the matter to which the misrepresentation related 
was relevant to the insurer, or did not care whether or not it was 
relevant to the insurer. 
 
Consequently, judging from a circumstance on whether or not it constitutes a 
deliberate misrepresentation will need to exam if the misstatement is untrue or 
misleading, and its relevance to the insurer. The second requirement of 
relevance of knowledge is rather necessary. In practice, unrelated, minor 
matters were being used to avoid the policy for serious illnesses and death.1031  
 
“By knowing that ‘a matter was relevant’, it means that the consumer thinks it is 
something the insurer would want to know.”1032 The second requirement of 
relevance of knowledge is considered to be the most controversial part of this 
test. 1033  The key problem to be concerned is the difficulty as to evidence 
gathering where proposer thought that the non-disclosed information is trivial at 
                                                            
1030 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) paras 6.15-6.16. 
1031 Peter J Tyldesley, ‘Reform at Last’, in Peter J Tyldesley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
Representations and Basis of the Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) at 4.6. 
1032 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.32. 
1033 ibid para 6.21. 
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the time and irrelevant to fairly general questions asked, such as providing 
medical details in the last five years, but regarded as relevant early symptoms 
of complaints by the insurer.1034 Given a certain condition of individuals, whether 
a particular misstatement or non-disclosure is relevant or not might be, in each 
case, a question of fact. For example, a consumer might act unreasonably but 
honestly as he/she was having trouble recognising the matter misrepresented, 
thereby genuinely but incorrectly believed that the answer provided was true.1035 
Nevertheless, where consumers genuinely believe their answer is true would at 
most be considered as being careless regardless whether they put their minds 
to whether it was relevant; the Law Commission suggested a compensatory 
remedy for such circumstance which “aims to put the insurer in the position in 
which it would have been had it know the information”. Conversely, if they 
genuinely thought that the fact was irrelevant, it would be concerned to be 
careless no matter whether or not they put their minds to whether the 
information was true.1036 
 
The reckless category first appeared in April 2003 issue of Ombudsman 
News. 1037  This approach has been “over-enthusiastically” invoked by many 
insurers to label any fault made by assured as “clearly reckless”, entitling them 
to avoid the policy.1038 It was common practice that an insurer exam closely a 
                                                            
1034 ibid para 6.22-6.23. 
1035 ibid para 6.24-6.26. 
1036 ibid para 6.27. 
1037 Issue 27. 
1038 Peter J Tyldesley, ‘Reform at Last’, in Peter J Tyldesley (ed) Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
Representations and Basis of the Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) at 4.6. 
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consumer’s medical records at the point of claim, looking for anything, even a 
minor matter, which could be used to defeat valid claims.1039 Obviously, the 
reckless category was misunderstood and wrongly applied by the insurer.1040 
 
Defining “reckless” is complex. The Law Commission redoubled their efforts in 
exploring a better explanatory method of this term, but continued to be 
undefined and followed the common law approach. Taking a closer look at 
some previous common law approaches, it was held in the early case of Derry v 
Peek 1041  concerning fraudulent misrepresentation, that a consumer acts 
recklessly, if they act without care and regard for the truth of an answer. It was 
argued that the relevant test as to recklessness was that what articulated in 
Fraser v B N Furman (Productions) Ltd,1042 in which Diplock LJ observed: “...it 
must be at least reckless, that is to say, made with actual recognition by the 
insured himself that a danger exists, and not caring whether or not it is 
averted…” It reflects the approach adopted by the ABI in its Code of Practice 
covering misrepresentation and claims in which it defines the concept as acting 
“without any care”. 1043  “In this context, ‘not caring’ is different from act 
‘carelessly’, by not taking sufficient care to check the facts. It requires a lack of 
interest in whether a statement is true, or whether a statement is relevant.”1044 
                                                            
1039 ibid. 
1040 ibid para 4.7. 
1041 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337. 
1042 [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 
1043 ABI Code of Practice, ‘Managing Claims for Individual and Group Life, Critical Illness and Income 
Protection Insurance Products’ (January 2009), para 2.1. 
1044 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.18. 
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Drawing lessons from the approach adopted by the FOS, a misrepresentation 
will be considered to be reckless where it is difficult to believe that the proposer 
could have overlooked a matter which is typically of significance and well known 
to him, but there is not enough evidence to show deliberate 
misrepresentation.1045 On the face of it, proofing of reckless requires a lesser 
test than that of deliberate.1046  
 
“Careless” is deliberately not defined in the Act; alternatively, the Law 
Commission introduced a “blanket solution”, by which it presumptively includes 
all of qualifying misrepresentations that are not deliberate or reckless. The term 
of this category was chosen from variety of labels, namely, “inadvertent” – 
which was employed by the FOS to describe such misrepresentation, but was 
concerned to be too narrow covering only mild carelessness by the Law 
Commission; and “negligence” – which was used in the ABI Code of 
Practice. 1047  The Law Commission, again, expressed their concern as to 
confusion of legal concepts and stated in the report that “the only reason for 
using the term “careless” is to emphasise that this is a new, stand-alone 
category. It is not intended to draw on any existing concepts or case law within 
the law of negligence.”1048  
 
                                                            
1045 J. Summer, Insurance Law and the Financial ombudsman Service (Informa 2013) para 13.46. 
1046 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-36. 
1047 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.55. 
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8.2.4.2 “Deliberate or reckless” misrepresentation: the contract may be 
avoided 
The remedy of avoidance, set out in MIA 1906, s. 20(2), is retained. Under 
schedule 1(2) of CI(DR)A 2012, if the misrepresentation was “deliberate or 
reckless”, the underwriter may be entitled to avoid the contract and refuse all 
claims and retain premiums in most of cases “except to the extent (if any) that it 
would be unfair to the consumer to retain them”. “Avoidance involves a penal 
element, designed to show society’s disapproval of the consumer’s conduct and 
to discourage wrongdoing.”1049 The exception set out in para. 2(b) balances the 
aim of deterring wrongdoing with the need for some flexibility in those cases 
where retaining the premium might be unfair, such as in life insurance policies 
that include an investment element, or joint policies where only one of the 
policyholders has acted fraudulently.1050  
 
Under s. 5(4), the onus is on the insurer to show that a qualifying 
misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, followed by two rebuttable 
presumptions set out in s. 5(5) aiming to smooth the onus of proof and shift the 
burden to the consumer,1051  if it is shown “(a) that the consumer had the 
knowledge of a reasonable consumer, and (b) that the consumer knew that a 
matter about which the insurer asked a clear and specific question was relevant 
to the insurer”. 1052  Accordingly, it is then for the consumer to rebut these 
                                                            
1049 ibid para 6.26. 
1050 bid paras 4.20 & 6.48-6.53. 
1051 ibid para. 6.34. 
1052 CI(DR)A 2012, s. 5(5). 
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presumptions by providing evidence to show that he/she had less knowledge 
than that normally expected, or that he/she had a reasonable ground to believe 
that the issue was irrelevant, despite the clear question.1053 In other words, 
where the fact is obvious and well known to someone in their position, 
consumers would normally be expected to know such matter.    
 
8.2.4.3 “Careless” misrepresentation: a compensatory remedy 
Avoidance is admittedly a harsh remedy, providing too much protection than 
was necessary to the insurer. CI(DR)A 2012 finally introduced the proportionate 
approach into insurance law for consumer contracts, with the purpose of 
establishing a fairer remedy when the draconian threat of avoidance is 
inappropriate. The compensatory remedy now has statutory force under English 
law. This system is akin to that applicable to business insurance.  
 
Accordingly, if a misrepresentation is found to be “careless” the remedy will 
depend on an assessment of the effect of the misrepresentation in compliance 
with the loss to the insurer. If the underwriter would have simply charged a 
higher premium had there been no misrepresentation, the underwriter will be 
entitled to “reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim.”1054 In 
particular: 
• First, no remedy is available for the insurer if the insurer would have 
                                                            
1053 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) paras 6.35-6.37. 
1054 CI(DR)A 2012, sched 1, para 5-8. 
348 
 
entered into the contract on the same terms had it known the truth. This 
follows the common law approach embraced by the case of Pan Atlantic 
Insurance Co v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] All ER 581, in which 
the test of inducement was first espoused.1055  
• Second, if the insurer would not have entered into the consumer 
insurance contract on any term, the insurer may avoid the contract and 
refuse all claims, but must retune the premiums paid (para.5). This 
remedy of avoidance is a “self-help” remedy that does not require the 
sanction of court. However, if it is found that the remedy is wrongfully 
applied, the insurer will face liability in damage to the assured as a result 
of repudiation of contract.1056 
• Third, if the insurer would have entered into the consumer insurance 
contract, but on different terms (excluding terms relating to the premium), 
the contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those 
different terms if the insurer so requires (para.6). If, for instance, the 
insurer would have imposed a warranty or excess in the policy, the claim 
would be treated as if the policy were made on those terms;1057 but if it 
would have included a particular exclusion in the policy but the claim falls 
outside that exclusion, the assured would still be in titled to the claim 
fully.1058 Thereby, this may or may not always serve the insurer in claims 
                                                            
1055 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-37. 
1056 ibid. 
1057 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.59. 
1058 ibid para 6.73. 
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handling process.1059 Additionally, the insurers are required to show not 
only that they would have entered into the contract on different terms; but 
also the specification of those terms.1060 
• Finally, as an additional point to the third possibility, if the insurer would 
have entered into the consumer insurance contract (whether the terms 
relating to matters other than the premium would have been the same or 
different), but would have charged a higher premium, the insurer may 
reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim (para.7). 
Definition of “reduce proportionately” and its methodology is set out in 
para.8, by which the amount of the assured’s claim is reduced 
accordingly. 
 
A careless qualifying misrepresentation will have the effect on the future 
treatment of the policy where the insurer demands continued performance of 
the policy on different terms or with higher premium. In non-life insurance, the 
insurer can choose to treat the contract as subsisting and give the consumer 
notice of the amended terms. The consumer can then choose to accept those 
terms or terminate the contract on reasonable notice. Alternatively, the insurer 
has the option of terminating future cover on reasonable notice. Where the 
contract is wholly or mainly life insurance, however, the insurer will not have the 
option of termination. The contract will continue on amended terms and the 
                                                            
1059 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-37. 
1060 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 6.80. 
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insurer must give the consumer notice. If the contract is terminated by either 
party, the consumer will be entitled to a refund of future premiums. Claims 
arising in the period up to the termination will not be affected. 
 
8.2.5 Basis of Contract Clause 
Common law permits an insurer to include a declaration in an insurance 
proposal form or in a document which refer to proposal form to undertake the 
accuracy or the truth of any pre-contractual statement made to the insurer, 
whereby it converts pre-contractual representation into policy warranties, 
thereby the insurer is discharged from liability for all claims if the statement 
concerning past or present fact was untrue, whether or not it was material or 
induced the insurer to conclude the insurance policy. More importantly, in 
contrast with burden of proofing lack of utmost good faith, there was no need for 
the insurer to prove materiality or inducement, only breach.1061  
 
Clauses of this nature, creating a significant imbalance in the pre-contractual 
burden imposed on consumers, have long been of questionable status in 
relation to consumers. Moreover, the use of “basis of contract clause” is already 
restricted in other jurisdictions, for example, the clause has long been abolished 
in Australia when the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 came into force in 1986. 
Although the ICA 1984, dedicating to strike a fair balance between the assured 
and the insurer, is replaced by the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 
                                                            
1061 R. Merkin & M. Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 2-32. 
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(ICAA 2013), 1062  the s. 24, inheriting from its predecessor, states that “a 
statement made in or in connection with a contract of insurance, being a 
statement made by or attributable to the insured, with respect to the existence 
of a state of affairs does not have effect as a warranty but has effect as though 
it were a statement made to the insurer by the insured during the negotiations 
for the contract but before it was entered into,” whereby the insurer only has 
recourse to the remedies set out in ss. 28-30 of the ICAA 2013.  
 
CI(DR)A 2012, s. 6, rendered basis of contract clause ineffective in consumer 
insurance policies, states as follow: 
(1) This section applies to representations made by a consumer— 
(a) in connection with a proposed consumer insurance contract, or 
(b) in connection with a proposed variation to a consumer 
insurance contract. 
(2) Such a representation is not capable of being converted into a 
warranty by means of any provision of the consumer insurance 
contract (or of the terms of the variation), or of any other contract (and 
whether by declaring the representation to form the basis of the 
contract or otherwise). 
 
The abolition of basis of contract clause brings the law into line with recognised 
good practice. However, it would defeat this provision if insurers included 
                                                            
1062 Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 received Royal Assent on June 28, 2013; and came into 
force on December 28, 2015. 
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specific warranties from the insured as to past or present fact in a proposal form 
or elsewhere. As to contracting out, s. 10 of CI(DR)A 2012 provides that “a term 
of a consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the 
consumer in a worse position ... is to that extent of no effect.” 
 
8.3 Micro-businesses  
As of August 2015, 95 per cent of all businesses in the UK are micro-
enterprises, which make a crucial part of contribution to the economy.1063 
Insurance, as a financial security method, does not seem to be fully functioning 
as to providing efficient safeguard to micro-businesses against financial losses 
at the time of the risk insured occurring. As a matter of fact, in terms of the 
abilities of dealing with money matters, micro-businesses are not necessarily in 
a stronger position than private individuals concerning nature and 
characteristics of businesses of this scale as shown by the study of sample 
cases of the FOS complaints. The FOB Review of Complaints shows that only 
fewer micro-enterprises had legal or accountancy support at the time of the 
events that led to their complaint, either from external professionals or in-house 
expertise. 1064  In accordance with the Review, main reasons for complaint 
involved are rejection or reduction of claims (40 per cent) and mis-sold 
insurance policies and misrepresentation from the insurers (21 per cent).1065 In 
general, more than half of micro-businesses policyholders have trouble 
                                                            
1063 The FOB Review of Complaints: Micro-Enterprises and Financial Services (August 2015) 2, 
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/pdf/Micro-enterprise-complaints-Aug-2015.pdf> 
assessed 9 Dec 2017. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 ibid 21. 
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understanding terms and conditions of insurance contracts as to matters related 
to non-disclosure or misrepresentation particularly; nor do they comprehend the 
consequences of breach those terms.1066  
 
The Law Commission reviewed this issue in their Consultation Paper in July 
20071067 and concluded “less sophisticated businesses needed more protection 
than other enterprises”.1068 Initially the Law Commissions suggested placing 
controls on insurers’ written standard set of terms to prevent insurers giving 
themselves greater rights to avoid claims than under the business insurance 
default regime, if such terms would defeat the insured’s “reasonable 
expectations of cover”.1069 After acknowledging this would introduce too much 
uncertainty over the constitution of standard terms,1070 the Law Commission 
suggested removing micro-businesses from the business regime altogether 
and, for the purpose of retaining uniformity of the law with the rules used by 
FOS, treating them in the same way as consumers within the consumer regime 
for pre-contractual disclosure and representation on the basis that most such 
businesses, if not all, would have no greater understanding of insurance law 
than consumers.1071 However, this plan has been rejected for four reasons: first, 
there was the difficulty of clearly defining a micro-business; second, insurers 
                                                            
1066 ibid 24 
1067 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 2007) 
1068 Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: Should micro-businesses be treated like 
consumers for the purposes of pre-contractual information and unfair terms? (Law Com IP No 5, 2009) 
para 3.1 
1069 ibid para 3.2 
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would have to re-programme their systems to differentiate between micro-
businesses and enterprises that fell outside the definition, incurring additional 
cost; additionally, there was no compelling evidence of systemic problems to be 
found in practice as to micro-businesses non-disclosure and misrepresentation; 
more significantly, Micro-business has already been protected by the FOS, 
under which they are entitled to file complains if they feel that an insurer has 
unfairly turned down a claim for misrepresentation or non-disclosure or if other 
terms of the contract are unfair and obtain consumer-type protection.1072  
 
The process of defining the term “micro-businesses” has been complicated and 
formidable. As early as when it was discussed in the Issues Paper 5, for the 
purposes of pre-contractual information and unfair terms in insurance contract, 
the Law Commission has measured the test with caution in three perceived 
ways: a number-based method, a turnover-based assessment and the FOS 
jurisdiction limit; and ultimately concluded each of the test is considered to be 
problematic in practice. 1073  Although the first two tests, accompanied with 
varying degrees of technical problems on their performance involving staff 
headcount to the employee requirement and susceptibility of exchange rate 
fluctuations plus inaccurate representation of the annual turnover/balance sheet 
at the time of contracting to the annual turnover and balance sheet 
requirements, have not received much support, the third option has attracted 
                                                            
1072 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of 
Warranties (Law Com No 204, 2012) para A.3 
1073 See generally at Law Commission, Reforming Insurance Contract Law: Should micro-businesses be 
treated like consumers for the purposes of pre-contractual information and unfair terms? (Law Com IP No 
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the most attentions, i.e. 80 per cent of consultees responded to this question 
were in favour of the FOS approach as to the definition of micro-businesses.1074 
It is considered in the following paragraphs.  
 
As a result of the implementation of the Payment Services Directive, the FOS 
has adopted the general European definition of a micro-enterprise as set out by 
the Commission of the European Communities1075, namely, micro-business is 
businesses which employ fewer than ten staff and have an annual turnover or 
balance sheet that does not exceed two million euros.1076 In this definition, the 
term “enterprise” means any person engaged in an economic activity, 
irrespective of its legal form and includes, in particular, self-employed persons 
and family businesses engaged in craft or other activities, and partnerships or 
associations regularly engaged in an economic activity. 1077  In determining 
whether an enterprise meets the tests for being a micro-enterprise, account 
should also be taken to the enterprise’s ‘partner enterprises’ or ‘linked 
enterprises’.1078 In such circumstances, staff headcount and financial details of 
partner/linked enterprises must be added to those of the enterprises to 
determine if the business falls within the definition of micro-businesses.1079 For 
example, where a parent company holds a majority shareholding or exercise 
                                                            
1074 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of 
Warranties (Law Com No 204, 2012) paras A.31, A.36-49. 
1075 In the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
1076 Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, art. 2(3) Annex. 
1077 Payment Services Directive, art. 4(26); Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, art. 1 Annex. 
1078 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of 
Warranties (Law Com No 204, 2012) para A.50. 
1079 ibid paras A.55-59. 
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dominant influence in a complainant, if the parent company does not meet the 
tests for being a micro-enterprise then neither will the complainant.1080 It has 
proved that, “under the above rules, determining the status of a business will be 
no simple task, with the risk of creating uncertainty for both insurers and 
insureds”.1081  
 
Defining micro-businesses has encountered great difficulty. Alternatively, the 
Law Commission considered having a stab at specification of sole traders and 
small partnerships consisting of two natural partners with unlimited liability and 
found out that it will put such businesses in a discomfiture dilemma. 1082 
Following a long and careful analysis, the Law Commission eventually decided 
not to propose to conduct special treatments for micro-businesses at this 
stage.1083 Nevertheless, nothing will prevent micro-enterprises seeking for more 
remedies from the FOS where it is necessary.  
 
8.4 Alternatives to law reform 
On December 3, 1980, the Guardian Royal Exchange (GRE) first abandoned 
the use of duty of disclosure and that of basis of the contract clauses in non-life 
insurances,1084 which initiated a new journey for consumer insurance. One year 
later, the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (IOB), replaced by the Financial 
                                                            
1080 ibid para A.57(1). 
1081 ibid para A.60. 
1082 ibid paras A. 72-73. 
1083 ibid para A.126. 
1084 Peter J Tyldesley, ‘Reform at Last’, in Peter J Tyldesley (ed), Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
Representations and Basis of the Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) at 2.40. 
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Ombudsman Service (FOS) in 2001, commenced operations as a substitute for 
law reform1085 resolving consumer disputes by reference to “good insurance 
practice” rather than legal principle. The FOS, strongly influenced by the IOB, 
was set up under the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 in 2001, by which 
the ombudsman is obliged to make decisions fairly and reasonably under the 
compulsory jurisdiction. Over the years, the FOS developed a framework to 
resolve consumer disputes. 
 
The insurance industry also set up series of guidelines and codes to mitigate 
the harshness of the law and overcome problematic issues in the reported 
areas of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The first self-regulatory code: the 
Statement of General Insurance Practice, promising fair treatment to 
consumers, was promulgated by the British Insurance Association1086 in return 
for an exemption from key provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
The Statement of Practice was not legally binding. The terms of the Statement 
were not particularly robust, compliance was not monitored and until the advent 
of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau there was no route by which a consumer 
could enforce the rights they supposedly gave. 1087  The Statement was 
subsequently amended and strengthened in 19861088 and continued in use until 
the adoption of statutory regulations for general insurers: the Insurance 
                                                            
1085 Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty 
by the Insured (Law Com CP No 182, 2007) para 1.21. 
1086 The British Insurance Association represents insurance industry in Britain until 1985, and the 
Association of British Insurers thereafter. 
1087 Peter J Tyldesley, ‘Reform at Last’, in Peter J Tyldesley (ed) Consumer Insurance Law: Disclosure, 
Representations and Basis of the Contract Clauses (Bloomsbury 2013) at 2.16. 
1088 Law Commission, Consumer Insurance Law: Pre-contract Disclosure and Misrepresentation (Law 
Com No 319, 2009) para 2.31. 
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Conduct-of-Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) issued by the Financial Service 
Authority (FSA) in 2005, in which it requires an insurer to pay a claim in a case 
of innocent misrepresentation.1089 ICOBS, was developed to redress the balance 
of the legal requirement upon the insured to disclose information to the insurer 
and to ensure consumer protection, requiring insurers, or those acting for them, 
to inform their customers of clear and fair information when selling insurance 
products. Practically, it is noteworthy that, for the insurance sector, the conduct 
rules in ICOBS and COBS differ, so the first challenge is to identify whether to 
apply COBS or ICOBS in relation to a particular circumstance. Now ICOBS has 
followed and largely amended in consistence with CI(DR)A 2012. 
 
The Financial Services Act 2012(FSA 2012), under which the function of the 
Financial Services Authority is divided between the Bank of England (BoE), a 
new Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA – a new subsidiary of BoE) and a 
new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 1090  received Royal Assent on 19 
December 2012, from which a new financial regulation framework is operative 
in the UK. By replacing the FSA with the FCA and PRA, the FSA 2012 clarified 
the focus and supervisory power of these two new regulators. With introduction 
of a much stricter and more intrusive regulatory structure, the FCA has been 
awarded new product intervention powers and its investigatory powers has also 
been intensified. 1091  In accordance with the FSA 2012 insurers are dual-
                                                            
1089 ICOBS 8, for the full terms of the ICOBS go to: www.fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ICOBS  
1090 FSA 2012, s. 2(3), the PRA and the FCA are the corporate successor to the FSA. 
1091 See s. 6 of FSA 2012, chapters 1 and 2 for details. 
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regulated by two independent groups for conduct and prudential issues. In 
contrast, insurance intermediaries are only regulated by the FCA for both 
prudential and conduct purposes as those firms that do not carry out PRA-
regulated activities. The PRA, as the name suggested, is taking responsibilities 
and statutory objectives to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-
authorised persons. In respect of regulating insurers, the PRA has an insurance 
objective: to contribution to securing an appropriate degree of protection for 
policyholders against unreasonable insurers.  
 
The FSA 2012, with approaches of a high-level principle-based regulation 
focusing on high quality consumer outcomes to ensure fair treatment of 
customers, shifted emphasis away from the light touch rule-based regulation. 
Principles for Businesses (PRIN) include explicit and implicit guidance on the 
fair treatment of customers, which is a fundamental concept that FCA inherited 
from its predecessor, the FSA, applicable to all firms at all stages of a product 
life-cycle, no matter wholesale or retail.1092 Since the decision of the court in 
British Bankers Association v Financial Services Authority and Financial 
Ombudsman Service,1093 the regulator is able to enforce a breach of a principle. 
 
Essentially, Principle 6 requires that firms regulated by the FCA must pay 
general intention to the interests of customers and treat them fairly,1094 meaning 
                                                            
1092 Principles for Businesses, FCA Handbook. 
1093 [2001] EWHC 999. 
1094 FCA: Treating Customers Fairly-essentials, Lexis PSL Financial Services view topics, see 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/financialservices/document/393814/59JC-1WG1-F18F-P23M-
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firms should “place the consumer at the heart of its business”1095 and must not 
place its own commercial interests in higher priority to the requirement to treat 
customers fairly,1096 failure to do so will result to enforcement action being taken 
by the FCA for breach, e.g. negative publicity, fines, withdrawal of the firm’s 
regulatory authorization etc.1097 If the detriment of the consumer is found, then 
the FCA will expect appropriate redress to be paid to the consumer by the firm. 
The Financial Ombudsman Service oversees cases where problems cannot be 
settled between customers and firms. As part of its work it takes account of 
whether firms have paid due regard to the interest of customers and treated 
them fairly (Principle 6). The FOS will also take into account all the other FCA 
rules guidance and standards to decide what is fair and reasonable. 
 
For example, in contrast with the approach eventually adopted in the CI(DR)A 
2012, the FSA rules do not require insurers to ask question about those matters 
which are generally found to be material.  
 
Neither of these mechanisms produces new legal precedents. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
00000-00/FCA%3A-Treating-Customers-Fairly—essentials> assessed 10 Dec 2017 
1095 Swinton Group Ltd was fined £7.38 million for mis-selling monthly add-on insurance policies, see FCA 
press release at <http://www.fca.org.uk/news/firms/swinton-group-fine-mis-selling-add-on-insurance-
policies> assessed 10 Dec 1027 
1096 Clydesdale Bank was fined £8.9 million for failing to treat its mortgage customers fairly, see FCA press 
release at <http://www.fca.org.uk/news/clydesdale-bank-fined-89-million> assessed 10 Dec 2017 
1097 Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual, FCA Handbook, DEPP 6 
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